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CATHOLICS POLLED ON ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR ARMS, NATO

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 29 Oct 82 pp 15-17

[Report by Ton Oostveen: "Bishops on Nuclear Arms: Speak Out or Remain Silent?"; passages in slantlines printed in italics or boldface./

[Text] About 40,000 Dutch catholics have informed their bishops individually or in groups whether they are in favor of or against nuclear disarmament. The score: 50/50 in individual reactions; in groups, about 6 out of 7 were in favor. Arguments of faith turned out to be scarce. A difficult dilemma for the bishops: /speak out or be silent?/

The following dilemma was presented to the 11 roman catholic bishops of the Netherlands by /two/ of their 5,617,000 beloved faithful:

/Being religious without politics is the same as playing football without touching the ball./

/Primarily this political involvement causes respect for the church to decline and causes its credibility in preaching the gospel to suffer./

Must the bishops take a stand with regard to the nuclear arms question and in particular with regard to unilateral disarmament? Of the 444 persons and groups who expressed their opinion on this, half says /yes/ and one fifth /no/. Thus speak out? But to say what?

IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] Sows Discord

Since 1977 the Interchurch Peace Council, in which the catholic church collaborates with eight other ecclesiastical communities, has been sowing discord in religious Netherlands by giving the striving for peace generally aspired to an extremely concrete content: /Nuclear Arms Out of the World, Starting with the Netherlands./ With that strongly worded position the IKV changed the /soft/ environment of religious peacefulness for the /hard/ political discussion: friends were mobilized, but enemies even more so. In that polarization, the church leaderships saw themselves one by one confronted with the demand to clarify whether the IKV was still representing the churches.

Although in this country the /Dutch Reformed Church/ was practically the first which pushed the nuclear arms question under the nose of its members, the /Roman Catholic Church/ also followed suit. Following the examples of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI, who vigorously condemned the arms race, the Dutch Bishops published a pastoral letter in January 1976 in which they threw out a feeler on the possibility of "unilateral steps in the area of arms control and arms limitation."

The bishops were of the opinion that such steps would have to be both compatible with a "lawful and efficient protection of our own security" and simultaneously "(would have to) contain an invitation for a positive reaction, which is necessary for true disarmament."

That little bishops' feeler was picked up by the IKV, elaborated into the fiercely controversial IKV slogan and thus utilized to separate the hawks and the doves in religious Netherlands. At least, that's what it started to look like. A sort of faith struggle originated: advocates of unilateral disarmament appeared to want to put the entire bible at the service of their choice, and opponents were put in the corner of the not-too-serious faithful. Thus it was no wonder that gradually many people wanted to find out from their ecclesiastical authorities if, and to what extent, they actually backed the "pushers" of the IKV.

Faith or Politics

The bishops have managed fairly well to delay the answering of that question for a considerable period of time, but they have not been able to avoid it. Their problem indeed was not trivial: was this a matter of /a question of faith/, in which bishops ought to consider themselves competent, or a /political/ question, so that their opinion possibly would not carry any more weight than that of the average voter?

Furthermore, the bishops could not be blind to the political power arenas in this country: most of the catholics support the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and that party doesn't stand out for friendly feelings toward the IKV. Many are of the opinion that that was the reason why the bishops let two elections pass ('81 and '82) before publicly announcing their standpoint.

In February 1981 the bishop decided to consult with their religious community on the stand to take. No matter how praiseworthy that step was, it was highly unusual, to say the least. In the catholic church there is no democracy; in matters of faith the pope and the bishops make the decisions. Irritated catholics therefore wondered why the bishops did not listen to their following in the matter of abortion, but did indeed listen in that of disarmament. It seemed as if the bishops did not consider the IKV discussion to be so much a matter of faith. But then: why a consultation and why a pronouncement on it later on? Then why wasn't the entire matter put on the politicians' plate where it belongs as a political /issue/?

Although there is thus definitely something unstable about the approach of the bishops, many still find their cautiousness in the nuclear arms issue a merit which would also suit them well in other matters (celibacy, women in [religious] service, marriage morality, etc.). Now the impression exists that the bishops

are not divided on ecclesiastical hot potatoes but that they are divided on political questions. And that seems to be correct: in particular Bishops Gijzen and Bar excelled in their clarity in disavowing the IKV. Bishop Ernst, on the other hand, has aligned himself behind the IKV slogan through the catholic peace movement Pax Christi of which he is the chairman.

When Cardinal Willebrands, on behalf of the bishops, submitted the nuclear arms dilemma for advice to the Dutch catholics in February 1981, he carefully took as a starting point the bishops' position of 1976 on the possibility of unilateral steps. Would that be possible under the conditions mentioned at that time (secure and yet inviting)? If yes, why? If no, why not?

Unilateral Steps?

The cardinal further posed questions on the significance of the NATO membership, on the possibility for a small country to take unilateral steps of its own accord, on the IKV approach and on possible alternatives for reducing nuclear arms.

The cardinal wanted to know from opponents of unilateral steps what possibilities they saw to ward off the danger of a nuclear war and whether they consider the possession of nuclear arms morally justified or not.

One would short-change the letter of the cardinal if in answering the questions one were not aware that they had been preceded by biblical references to Jesus as the bringer of peace and to one's duty of being conciliatory toward the enemy. Nevertheless, biblical-theological arguments do not seem to have played an important role for most of the responders of the letter.

The bishops received 2217 responses: 1180 from individuals, 1037 from groups. The size of the group was not always known (for example, on behalf of how many people did the KRO [Catholic Broadcasting Association] answer? However, an estimated 40,000 people answered the bishops' questions -- thus less than 1½ percent of the registered catholics.

The 2217 reactions covered an average of two typewritten pages. They have now been analyzed by the KASKI, the Catholic Institute for Social Scientific Research in The Hague. The researchers of the material were faced with an extremely difficult task: there was no /system/ in all those answers; some were full of emotions, others were pleading their individual causes, and yet others avoided the actual questions asked.

Confusion and Tedious Diligence

But those questions prompted those answers according to KASKI which establishes that some questions "unfortunately do not meet important socio-scientific criteria" and sometimes "the terminology used in some questions is suggestive or leading."

The /confusion/. as we might well call it, was systemized very tediously in order to still be able to come up with quantitative results. Those results, in

all of their relativity, offer the following picture:

1. Of the /individuals/ who sent in a reply, 501 turned out to be in favor of, and 510 against, unilateral disarmament steps (under the conditions of security and an invitational character).
2. Of the /groups/, 623 where completely or by a large majority in favor, and 110 were completely or by a large majority against such steps.
3. 444 Answers came in on the /unasked/ question of whether the bishops ought to have a say in the matter of nuclear arms. Of the persons who expressed themselves on this, 40.8 percent said /speak out/ and 28.2 percent /remain silent/. In the groups, 55.5 percent was in favor of speaking out and 8.8 percent in favor of not speaking up.
4. Only a little over 17 percent of all the reactions contained a stand on the IKV. Among individuals there were 88 opponents and 85 supporters of the IKV. Among groups, the IKV scored 67 positive and 34 negative reactions.
5. The bible and faith played a very small role in the positions taken. The 501 individual supporters of unilateral disarmament submitted 1498 arguments, of which only 155 were derived from the bible or theology. The 510 opponents came up with 1395 arguments of which 35 involved faith. The groups which opted for unilateral steps had derived about 40 percent of the submitted arguments from faith; the groups against unilateral steps put only four arguments of faith on paper.

With this, the quantitative result of the "broad religious discussion" has certainly been given. The number of reactions, suggestions or alternatives of another nature were so small in number and, actually, so divided, that numbers don't mean much. But obviously the discussion called forth by the bishops was not intended merely to count noses. One argument does not equal the other.

Deeper Discussion

The KASKI (justly) does not discuss the /force/ of the arguments. For that reason a lot of work remains for the bishops to do if they would really want to graft their definitive judgment onto the quality of the arguments put forward. For that matter: the bishops' judgment will certainly not be very /definitive/. The secretary-general of the roman catholic ecclesiastical province, Dr H.A. van Munster, explains that in a letter accompanying the KASKI report:

/"The bishops will not (therein) deem themselves obliged to repeat what has come out in the discussion. They will attempt to arrive at their own judgment in this complex material. The data of the consultation will, however, be of great value in linking the considerations of the bishops to the concerns, expectations and insights of those who have replied, so that a deeper religious discussion will be possible. In that manner one may avoid the taking of standpoints -- as too often happens in the nuclear armament discussion -- which later on one cannot or will not abandon."/

Unburdening Responses

Although KASKI thus does not weigh the arguments, the reporters do indeed treat us to a number of outpourings from the many letters. Few new insights turn up, however: the /dialogue of the deaf/ does not seem to be pierced. It might be interesting, however, to quote a number of those responses here.

On the /usefulness/ of the discussion:

/"The bigwigs make all the decisions."/

/"Good that the bishops are taking these initiatives. Perhaps the youth will also take an interest in the church again."/

A number of reactions say that it is "characteristic of the general confusion" that the bishops consult their church members on nuclear armament. /"Where was the church when the discussion on abortion was so intense?"/

A number of people warn against the bishops using their /spiritual/ authority to give strength to their /political/ views. They are called "neither competent nor responsible" with respect to national defense and [their involvement] might "turn co-believers into heretics."

On the IKV and Pax Christi:

/"The surest way to a nuclear war is the way now advocated by the IKV and Pax Christi (. . .)"/

/"The IKV is acting as a sort of fifth column in order to prepare the way for communist domination (. . .)"/

/"Moscow is behind it, and with quite a lot of money. The IKV finances all sorts of subversive activities with that blood money (. . .)"/

As to remarks such as these, KASKI notes that in individual reactions the IKV is depicted primarily as a receptacle of pushy doomsayers or atheists trained by Moscow who barter their church and faith with a Judas kiss. In groups, this reaction appears to be the result of serious discussion, resulting in more nuanced and less emotional standpoints.

For that matter, the IKV may also note reactions such as the following: /"With this campaign (of the IKV), people can give their all to their belief in, and hope for, a meaningful existence in spite of sin and deficiencies."/

Of the alternatives to unilateral steps or IKV campaigns proposed in the reactions, prayer scored the highest: it is mentioned 82 times. Mobilizing public opinion is mentioned 72 times, although one may wonder what else the peace movements and now also the bishops are actually doing right now! On prayer:

/"It would be more praiseworthy to preach a prayer crusade in the churches in order to have the enormous threat which is hanging over the world removed by HIM, who can do it."/

/"One prays too little; Maria already said that at Fatima."/

On Public Opinion

/"In this context it is necessary to firmly mobilize "the common people" -- if necessary for many years."/

On "The Enemy"

/"Learn Russian, Polish, Czech; visit the country as a tourist and try to establish contact with the common people."/

On the task of Christianity:

/"To cultivate a human race which unconditionally obeys the two commandments which Jesus Christ called the most important."/

On the Defense Budget:

/"One should free up the money which is being spent on this arms race for the economy of 'the weak', in particular in nations which are among our so-called 'enemies.'"/

In Summary:

/"Only sane intelligence can bring the solution."/

The Imitation Motive

Although numerous other serious, though seldom new, arguments can be quoted for or against unilateral steps, it might be good to conclude this summary with arguments which typically sprout forth from faith, since that is the area in which the church can claim a certain competency.

Most often the /imitation motive/ is encountered. One sees in Jesus Christ someone who abandons any position of dominance. The point of departure of human action in the Christian sense would be: /"not to make yourself look bigger than someone else."/ And such human action also should be given a political interpretation.

Someone opts for unilateral steps /"because -- if you like -- I prefer to be a martyr rather than a murderer."/

And especially: the creation must be preserved: /"The use and possession of nuclear arms runs directly counter to the command of the Creator to make the earth 'habitable.'"/

For that reason some people prefer to be "red rather than dead."

/"I'd rather have a communist Soviet over me than a nuclear time bomb under me."/

After all this, one is tempted to say: Bishops, go ahead. In the response to the most important question there is a 50/50 score in individual reactions: a large majority of the groups opt for unilateral steps; opinions on secondary matters are absolutely divided; there is no mention of new political-military-economic standpoints; in the only area in which a church could speak with authority there is a scarce return of arguments. Apparently the nuclear arms issue is seen by many more people as a purely political rather than as a religious matter.

Opponents of the (christian) peace movement thus may smile contentedly about these results and return the nuclear arms dilemma to the area where it exclusively belongs in their view: the political platform.

Remain Silent?

Supporters of the (christian) peace movement will have to ask themselves to what extent they have absolutely failed to clarify that the bible and theology in their view unavoidably lead to the vulnerable policy of unilateral disarmament. They have indeed always /proclaimed/ that it is so, but they do not seem to have succeeded in convincing many people. Supporters of the peace movement more often come up with political and military arguments also than with arguments of faith.

And the bishops? They are "preachers" by profession and calling. But they ought to have something to preach about! If they can speak preachingly, thus from within the bible, on the nuclear arms dilemma, they should certainly do so. But if in their view it may freeze or thaw with respect to the bible, so that only a political difference of opinion remains, then, for god's sake, let them /remain silent/.

[Box p 16]

Catholics on NATO

In the letter with which they started off the nuclear arms discussion in the roman catholic circle, the bishops also asked a question with respect to the significance of NATO. Hereunder /in percentages/ follow the standpoints taken by individuals and groups in favor of the possibilities mentioned in this small sample.

Attitude toward NATO	individuals	groups
Full support	12.8	3.7
Conform to the majority in NATO, critically	14.5	7
Critical minority standpoint in NATO	22.7	23.9
Potential non-member or opposition member	3.6	3.8
Leave NATO	1.1	0.4
Divided		17.5
No opinion	45.3	43.7

(The KASKI report NUCLEAR ARMS can be ordered from the Secretariat of the Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Community, P.O.Box 13049, 3507 LA, Utrecht; price fl. 7.50 plus postage)

BASQUE INDUSTRIALIST'S PLAN TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Announces Plan

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 18 Nov 82 p 17

[Article by Jose Luis Barberia]

[Text] "This whole business of street demonstrations and judgment communiques by the terrorists is something already behind us; it is all useless. What we need now are more drastic solutions, even if they lead to potentially dramatic situations," said Luis Olarra, president of the General Confederation of Vizcayan Businessmen [CGEV], who spoke to EL PAIS yesterday after announcing a "direct action" plan against terrorism apparently developed by more than a hundred Basque businessmen.

Luis Olarra, who represents the "hard-line" segment of the Basque business community, did not discount the use of violence as one more resource of this project which, according to Olarra, would be put into effect gradually by means of increasingly hard-line actions and policies.

Such a plan would have two different orientations: on the one hand to pressure the government and public agencies to formulate decisive plans against terrorists and the political groups that support them; and on the other hand direct action by businessmen along these same lines. Olarra refused to specify the types of direct action and pressure included in the supposed plan, although he clearly implied that the business sector might stop all industrial activity at its plants in response to a terrorist attack. "We are going to put an end to terrorism," said Olarra, and then added immediately: "Those who commit violent acts or justify violence will not continue to go unpunished."

In Olarra's judgment, it is unacceptable for political groups who favor violence to be allowed to develop a political practice and even include elected parliamentary representatives. Alluding to Perico Solabarria, the Basque deputy for Herri Batasuna, [Popular Unity] Olarra specified: "We are not going to allow individuals who have declared that when the ETA assassinates businessmen they are ridding this country of mafiosos to walk the streets with impunity."

The president of the CGEV indicated that the antiterrorism plan, which he described as serious, methodical, consistent, and well thought-out, falls within the bounds of the law, while affirming that social groups and organizations will end by supporting it, so that businessmen and the government will act jointly for once. "This is an old project that has finally come to life. We are making connections with businessmen from Vizcaya and the other Basque provinces, and many of them, more than 50, are actually participating in the formulation of this project." Olarra pointed out that the antiterrorism plan does not represent the sole initiative of the organization he heads.

Direct Confrontation

Efforts by EL PAIS to collect reactions by various business organizations of the Basque Country to these declarations were unsuccessful yesterday. The president of the CGEV has been the victim of several kidnaping attempts by commandos of the ETA's military branch, and he has been known in recent years for his forceful statements and his explicit threats against terrorist organizations. Olarra's political tactics, which seek direct confrontation and use threats as a weapon, have made him the most significant representative of the hard-line segment of the Basque business community. At the same time, they have provoked a reaction against his position by part of the Basque business sector and spokesmen of the Euskadi government.

The project Olarra has just made public is probably something that he himself thought of years ago. Members of ETA circles in the French Basque Country remember a document which Olarra himself supposedly sent to presumed leaders of the ETA in which he threatened them with death if he or his family should suffer any attack. According to these sources, Olarra said in this document that in case of attack, mafia elements would counterattack specific leaders of the ETA's military branch.

On the other hand, the Orbegozo family's spokesman yesterday declined comment on declarations by Olarra, who has served threatening notice on those who are holding the businessman from Guipuzcoa. This same spokesman denied a report published yesterday by a Basque Country source which said that the kidnaped businessman had acceded many years ago to ETA blackmail and had been paying the so-called revolutionary tax. The Orbegozo family continues to await contact with the kidnapers, whose identity is still unknown, although some reports attribute to Delegate Ballesteros, head of the Anti-Terrorist Command, the opinion that the perpetrators of the kidnaping may be members of the Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos. Students of the Iparraguirre secondary school have publicly expressed their protest against the kidnaping, while demanding the immediate release of Saturnino Orbegozo.

"Olarra May Not Create Parallel Channels"

When the Basque government was consulted on the announced plan, the Interior Department councillor, Luis Retolaza, declared, "If Luis Olarra is preparing a plan for antiterrorist action on his own, he will have to contend with the

minister of the interior, which is the office that has a serious plan for the struggle against violence." According to our correspondent in Vitoria, Tonia Etxarri, this representative of the Basque government, speaking as if calling for a return to common sense and respect for law and order, said that "No one may create channels parallel to those of the legal establishment. We cannot allow the creation of forces similar to the "somaten," he said; that would be antidemocratic."

The acknowledgement by the reknowned Vizcayan businessman Luis Olarra of the existence of the preconceived plan to eradicate violence--perhaps by applying the biblical phrase "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"--provoked an immediate reaction from the head of the interior department of the Basque government who did not hide his preoccupation in face of the danger that "some businessmen may take the law into their own hands."

In the opinion of this Basque councillor, it is the Ministry of the Interior that has a real plan against terrorism. "It is another matter if the plan has not had the success we would all desire, because it is very difficult to eradicate violence, here as elsewhere." Retolaza describes Olarra's call for a serious plan as "pure demagoguery. He makes it sound as if, up to now, agencies more capable, more technically sophisticated, and more professional than the business sector have taken the struggle against terrorism as a kind of joke."

After pointing out the importance of every effort against violence being legal and democratic, the representative of the Basque government's interior department declared, "If Luis Olarra were in Italy, a country so sorely afflicted with the problem of terrorism, he would no doubt have created his own army by now."

With respect to the campaign carried out over the last several months by the Basque Nationalist Party [PNV] against payment of the "revolutionary tax," the interior department's representative acknowledged that "little by little, the population is learning the importance of standing up to terrorism through the unity and strength of all." In this sense it is worth remembering that after the PNV, in its extraordinary session held last May, issued a special call for its own members not to pay the "revolutionary tax," to the point of threatening expulsion of anyone who did so, a number of municipal juntas of the party have come out in public statements against payment of the so-called tax.

Meets With Criticism

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Nov 82 p 19

[Article by Patxo Unzueta]

[Text] Industrialist Luis Olarra yesterday confirmed the existence of "a plan now under study by businessmen of the Basque Country to stand up to terrorism," but he modified his statement by saying that the actions being

studied "will not be sudden or spontaneous, or the fruit of the moment's wrath, but well-planned and coordinated with the authorities, without stepping outside the constitutional framework." These modifications failed to satisfy labor unions or Basque politicians, who expressed concern over what they considered "a very dangerous plan that might lead to an uncontrolled escalation of private violence."

In statements made to the RTVE's [Spanish TV] national center in Bilbao, Olarra, currently president of the CGEV, royal senator in the 1977 legislature, and Statutory Union [UF] candidate for Congress in 1979 in coalition with the AP [Popular Alliance], insisted on the determination of the segment of the business community over which he exercises influence to "prevent the indefinite extension of current passivity in the face of terrorist attacks, and the impunity of those who carry out such attacks and blackmail, as well as those who support them and even publicly flaunt their support."

Concerning the type of measures this action plan might specify, Olarra limited himself to saying that "there will be progressive, step-graded initiatives, in accordance with the nature of acts committed by the terrorists and the attitude taken by the government toward such acts." He reaffirmed that, in any case, "we will do nothing anti-constitutional," and expressed his hope that the measures taken would "contribute to creating a climate of social awareness against terrorism." In conclusion, he said, "The fact is that given the two options open to the business community, which are either to leave the Basque Country or face up to terrorism, we have chosen the latter."

Although sources close to Olarra assured reporters yesterday that "numerous businessmen, especially from the province of Guipuzcoa, have gotten in touch with the authors of this new campaign against terrorism, offering their cooperation and taking an interest in the plan," the Adegui business association, which embraces a large majority of Guipuzcoa's businessmen, yesterday issued a strong statement against Olarra's announcement.

Rejection by Adegui

Jose Maria Vizcaino, president of Adegui and recently chosen businessman of the year, said that violence, kidnappings, and terrorist blackmail are not directed exclusively against the business community, but also against other social sectors, including the military, a group which in his opinion is suffering worse than anyone from the terrorist plague. "When we who observe the Constitution ask the military not to fall into the trap laid by the terrorists, it would be a grave matter for civilian organizations to fall into that same trap," pointed out Vizcaino.

While emphasizing that Basque businessmen have all been sharing the same feelings of helplessness and isolation for some time now, the industrialist from Guipuzcoa said that it is precisely the selection of methods to solve

these serious problems which separates him profoundly from the position taken by Luis Olarra. "I believe," specified the president of Adegui, "that any solution must emerge from respect for the rules of the game in our democratic society and respect for the law, in which many of us believe and which we work to build, no matter how difficult it may sometimes seem to exercise it." Vizcaino said he was sure that a large majority of the Basque business community would reject the attitude of "taking the law into its own hands," since in his opinion "to use the methods and strategies which we specifically oppose would be to fall into a trap."

One of the basic tasks we must share with other organizations is to continue to raise public awareness that violent acts do not affect businessmen only, for their repercussions exact a price from the society at large. "This is why," added Vizcaino, "the struggle on this field of action is a collective enterprise of the central government, the parliaments, businessmen, workers, and really of the reaction of our whole society."

Javier Hernandez Bilbao, secretary general of the Vizcayan Business Center [CEV] (an organization that competes with the Confederation headed by Olarra for representation of the business community of Vizcaya and which is particularly influential in the steel industry), said that "since the foundation of the Center in 1898 we have seen all sorts of political regimes, and we have always been noted for our submission to the reigning system of law, while we have always been guided exclusively by the defense of our business interests, outside of any partisan consideration. For this very reason, we are against acts that attempt to put the burden of responsibility on business's shoulders for matters that pertain to the public authorities, especially if such acts are proposed in a dubiously legal manner, as appears to be the case here."

As far as the labor unions are concerned, ELA-STV [Solidarity of Basque Workers] kept to its traditional position of "not commenting at all on matters that do not concern us directly," while David Morin, secretary general of the CC OO [Workers Commissions] of Vizcaya, was of the opinion that "while on the one hand it is positive that businessmen are determined to stand up to terrorist blackmail and refuse to pay the 'revolutionary tax,' it is negative, on the other hand, that any one sector should attempt to assume the responsibility for representing all society and take measures into its own hands. The isolation of terrorism will happen only as a result of joint action by all social sectors within the framework of constitutional legality, and not of irresponsible, adventurist initiatives that lead no one knows where."

Ramon Jauregui, secretary general of the Basque Country's UGT [General Workers Union], declared that any operation in the struggle against terrorism "must be circumscribed within the realm of law." The union leader specified that businessman Luis Olarra's announcement of the creation of a serious plan against violence revealed "a certain margin of distrust toward the new socialist government," according to a report from Vitoria by correspondent Tonia Etxarri.

After remarking that the business sector, "in its capacity as social agents and as victims of terrorism, must take a greater part in the struggle against violence," Ramon Jauregui placed special emphasis on the need for all social sectors, through debate and mobilization for action, to render themselves capable of putting a stop to the terrorist phenomenon that is afflicting the autonomous Basque community. In this sense, he described as "useless, because they are counterproductive," actions that fail to incorporate the popular masses. "These are isolated acts by a businessman that may have important economic repercussions, but that have no social efficacy whatsoever."

9839

CSO: 3548/39

BRIEFS

NEW NORTH SEA EXPLORATIONS--The Danish Underground Consortium will once more seek to find ways of winning more oil from Denmark's theoretically largest oil field, the Dan Field. This will be done, in the first place, by having the Mærsk Explorer make new explorations in the oldest Danish oil field, which contains 200 million tons of oil, only a fraction of which may be won. The main purpose of the exploration is to provide new information on the field. Information which, combined with new know-how and technology, may possibly raise the percentage of oil winning from the now expected 8 percent in the dense lime layer in the field. The new exploratory drillings will be undertaken after the Mærsk Explorer has completed its exploratory drilling Emma 1, 12 kilometers east of the Dan Field. The said exploration did not yield any oil. The Dan Field has, time and again, been explored in the hope of winning more oil from what is described as the densest lime layer in the North Sea. The Gorm Field, which contains a little more than 100 million tons, is thus expected to produce up to 12 percent of this oil, and that even at a considerably faster rate. But also this percentage is low in the North Sea context. In the Norwegian and British fields, the oil winning percentages are between 20 and 40. [Text] Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Dec 82 p 7] 7262

CSO: 3613/31

BRIEFS

INCREASED FUEL USE BY FISHERMEN--Oil consumption by the Icelandic fishing fleet now amounts to around 195 million liters a year, a 50 percent increase over 1972 when oil use was around 130 million liters. There are now 100 Icelandic stern trawlers and their numbers have increased rapidly since the beginning of the last decade when the first arrived in Iceland. This increase in the number of trawlers and likewise the emphasis on trawler fishing is the most important reason for the greatly increased oil consumption. This was clear from economist Agust Einarsson's lecture on energy conservation policy given yesterday before the National Association of Fisheries Outfitters. Einarsson also said that, in spite of the great increase, oil consumption had increased less than the increase in horsepower for the same period. He also noted that during the years 1969 to 1972 the proportion of oil costs of total catch value was rather constant, or 8 to 10 percent. During the years 1974 to 1975 the proportion increased to 22 percent in terms of the unsupported oil cost. In 1976 the proportion was around 18 percent and was extremely stable until 1979 when the second oil shock occurred. The present proportion, according to Einarsson, is 21 percent of total revenue in terms of the unsupported oil cost. Thus oil costs have improved by 15 percent, trawlers have decreased by 25 percent and their sizes by 27 percent. Every fourth or fifth fish taken out of the sea, in other words, goes to pay for oil. /Text/ /Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 82 p 2/ 9857

CSO: 3626/16

ENERGY MINISTER URGES MORE USE OF WATER POWER, DISTRICT HEAT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 32

[Article by Bjorn Jerkert]

[Text] "We must not go from a dependency on oil to one on coal."

That is what Ulf Dahlsten, state secretary in the Ministry of Energy, said yesterday at a conference on energy in Stockholm.

"Consequently," he said, "the government is, among other things, hoping for much from the heat pump."

The government will take special measures in energy questions in the metropolitan areas. Next week politicians from Stockholm, Goteborg and Malmo will have a meeting with the ministers of energy, Birgitta Dahl (Soc).

Dahlsten is of the opinion that many years have been lost in regard to water power. Production will be increased from 62 to 66 terawatt hours. He also advocated quick and forceful measures in the energy field, among other things, in district heat.

He believes it can provide up to 40 percent of the heating requirements.

The government will cooperate with the municipalities in expanding thermal power plants, installations for burning peat and heat pumps. Seven hundred million kronor is being appropriated for a central purchasing commission. The expansion will take place with help from Swedish industry.

Critical of South Gas Project

Dahlsten was also critical in regard to how the South Gas Project is being managed.

The conference was about Stoseb 80, the proposal of the Stockholm area energy corporation regarding the future.

Not many municipalities mentioned heat pumps in their answers. A summary indicated that none of them wanted in their area the thermal power plants which most of them desired.

Agreement has now been reached on a continued expansion for district heating with furnaces for solid fuel, plus small electrical furnaces and heat pumps. More small houses should be converted to electrical heating.

The head of Stockholm's energy agency, Jan-Erik Ryman, believes that there will be many new electrical furnaces until there are better assurances regarding coal.

The Forsmark tunnel has been dropped by Stoseb, but Ryman believes that the reactor will, nevertheless, help to supply the region's heat with electricity rather than taking much more heat from it by means of a hot water tunnel.

"It would be awfully expansive," he said.

Electric Power Difficult to Replace

He also believed it would be difficult to replace electric power since nuclear power is being dismantled.

The municipality of Stockholm adopted the other day its energy plan. The Socialists and Liberal Peoples' Party decided to postpone a decision regarding the future of the gas works. Otherwise there was agreement in the War, Gas and Electricity Board.

1.25 million cubic meters of oil will be saved primarily by new coal-burning plants, more electric heating and better savings.

Eighty-five percent of the city will have district heating which is cheap and better for the environment. A couple of coal-fired hot water furnaces are planned for Vartan. Various sites are now being discussed, for example, the gas works site, the freeport area, to the right or left of the bridge, or only one of the right by the northern dock.

Ryman thought the idea of placing them on Stora Hoggarn in the water between Lidingo and Nacka would be too expensive.

He said it could possibly be a site for a power plant for heating to serve the entire region.

Arne Sundstrom of the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power warned of a hasty excessive reliance on district heating.

There was not a word about heat pumps in the 1978 plan. Now it is a big thing and he warned against long-range commitments.

6893

CSO: 3650/65

COUNTRY'S FIRST LARGE-SCALE WIND ENERGY PROJECT IN TROUBLE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 14

[Article by Bo Engzell]

[Text] The state is facing multimillion demands in regard to Sweden's first wind power plant. It is located in Maglarp near Trelleborg, but is not yet in operation. Things are going badly for the "flagship" of wind power.

It is now 10 months behind schedule, and it can be much, much more. The wind power plant is constantly having trouble.

"We really don't know today when Sydkraft can take over the operation of the Maglarp plant," Per-Olof Ekbohm says.

The Karlskrona shipyard built the big wind power plant. The overall cost is about 70 million.

It is now likely that the National Board for Energy Production Research will assess millions against the yard for delays and added costs.

There is much that does not work at Maglarp.

In the first place, deliveries were delayed. There were computer problems and difficulties with the hydraulic equipment.

And when the wind-operated power plant was erected, matters did not improve. Trial runs had to be postponed.

Or stopped. Or the results were poor.

Many Mistakes

The mistakes have been manifold. The computers for regulating the whole system broke down; various parts have been afflicted with oil leaks; and struts have broken.

There are many things still to be repaired. The trial runs must give satisfactory results before Sydkraft will take over the wind-operated plant.

So we can be well into the new year before the 100-meter high wind-operated power plant comes into operation at Maglarp, which is Sweden's number one wind vent, even if the wind was so-so now and then during the tests last fall.

There is not much going for Sweden's first big wind-operated power plant.

And Karlskrona has shipped a wind-operated plant like the one erected at Maglarp to the U.S.A.

6893

CSO: 3650/65

FOREIGN TRADE FIGURES POINT TO DEFICIT

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 14 Nov 82 pp 1, 16

/Text/ During the third 1982 quarter the Cypriot foreign trade situation worsened and there are disturbing indications that it will be improved only slightly during the fourth quarter. This worsening is mainly due to the diminishing rate of exports in contrast to the rapidly increasing rate of imports during the July-August 1982 period, according to Popular Bank preliminary data based on projections it made and in conjunction with the data published in the July-August economic report the bank published.

As a result, the trade deficit during the first 8 months increased significantly and reached 209 million pounds; it increased, that is, by 25.2 percent compared to only 15.6 percent during the first 6 months of the year. As a result the percentage of the import coverage from exports was decreased to 45 percent. More analytically:

- a. During the first 8 months of 1982 the value of imports reached 373 million pounds and thus exceeded by 53 million pounds or 16.5 percent that of the corresponding 1981 period and compared to an increase of 13.6 percent earlier.
- b. Among all categories of imported items, the imports of consumer goods increased by about 35 percent to about 80.5 million pounds or 21.5 percent of the total imports.
- c. The exports of consumer goods which are hurt by the continually sharpening competition in the international markets and the evident drop of exports to Libya just reached 45 million pounds or 4 percent less than last year.

Balance of Payments

Despite the worsening of the trade balance during the July-August 1982 period, the net income from invisible resources showed during the same period a new progress thus increasing the total surplus during the first 8 months of 1982 by 146 million pounds or 28.5 percent. This increase was mainly due to the spectacular increase in tourist exchange which reached 98.5 million pounds. If one considers the additional increase in the number of arrivals of foreign visitors as a result of the crisis in Lebanon, the total number of arrivals is expected to be slightly

less than 550,000, while the income from the tourist exchange is expected to be almost 144 million pounds.

However, the current trade deficit reached 35.5 million pounds; in other words, it increased slightly compared to 1981. On the other hand, the net inflow of capital during the first 8 months of 1982 increased to 53 million pounds compared to about 28.5 million pounds during the corresponding 1981 period.

As a result of the above developments, there was a surplus of 17.5 million pounds in the balance of payments which is favorably compared to the 4.6-million-pound deficit of a year ago. Also, the foreign exchange reserves increased from 178.8 million pounds at the end of August 1981 to 267 million pounds at the end of the period under consideration.

Inflation

The inflation rate, as reflected in the changes of the Retail Prices Index, was 7.5 percent during the January-August 1982 period compared to 8.5 percent during the first 6 months.

Tourism

During the first 8 months of this year the number of visitors climbed to 374,000 or 83,600 (28.8 percent) more than the number of tourists during the corresponding 1981 period.

Unemployment

At the end of August the total number of unemployed was 8,240. It showed, that is, an increase of 1,325 persons (19 percent) compared to August 1981.

7520

CSO: 3521/92

FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 1981 PRESENTED

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 12Nov 82 p 8

/Text/ According to the fiscal report submitted by the general accountant, the 1981 Development Budget was reduced by more than 4 million pounds. On the contrary, the budget instead of having a surplus of 12,513,000 pounds as estimated, finally showed a deficit of 36,217,000. The total revenues were only 164,575,000 pounds and not 182,389,000 pounds as originally estimated.

The indirect taxes totaled 74,463,000 pounds and represented 45.24 percent of the total revenues which are broken down as follows: direct taxes, 39,955,000 pounds (24.28 percent); incomes from services and sale of goods, 9,574,000 pounds (5.82 percent); rents and fees, 10,392,000 pounds (6.31 percent); transfers, 8,654,000 (5.26 percent); income from loans, 9,843,000 pounds (5.98 percent); Greek government grant, 10,132,000 pounds (6.16 percent); and miscellaneous collections, 1,562,000 pounds (0.95 percent).

The regular budget outlays totaled 200,842,000 pounds. Originally they were estimated at 169,876,000 pounds. A breakdown of their outlays is as follows: salaries and allowances, 75,921,000 pounds (37.8 percent); public debt payments, 28,264,000 pounds (14.07 percent); defense, 17,154,000 pounds (8.54 percent); loans and contributions, 25,098,000 pounds (12.5 percent); subsidies, 15,000,000 pounds (7.47 percent); long-term loans and advance payments, 471,000 pounds (0.23 percent); returns of tariffs and monies, 8,298,000 pounds (4.13 percent); pensions and bonuses, 6,377,000 pounds (3.18 percent); maintenance and operation of motor vehicles, 1,055,000 pounds (0.53 percent); traveling, 647,000 (0.32 percent); office operation expenses, 1,202,000 pounds (0.60 percent); hosting expenses, 160,000 pounds (0.08 percent); and miscellaneous expenses, 21,195,000 pounds (10.55 percent).

7520

CSO: 3521/92

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK LOAN--It was announced that the government received a new 9-million-dollar loan from the European Investment Bank for financing the Vasilikon-Pandaskhoindou project for which the government has contracted other loans with the World Bank, the Kuwait Financing Fund and the German Foreign Investments Bank. The new loan is in ecus whose value is almost equal to that of the dollar. For the Vasilikon-Pendaskhoinou project 25 million dollars will be needed. It will include two dams (Dipotamos and Kalavastos), pipes from the two dams to the refineries of Khoirokoitia and Kornos and also pumping complexes. According to the original plan the whole project is expected to be completed by 1985. /Text/ /Athens TA NEA in Greek 12 Nov 82 p 8/ 7520

LIBYAN DEBT PARTIAL PAYMENT--Libya has remitted to Cyprus about 7 million pounds towards its debt to Cypriot entrepreneurs who exported products to that country. According to reports the money arrived 6 weeks ago and Libya has promised to pay off all its debts which are now overdue for 2 years. The total Libyan debt to Cypriot exporters is about 30 million pounds of which 23 million represent insured exports. /Excerpt/ /Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 11 Nov 82 p 12/ 7520

CSO: 3521/92

GOVERNMENT TO BORROW TWO BILLION KRONER ABROAD IN 1983

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Nov 82 Sect III p 1

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] The government will in 2 weeks raise its first major state loan abroad since the fall. The loan will be of 250 million dollars and is expected to be signed by Minister of Finance Henning Christophersen a few days after the Folketings new loan authorization takes effect in December.

The new state loan will be raised in the Eurocurrency market, and it is the large American bank Manufacturers Hanover which will be arranging the loan. The amount of the loan of 250 million dollars corresponds to 2.2 billion kroner. It is a question of a bond loan with a maturity of 7 years and with a variable rate of interest which has been fixed at 1/4 percent above the so-called LIBOR interest rate in London.

Niels Erik Sørensen, chief of section in the Department for the Management of the National Debt of the Ministry of Finance, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the said interest rate corresponds to the normal market terms. The loan agreement makes it possible for bond holders to demand their money back after 5 years, and a minimum interest rate of 5.25 percent has been fixed.

Creditworthiness

The creditworthiness crisis which Denmark has experienced in the fall seems, however, to have had its effect on the terms of the loan, viz. in connection with the commission which the Danish state will have to pay. For it amounts to 1 5/8 percent of the amount of the loan, so that the loan is paid at the rate of 98 3/8 percent.

Financiers compare this commission with the one which Malaysia will be paying for a 10-year loan raised at approximately the same time as the Danish loan. Malaysia is only to pay 1 1/8 percent in commission.

Sources within the Danish Ministry of Finance, however, do not describe the Malaysian loan as any success, stating that a group of international banks have beforehand been ready to take over the said loan.

In contrast, the Danish government wants our bond loan to be sold in the international capital market to others than the large banks arranging the loan. The reason for this desire is that the Danish government wants, later on, to borrow directly from these banks. It would be ill-advised to overtax the same sources of borrowing.

Since last spring, when the government's previous loan authorization became exhausted, the state has not been raising any new loans abroad, and during this period there has been a drain on the foreign exchange reserves and the undrawn foreign exchange credits.

The break in the borrowing activities has now ended. Next year the Ministry of Finance plans to borrow an average of approximately 2 billion kroner monthly abroad.

7262

CSO: 3613/31

LABOR UNIONS RECONSIDER FUTURE ROLE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 19 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Nina Grunenberg: "The Old Hearthside Offers No More Warmth. Labor Unions Caught in a Deep Crisis--Where Nothing is Left to Split Up, Ideas are Needed, not Routine"]

[Text] Ever since the establishment of the Federal Republic, the labor unions have been a bulwark of stability and social harmony. Today, with 2 million unemployed, unions are being forced to rethink their role for the future. In recent years, Nina Grunenberg has written about functional elites in West Germany--prime ministers, generals, bishops, diplomats. In this new ZEIT series she portrays the labor unions, their leaders and officials.

When Heinz Kluckner bade his farewell to fellow officials of the Public Service, Transport and Communications Union at Wiesbaden's theater on 29 September 1982, he had such difficulty in speaking that his words could be heard only faintly and haltingly.

For 18 years he had been the leader of a host of millions of workers in public services and, for their employers at national, Land and municipal levels, not only a formidable adversary but sometimes even a scourge. The media, not blessed with any abundance of striking personalities in public life, had created the image of this robust man as the "prototype of trade union leaders." His sudden resignation was, for many, cause for bewilderment.

What moved him at Wiesbaden was not just a premature departure forced on him by his ruined health, it was also his concern for the future of the trade union movement. Equipped with an emotional constitution whose complex sensitivity had made him the moral conscience of the German Labor Union Federation, and with strategic talents that ranged far beyond the practical requirements of everyday union leadership, he was deeply concerned for the preservation of trade union gains, for the power, reputation and strength of his organization.

Kluncker was aware, sooner than most others, that the major crisis which the unions had previously seen affecting only the state, the economy and the society, had now struck home at their own institution. In Kluncker's case, this awareness was not something purely cerebral, it was a thing that clutched at his very guts. It also served to mobilize his every instinct, since his roots are

fixed in the labor movement. His family--parents and grandparents, his parents' siblings and their spouses--has been active in the trade union movement since the revolution. That the Klunckers are also all of them Social Democrats, almost goes without saying.

It is also this family heritage that accounts for the notoriously clean conscience with which Heinz Kluncker fought for the interests of his organization. As if he were really still an authentic labor leader risen from the ranks of working people in the age of early capitalism--and not the senior lobbyist for the public services sector--he proclaimed to his associates in Wiebaden in an emotional farewell: "I will be suffering with you if the powers that be try to grind you down."

There is no privilege in the world achieved by a German union official which could persuade him that he has long since been liberated from the ranks of the oppressed. In good economic times such rhetorical flourishes are borne aloft more like commemorative banners. In times of depression they signify even more. This is also made evident by the militant language used in recent weeks by speakers at the protest demonstrations of the German Labor Federation. The recalling to mind of the old policy of class conflict is one indication that trade union officials are rummaging among the stage properties of the labor movement in a search for footing and orientation. They are in dread of what they see approaching. Yet they are as ill-prepared as all the others with responses that match the situation. There is only one thing that they claim to know as a certainty: "If you don't want to be an anvil, you have to be a hammer."

The unions are on the defensive. They see themselves faced with a development that they had not anticipated and which has caught them unprepared. A whole new array of basic economic conditions has posed them serious problems. The most troubling question is, "Is our own self-confidence strong enough?" Or are they only a giant astride feet of clay?

Their confidence in their own strength is still based upon the experience of those proletarians whose misery is depicted in the drawings of Kaete Kollwitz. In fact, however, it was formed as a result of their having shared in the economic miracle. For 30 years, their expectations had been preprogrammed for economic growth, their union organization for expansion. The password was "Forward!" or, put in more prosaic language, "higher wages!" Friedhelm Farthmann, minister for labor and social affairs in North Rhine-Westphalia, once characterized union successes with the words, "It can be said without exaggeration: in no other country of the world--neither capitalist nor socialist--has there ever been so sharp a rise of income for the mass of people in so short a time."

In order to go forward, the German trade unions have, from their very beginning, taken hold of the "doorhandle of legislation," under the monarchy and during the Weimar Republic, though not always under so favorable conditions as those today. Even their reform strategies for expansion of the welfare state were not left to direct confrontation with management at the bargaining table; they were to be guaranteed them universally and centrally through the agency of the state.

Their influence upon the political decision making process was to be exerted through their power base in the parliaments: of the 519 deputies in the 9th German Bundestag 304 (58.6 percent) were union members (76 CDU/CSU, 8 FDP, 220 SPD). Heaviest representation came from the Public Service and Transport Union (OeTV) with 101 deputies (94 SPD, 6 CDU, 1 FDP); the Education and Science Union

(GEW) with 31 deputies (29 SPD, 1 CDU, 1 FDP) and the Metalworkers Union (IG Metall) (29 SPD, 1 CDU). Included among the deputies are two union chairmen and a deputy chairman: Ernst Haar of the Railroad Workers Union, Adolf Schmidt of the Miners Union and Hermann Rappe, deputy chairman of the Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workers Union.

The trade unions attained the zenith of their influence when the Social Democrat chancellor first took up quarters in the Palais Schaumburg. No one could any longer ignore this "pillar of the state." As Heinz Oskar Vetter, former chairman of the German Trade Union Confederation recalls: "At that time we had an administration whose intentions coincided almost totally with our own statements." Even the FDP put up no obstacles. It was that party's former secretary general, Karl Hermann Flach, who turned the high-spirited phrase that the trade unions in the future would not be measured by the standard of whether they could have pulled out another one or two percent at the bargaining table, but whether they would support Willy Brandt, "the greatest chancellor that the German working people have ever produced." That was in 1971. At the same time, the rank and file of the metalworkers union were demanding 15 percent, without anyone becoming particularly upset.

Even more than Willy Brandt, for whom only the very young and the thinning ranks of old-time trade union leaders still have a weakness--perhaps because what is common to all of them is that they still pursue the vision of a better tomorrow--it was Helmut Schmidt who was the favorite of the trade union chairmen. He courted them with circumspection and unusual empathy. It was in their friendship and support that Schmidt would take refuge when he was under pressure. They were his most reliable auxiliaries. Helmut Schmidt had three coalition partners, Willy Brandt once grumbled, "the Trade Union Confederation, the FDP and the SPD, in that order." For the opponents of this "historic alliance" the trade unions' demand in 1976 for paritative co-determination in the economy was the final proof that the Federal Republic was on its way to becoming a trade union state.

The cries of doom from that time are today almost totally forgotten. The downhill slide of the economy has brought about a radical change of perspective. "Back in the fat years," remarked one union member thoughtfully, "we were testing the load limits of the economy. Now it's management that's testing our threshold for pain." There are many veteran trade unionists who are thoroughly convinced that the recession is nothing more than a trick of employers--as well as a "revenge for Sadowa," for defeats during prosperity that were never accepted when the unions succeeded in gaining wage hikes that far surpassed gains in productivity. Today, with well over 2 million unemployed, management can afford to treat their labor factor more cavalierly once again. Works council members relate endless anecdotes on this theme.

Often such conversations conclude with the disarming assertion that they are not seeking anything that is not fair and just: more money and enough work. Anyone who has had the philosophy of economic growth so firmly implanted in his flesh and bones is only slowly going to be able to adapt his consciousness to the anticipated "zero-sum games" in which the gain of the one player is always the loss of another. Clearer insights help only slightly on this score. Thus Monika Wulf-Mathies, one of the newer, younger, cooler generation of Kluncker, told the delegates at Wiesbaden without batting an eyelash that "We

stand in the labor tradition of 'forward!'" This could be viewed as nothing more than a ritual incantation: from wage contracts concluded over the past 2 years, it is clear that the tendency is slowly but steadily downhill. In two rounds of contract negotiations so far, the unions have not been able to maintain wages in terms of real purchasing power. Nor is there any better hope for the next round. The only increases are expected in taxes and social security deductions, rents and prices.

The feeling of their own helplessness in the face of this trend is deeply seated. Franz Steinkuehler, the powerful head of the metalworkers' regional council in Stuttgart, expressed it when he branded the drop in meat sales per capita from 91 to 89 kilograms per year as evidence that working people are being forced to cut back consumption. Even he knows that a theory of pauperization is not to be founded upon such evidence, though for him it is a matter of principle: for Steinkuehler, every cut in workers' material gains is, by its nature, a cutback in social terms. "A wage contract" he snorted, "is a mirror of real power balances. We were weak."

Norbert Blum, the minister for labor and social affairs in the new government, has made this point undeniably clear. During the ceremonies marking his installation in office, he thought aloud concerning the advantages of a wage freeze. In the hue and cry that followed, it was forgotten that he had also spoken of a price freeze. His calculated provocation was seen by the unions as a crude joke, yet they had to swallow it. "It used to be," remarked one banker reflectively, "that no one would have dared say a thing like that or they would have torn the fellow to ribbons."

The basic condition for development in recent years has been economic growth. "It enabled the unions," said one shrewd observer, "to gain a larger share of the gross national product without obliging them to say farewell to their historical experience and their union mentality." They never felt their revolutionary attitudes to be at odds with their consciousness of being property owners. They were able to act as if the two things had nothing to do with one another. It has only been since the change of administration in Bonn that the trade unions have no longer been able to dodge the confrontation with their own self-image. The change in the social climate has forced them to it. There is no longer any warmth to be found at the old hearthside. Since they can no longer produce successes as a "wage percentage machine," there is nothing any longer to shelter them from having to reconsider their future if they do not want to endure the loss of their importance.

Union leaders will be in a bad way to justify themselves to their constituencies on the issue of earlier retirements and shortened work weeks. The strategies which lead to their goals are complex. Germans already record the shortest anticipated lifetime working span of all Western industrialized countries. The cost factor involved in shortening the average work week is so high that it will shrink even further the scant latitude for wage increases. Even so, no one can be certain that additional jobs will be created by such measures.

There is a second point which affects the self-image of union officials: co-determination, which they gained only after a hard struggle, has not proved to be especially popular among union members. The feeling prevails among workers that

there have been no substantial improvements for them since representatives of their unions are seated on corporate boards of directors. Despite co-determination, AEG has still gone into bankruptcy. The impression that the unions have not been able to prevent anything from happening, often not even being able to anticipate plant closings, has hurt the image of labor's representatives. The fact that a number of union officials have built their personal careers on the basis of their participation in co-determination has intensified such criticism even further.

The third critical point concerns the unions' own enterprises. The unions have not exactly been convincing in creating an image of themselves as efficient entrepreneurs. The reorganization of the union-owned housing and urban development corporation, Neue Heimat Staedtebau, has cost them dearly. Yet even more costly than the half-billion marks that were lost has been the loss of moral prestige. The Neue Heimat scandal has demonstrated that even trade unionists are not immune to the temptations of power and the morality of big money.

They also have problems within their own ranks. The structure of their membership has been changing. The election of Ernst Breit as chairman of the German Labor Union Federation is almost a symbol of this. For the first time in the history of the labor movement, a civil servant has achieved the chairmanship; Breit is affiliated with the Postal Workers Union. The election of Heinz Kluncker's successor to the chairmanship of the Public Service, Transport and Communications Workers Union was another indicator of the changes. The choice of Monika Wulf-Mathies, a university graduate with a degree in German literature, could be interpreted as a victory of white-collar over blue-collar workers. Her rival candidate, Siegfried Merten, who lost by some 20 votes, was an exponent of old-time blue-collar union leadership.

The traditional hard core of the trade unions consisted of highly trained industrial workers. It was workers in the metal- and woodworking industries who were the first to organize themselves into industrial labor organizations shortly before the turn of the century. But industrial workers are no longer an ascendant social grouping. The Metalworkers Union (IG Metall) alone lost some 60,000 (of a total of 2.6 million) members between January and September of 1982. While new people are still drawn to the unions, the question of whether they will allow themselves to be cohesively organized remains an open one for the older industrial unions which still set the tone within the Labor Federation.

Examples of this are the teachers in the Education and Science Union, the heterogeneous membership of the Commerce, Banking and Insurance Workers Union and the writers in the Printing and Paper Trades Union. The concern is that this new type of union member will bring about not only new differentiations of workers' interests but a loss of solidarity as well. Bernd Engelmann, the chairman of the writers' group within the printers union, and Adolf Schmidt, chairman of the miners organization, have little in common apart from their preconceived notions of each other. In terms of practical solidarity this is too little. Solidarity is well on its way to becoming a cliché.

It can happen at night, toward 1:00 am and after the fifth beer, that a troubled trade unionist will breathe a tortured sigh. Thus it was that a works council member of the Chemical, Paper and Ceramics Workers Union confessed at a late hour in the Kempinski-Bar during the Berlin congress of the Labor Federation, that

his heart was sore. There were tears in his eyes while saying so: the congress had been overshadowed by the events of the Neue Heimat scandal. He ended the conversation with the words: "If we're being attacked from the outside, we have to close our ranks. There's nothing else for it."

Despite their heartache, genuine trade unionists are seldom inclined to talk freely of what troubles them. The "close-mouthed environment" from which they spring, together with the "traditionally taciturn nature of bureaucracies" is Ulrich Borsdorf's explanation for this deficit. In his exemplary biography of Hans Boeckler, the first chairman of the Labor Federation after World War II, the social scientist deals with this problem himself. Although union officials will give numerous speeches within their organization, these are usually framed in the ashen grey language of functionaries and in generalized formulas. Among the 8 million members of the 17 individual unions these may still evoke responses; an outsider, on the other hand, would be hard put to fathom their concrete substance.

Trade union officials live in a world of their own. On the surface they seem uniformly grey, boring and bureaucratic, though at their core they are as varied and complex as the branches into which the separate unions are organized. This world is governed by its own laws, there are other priorities that apply here. The interests of the organization have come first for as long as trade unions have existed. The only things that seem to interest a trade union chairman are his organizational apparatus, the cohesion and discipline in his organization and the number of "nay" votes that he could accept at his next election.

9878

CSO: 3620/122

REACTIONS TO BONN'S DECISION TO SAVE SAARLAND STEEL INDUSTRY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by Eckhart Kauntz: "Unemployment or Wage Subsidy"]

[Text] Saarbruecken, 7 December—"Since the Saarlanders do not take work all that seriously, they do not get rich and since they always get homesick, they do not tend to roam a great deal." The man who said this is himself a Saarlander and when he says it, he has a twinkle in his eye. It is Ludwig Harig, the most popular poet of the Saarland and no one gets mad at him for saying what he does. Whether the Saarlanders are really lazier than the Germans in other parts of the FRG is another matter. But the fact is that the people of Bremen who have been hit just as hard by the recession had an economic output in 1981—measured against GNP—of only 0.1 percent less than the Saarlanders although there are 372,000 more Saarlanders than there are inhabitants of Bremen.

"For a Saarlander," Harig goes on to say, "happiness comes from the stomach even if the head does enter into it." Harig certainly was not thinking of portly Saarland ecology minister Schacht when he put those words to paper. In any event, the ecology ministers of the Laender like to think back to a late fall evening in Berlin prior to their annual meeting in the Reichstag building when they did not get together in a modern setting but sat down to a gourmet meal at the Spandau citadel. But it was not the Berlin Senate that played host that night. It was Schacht whose minister president Zeyer thinks it "totally incomprehensible" that the 20,000-member union of steelworkers of the Arbed-Saarstahl concern has rejected a cut in their 13th monthly salary guaranteed in their wage agreement. "We cannot afford to accept such invitations," was what Mainz ecology minister had to say about the opulent repast. But by transferring funds from the road construction budget, the deep-in-debt Saarlanders pulled the whole thing off, it is said.

Warmly applauded by the members of the prestigious Bremen tobacco roundtable, Economic Minister Lambsdorff recently stated that the billions the government provided to Arbed-Saarstahl to help avert bankruptcy ran counter to the principles of an economic policy based on the market economy. The minister promised that this grievous mistake would not be repeated. Actually, this commitment by the government does not keep tens of thousands of employees from worrying about their jobs just a few weeks before Christmas. The collapse of the European steel market has brought this development about on the Saar even though "no other German firm has received or has been promised anything like such subsidies," as Minister President Zeyer noted before the Saarland Landtag only last week.

Now that the Saarland steel industry has run into such deep difficulties that the government treasury has to provide the money to pay the wages, Zeyer is unhappy about the headlines appearing in Germany's newspapers. "They not only add to the worries of Arbed-Saarstahl suppliers," he says. "It also upsets their customers and makes it more and more difficult to run a normal business operation." While Zeyer cannot see compassion reigning in every instance as far as the Saarland steel industry is concerned, SPD Land chairman Lafontaine has a different theory to explain the dramatic situation. Discussions in Bonn regarding a merger of the German steel industry are "proof of the fact that the attempt to get the Saar steel industry back on its feet within the framework of a multi-national steel production concern (the Luxembourg Arbed) must be viewed as having failed against the background of the national subsidy competition engaged in by the countries of Europe." Just the same, Lafontaine has no way of proving that as much as one more ton of steel would have been sold, if the Saar steel industry had been taken over by the government years ago.

The workers of the Saarland whose economic existence is at stake cannot agree on whether they should give in to Bonn's demand to take a pay cut as proof of their willingness to make a sacrifice and to take home only half of their Christmas bonus for the next 2 years. To many, holding on to their job is worth making a sacrifice. The only thing is, as one Voelklingen worker said in front of the TV cameras, no one can guarantee that any sacrifice he makes—no matter how high—will save his job. And as for Saarland Finance Minister Zeitel the issue is simply this: What is cheaper—to subsidize wages or to finance unemployment.

9478

CSO: 3620/133

FDP OPPOSES RHINE-MAIN-DANUBE CANAL, DECISION POSTPONED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Dec 82 pp 113-114

[Unattributed article: "Simply Beautiful"]

[Text] FDP resistance in Bonn to Rhine-Main-Danube Canal--
chancellor postpones decision.

Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann--a Bavarian both by origin and conviction--waxed lyrical as soon as the discussion turned to the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal.

At the cabinet meeting last week, Zimmermann pointed out that the canal should not only be built for economic reasons but for aesthetic reasons as well. After all, he said "it took the canal to make the landscape even more beautiful."

Minister of Transportation Dollinger said he could not agree more. He has seen the canal from all angles, he said--from a car, from a helicopter and from a boat. It was simply beautiful.

But for all the enthusiasm of the Bavarian aesthetes, the desired result was not forthcoming. To be sure, Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed a joint inspection trip to Bavaria but he was unwilling to accede to Dollingers' demand for a clear political decision in the matter.

Kohl said he did not think there was a need at present to make a decision and by so doing avoided an open conflict with the FDP. The fact is that there was no other issue on which the right and the left wing of the FDP had agreed more than on their rejection of the canal project which the Association for the Environment and the Protection of Nature (BUND) has called the "white elephant of the century."

As long ago as last September, FDP fraction chairman Wolfgang Mischnick had called for a "halt to further construction." And just recently, the conference of FDP national and regional fraction chairmen reiterated "its opposition to further construction of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal."

In January, all four members of the socialist-liberal cabinet--in response to an initiative by then Minister of Transportation Volker Hauff--voted for

joining the Bavarian Land government "in working out a balanced fiscal, economic and ecological formula for proceeding further with the project." This was to include the possibility of "terminating construction on the canal."

In November 1981, the budget committee blocked further construction with the agreement of Hauff, a firm opponent of the project which he had called "the dumbest one since the Tower of Babel."

The committee decision made it possible to use funds already budgeted for continuing construction projects already begun but called a halt to all others. In this way, the SPD and FDP seek to prevent hitherto unspoiled areas and animal sanctuaries between Hiltpoltstein and Kelheim--which environmentalists have been warning about for years--from being turned into construction sites.

Much to the chagrin of the Bavarian government under Franz-Josef Strauss, who is in favor of the canal project, the parliamentary decision remains binding even after the change of government and it makes no difference at least for the time being that the Bonn government and Bavaria have hastily agreed on continuing construction on the canal.

Canal supporters say that the remaining Nuremberg to Straubing section will only cost about DM 1.9 billion. If the canal were not completed, only DM 100-200 million would be saved which, they say, is hardly worth the trouble.

But these figures have been doctored. They do not include the cost of necessary improvements on the Main and Danube river beds which, according to Hans-Juergen Jaeger, former chairman of the Bavarian FDP fraction, would "amount to an additional DM 3.3 billion."

Projections as to freight carried on the waterway have been revised upward as well. Both the Bonn government and Bavaria believe a freight volume of between four and seven million tons annually to be a realistic estimate.

But they are virtually alone in making this estimate. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) expects freight to amount to just three million tons. Given figures of this magnitude, the construction of the waterway--which may cost as much as DM 4.2 billion--cannot be justified. The DIW believes that only 16 ships will use the canal each day. If that were so, the economy would lose 50 pfennigs on every Mark it spent on construction.

Even if freight were to amount to seven million tons, the Bavarians are prepared to admit that the economy overall would come up with a zero gain situation. In this way, the biggest ecological scandal in German postwar history--involving the systematic destruction of a whole region--would turn into the biggest government investment ruin.

Another matter that has not been cleared up as yet is whether the canal is to be a national or an international waterway. As for sovereignty, Bonn believes it rests with the FRG alone. But the countries of the East Bloc along with the Netherlands and Belgium maintain that the canal has international status. If that legal opinion were to prevail, it would have far-reaching consequences for domestic shipping.

By offering cut-rate tariffs, the communist countries could make life very difficult for the FRG transportation industry. For another thing, their ships could use the waterway free of charge.

The legal opinion presented by Dollinger's ministry does not seem convincing to at least one other member of the cabinet—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who is asking for a second opinion on the matter.

The completion of the "Bavarian nightmare," as the BUND has called it, is not likely to be held up by this, however. Chancellor Kohl made a promise to the Bavarian minister president shortly after he took office and without consulting his coalition partner. He promised Strauss that the canal would be built.

FDP budget experts offered determined resistance, to be sure. They prevented the lifting this week of the budget decision on not starting any new construction. But at the cabinet meeting, Kohl left no doubt about the fact that he will clear the way for completion of the canal project after the 6 March election once and for all.

"That is what I call continuity," said the FDP's Hans-Guenter Hoppe wilyly. "The former chancellor already wanted to see the canal completed. The CSU will no doubt put up a monument to Helmut Schmidt now."

9478

CSO: 3620/132

FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION CHAIRMAN REPORTS SERIOUS LOSSES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 25 Nov 82 p 48

/Article: "Fishing Fleet Deficit 409 Million Krona This Year"/

/Text/ The fishing fleet deficit is calculated at 409 million krona for this year, 14.2 percent of income. By size of ship, the deficit is 168 million krona for boats, 14 percent of income, 176 million for small trawlers or 13 percent of income, and 65 million for large trawlers or 20 percent of income. Included in the calculations is an 80 million krona subsidy to trawlers for exchange rate differences. That measure improves the outcome by 6 percent. This information is from a speech given by Kristjan Ragnarsson, chairman of the National Association of Fishing Outfitters, at a general meeting of the association yesterday.

Production of fisheries products will decrease by an estimated 16 percent this year. Last year, on the other hand, there was a continuous increase of production value.

It is expected that the value of fisheries production will be 7 billion krona and will have increased by 32 percent in Icelandic krona. The market value of frozen fish, salt fish and salt herring have remained unchanged but in terms of dollar values there has been a price decrease on account of the increase in the dollar value. On the other hand, prices for fish meal and fish oil have fallen considerably and stock fish sales have been poor. The median price decrease for products was 6 percent in dollar values but this was, to some extent, due to the exchange rate decrease in the value to the krona, 70 percent on the average for the year.

The prospects are that the total catch will be around 750,000 tons this year. The catch last year, on the other hand, was 1,430,000 tons. The decrease is due to the decline in the cod catch from 460,000 to 370,000 tons and a decrease in capelin catches by 630,000 tons.

Ragnarsson said that the outfitting costs has increased by 12-13 percent during the year and that the greatest increase was in oil and likewise in other operating costs on account of the decline in the exchange rate for the krona. Financing for continued oil subsidies was not guaranteed and the 7 percent oil payment will be discontinued at the beginning of next year unless the law is reenacted.

Steingrimur Hermannsson, minister of fisheries, said in his address that there were no plans for any fundamental changes in fisheries policy. Concerning the operating difficulties of outfitters, he said that the exchange rate reduction was not sufficient at the time. On the other hand, the government has never decreased the exchange rate more than suggested by the Icelandic Central Bank. Concerning a continued subsidy for oil, Steingrimur Hermannsson said that financing is available only till the beginning of the year but that the Althing should approve continuation. The subsidy was a stop-gap and a fish price increase is conceivable. If that is the case, however, the fishing industry would have to be made capable of supporting that price. He also said that he saw no reason to eliminate the oil payments. Hermannsson said that a great deal of year-old capelin was being caught and that it might be possible to allow a catch next year.

9857

CSO: 3626/16

BRIEFS

INFLATION OVER ONE-HUNDRED PERCENT--The Icelandic Central Bank has calculated the wage index figure for December at 471 points or 27 points more than the figure for November. The increase of index figures between the months is 6.08 percent. If this increase in the wage index is taken as a sign of the inflation rate and the percentage increase calculated for a 12 month period, the annual rate of inflation comes out to 103.07 percent in terms of this increase. /Text/ /Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Nov 82 p 48/
9857

CSO: 3626/16

INCREASED USE OF ROTTERDAM PORT BY SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Nov 82 p 14

[Article by Magda de Vetten: "Russian Ships More Often in Rotterdam -- Role of Meuse City in Intercontinental Traffic Ever Greater"]

[Text] Rotterdam -- "... but I simply cannot look into the Russian hearts." Up to three times, Mr Molenaar, manager of the Municipal Port Industry of Rotterdam, apologized for the speculative character of his statements on the increasing number of Soviet ships in the port of Rotterdam. For lack of data on the trade strategy of the Soviet Union, this would appear to be guess work.

It is a fact that visits by Russian ships to the port of Rotterdam have risen spectacularly during the first 9 months of this year: from 797 ships in 1981 to 1175 now, an increase of nearly 50 percent. The gross tonnage grew even more: by 64 percent to 12.8 million tons.

Molenaar thinks that Rotterdam has been given a somewhat larger role in the transportation of grain from North and South America and of oil products from the USSR. "Everywhere and by everyone, shipments are being spread over several ports in order to spread the risk of boycotts and strikes. The Soviet Union does this too."

He also attributes the growing activity to the facilities available in the port of Rotterdam. It can, for example, accomodate ships with heavier draught than the port of Antwerp. According to Molenaar, "the difference in cost due to the presence of these accomodations can be so great that the spread over other ports becomes less attractive."

Positive Response

"Furthermore, the Soviets probably expect a positive response to their request for permission to appoint their own managers in the port," thinks the manager of the port industry. For years, the shipping office of the USSR in Rotterdam, Transworld, has been trying to obtain a residence permit for personnel from the Soviet Union, up to now in vain. Molenaar suggested that increased trade with the Soviet Union could put pressure behind this request.

It is especially the bulk goods sector which benefits from the Soviet activities in the port, said Molenaar. However, the more labor intensive general cargo still travels via Antwerp. Molenaar: "We are happy with it anyhow."

Every activity is an activity. The transshipment in turn has an impact on other sectors."

The Grain Elevator Company [GEM] is one of the enterprises which benefit directly from the presence of Soviet ships in Rotterdam. During the past season, from November until May, the company managed to secure 1 million tons of grain, nearly one-third of the total transit trade.

Assistant manager A. Jansen cannot recall ever having awaited grain from the Soviet Union. In his opinion, the shift is due to the promotional activities of the company and of the Rotterdam municipality. Service and "acceptable rates" are also thought to play a role.

The GEM believes that to allow managers from the Soviet Union in the port would have a favorable effect on the cargoes which can be obtained. However, in the past this request from Transworld has always been rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A spokesman for the Ministry refused to provide a reason, even after repeated consultations, because of the "precariousness of the matter." He referred only to responses to parliamentary questions from 1976 addressed to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoep.

The latter said, among other things, that permission for Soviet citizens in the service of their government is dependent on the economic benefit the Netherlands would gain from it, the (in)dispensability of the civil servants and the possibility of reciprocity with the USSR.

Competition

The spreading of risks, better facilities and the desire for representatives abroad are not the only elements mentioned as an explanation for the increasing Russian shipping in Dutch waters. The competitive position of the Soviet Union in the liner trade is also thought to play a role. This was noted by A. de Ruiter, manager of shipping policy and maritime administration in the Ministry of Traffic and Waterways.

The Soviet Union started turning toward commerce in areas where they previously did not operate: these are the cross trades, transportation among third parties. De Ruiter claims that he has no objection to this competition "if things are calculated in a normal manner, but this does not happen. On a number of routes, the rates are heavily undercut."

De Ruiter believes that the Soviet Union can work so cheaply because the fleet is the property of the state. "The plans are firm, whether farming in the past went well or badly. Furthermore, in a country with a balance of trade deficit, hard currency is particularly attractive."

The Soviet Union apparently also makes extensive use of differential calculations. A ship returning home after having been unloaded can take a shipload back cheaply. "This also happens occasionally with Western shipowners, but much less," said De Ruiter.

By turning to the transportation of general cargoes, the ships from the Soviet Union also came into the waters of the Dutch companies. De Ruiter: "Only in this sector is there still something to earn. But this becomes more difficult when the Russians operate 10 percent below market prices."

According to De Ruiter, the Soviet promises made at a meeting of Western ship-owners in March of this year, to the effect that they would abide by the applicable rates did not quite work out that way. "We will talk about this again at the turn of the year."

"That Russian ships underbid on cross trades does happen sometimes, but the fact that they are state property has nothing to do with it," commented J. van Zonneveld, manager of Transworld Marine, the Russian shipping representatives in the port. "Often they are not even low enough in prices. They sail just like everyone else to earn money, not for statistics."

8463

CSO: 3614/15

ECONOMIC FIGURES, PROBLEMS FACING NEW GOVERNMENT

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 31 Oct, 2 Nov 82

[Article by Juan Tapia: "The Economy that the PSOE Will Inherit"]

[31 Oct 82 p 35]

[Text] Low growth and continued inflation: The economy will grow 1.5 percent and prices will rise 14.5 percent in 1982. Everyone agrees that management of the economy is one of the keys to the success or failure of the socialist government's impending test. After almost 8 years of continuous economic crisis, the Spanish economy has not completely managed to make the necessary adjustment to the oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80 and is now also facing the international economic recession, which seems to be accompanied by the beginning of a financial crisis.

In these difficult circumstances, recently evidenced by such clear examples as the suspension of debt payments to banks by ERT [Union Explosivos Rio Tinto, S.A.], the leading Spanish private management group, the suspension of payments by Aluminio Espanol [Spanish Aluminum], in which the INI [National Institute of Industry] has an interest, and the reemergence of the banking crisis, which is now affecting a banking group as important and deeply entrenched in Catalonia as Banca Catalana, it is obvious that the new socialist government will not have an excessive amount of room to maneuver. The socialists' measures will have to give consideration to a very difficult economic situation, which the present series on "The Economy that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Worker Party] Will Inherit" will try to summarize.

A Confidential Report

The text of the report submitted on 15 October--and which has partly been published, causing a rash of denials--by the governor of the Bank of Spain to the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Mr Garcia Diez, reads as follows: "In 1982, the Spanish economy has exhibited a low rate of real growth, a cessation of the process of decelerating inflation observed in previous years, a considerable lessening of declining employment and a trend toward improvement of the current balance of payments deficit."

The reality of the Spanish economy, however, is difficult to summarize in one sentence. Actually, the economic development of late 1981 and the first

months of 1982 seem to indicate the start of a certain degree of economic recovery which, it was hoped, would take hold at the same rate that the U.S. economy's recovery would make possible a more or less generalized improvement in European economies. But the U.S. recovery has been delayed from one quarter to the next and is currently anticipated in early or mid-1983. Moreover, the specter of an international financial crisis emerged during the summer. And in our country, the faint signs of recovery in the beginning of the year have given way to a new drop in the rate of economic activity and even to a new drop in employment.

Stagnation in Industry

The aforementioned confidential report of the Bank of Spain actually predicts a slight production increase in the primary sector of the economy--basically agriculture--following the strong recession of 1981, whereas it thinks that the important industrial sector may possibly exhibit zero growth as a result of the changing trend observed starting in May. In contrast, it is believed that the construction sector may grow by 1 percent in 1982, not as a result of a revitalization of housing construction, but due to public works, since official government bids increased by 98.6 percent in the January-May period. Unfortunately, the number of government-sponsored housing starts this year declined and the rate of privately financed housing starts continues to drop.

Thus from the standpoint of production, the economy's greatest growth will result from the behavior of the services sector, which it is believed may grow by 2 percent, thanks to a good tourist year.

Overall, the gross domestic product [GDP] is expected to grow by 1.5 percent, which is not entirely unsatisfactory in comparison to that of previous years (see table), but is totally inadequate for reviving the economy and stabilizing high unemployment figures. From the standpoint of demand, this growth is based on the high rate of exports of goods and services, which it is believed will grow by 5 percent--although in recent months a loss of export dynamism has been noted and may even increase--and will add 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth and 0.2 points to the growth of imports. Whereas energy imports will decline, the growth of nonenergy imports may be about 5.5 percent, although they are currently declining as a result of the economy's general loss of dynamism.

On the other hand, private consumption may undergo a decline that is difficult to measure because of the revision of wages and apparent reduction of inflation during the current half-year, while investment indicators show a clear slump for the second half of the year. The most expansive category will undoubtedly be public consumption, which will grow by 2.9 percent as compared to 2 percent in 1981, although the growth of public investment will only be 15 percent, in comparison to 24 percent in the previous year.

Reemergence of Inflation

There was strong upward pressure on prices in the first months of the year and in the spring, attributed basically to the rise of food prices (representing 40.5 percent of the general index) as a result of drops in agricultural production

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and the upward pressure caused by the increase in tourism, due to the world soccer championship games. Thus in the first 6 months of the year, prices rose 7.8 percent, as opposed to 6.2 percent during the same period of the previous year. This increase in inflation led to activation of the ANE's [expansion unknown] wage revision clause, which in principle may mean a new stimulation of inflationary pressures.

However, the behavior of the price index in recent months has been considerably more moderate and thus in late August, the annual inflation rate was 14.7 percent, as opposed to 14.4 percent in August 1981.

Based on this data, the confidential report of the Bank of Spain predicted an inflation rate of 14.5-15 percent for 1982, practically identical to that of 1981. The continuing inflation rate, from 1981 to 1982, is considered serious, especially since it interrupts a certain process of decline that began after the stabilization policy of Fuentes Quintana in 1977, which was subsequently endorsed in the Moncloa accords.

The OECD Differential

However, as noted by various research services, the most disturbing aspect of the behavior of prices is not their continued high level of 14.5-15 percent, but the radical difference existing between the development of prices in Spain and in most OECD countries. Thus while the growth of Spain's consumer price index continues to be 14.5 percent, in OECD countries this index has declined from 10.2 to 8.6 percent, thus the inflation differential between Spain and the group of industrialized countries, formerly 4.4 percentage points, is now 5.9 points. An identical, but not as pronounced, development is taking place in the EEC countries and since our principal markets and competitors are found within the OECD, there is no doubt that the continuation and increase of this differential is damaging our exporting capacity and our ability to attract tourists.

Moreover, such a large inflation differential may increase the trend toward the peseta's depreciation, which we will analyze tomorrow in the second part of this report.

Wages and Labor Costs

According to the aforementioned report of the Bank of Spain, the development of wages in the first half of the year was not a source of upward pressure on the rate of inflation. The wage increase resulting from agreements in the first half of the year was 10.4 percent, in comparison to 11.8 percent in the same period of the previous year. According to the wage survey, the increase in average hourly earnings declined from 20.7 percent in the first half of 1981 to 15 percent. Finally, the increase in personal income declined from 15.9 percent in 1981 to 14.1 percent in 1982.

Regarding labor costs, the Bank of Spain estimated a 2.7-percent increase in apparent average productivity, as a result of a slight increase in unemployment, and thus arrived at an 11-percent increase in labor costs for 1982.

In this regard, it is noted that the recorded moderate growth of average labor costs has played a significant role in the slow process of decelerating inflation, both as a result of the development of nominal wages and improvement of the system's overall productivity, caused by the decline in the number of employed workers for slight production increases.

In this respect, concerning the future, it appears that this method of increasing the system's general productivity is now quite exhausted, with unemployment exceeding 2 million people. It is therefore considered essential--especially if we want to reduce the level of unemployment--to keep a close watch on the development of nominal wages in future months.

On the other hand, production costs also depend on the cost of imports, thus the development of the average cost of imports seems rather positive, inasmuch as its increase has changed from 30.6 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1982.

The Bank of Spain therefore concludes by pointing out that the development of costs and prices in the future will basically depend on both the behavior of nominal wages and the peseta's rate of exchange. Thus these are two important challenges facing the new socialist government: wage moderation and maintenance of the rate of exchange.

General Picture of the Economy
Growth Rates over Preceding Period, Constant 1970 Prices
(30 September 1982)

<u>Demand--Production</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u> <u>(Estimated)</u>
Private Consumption	1.1	1.1	-0.5 to -0.3
Public Consumption	4.2	2.0	2.9
Gross Formation of Fixed Capital	-1.0	1.5	2.1 to 1.4
Domestic Demand (Excluding Stocks)	1.1	-0.3	0.4
Change in Stocks	(0.5)	(-1.5)	--
Total Domestic Demand	1.6	-1.7	0.4
Exports of Goods and Services	2.8	8.1	5.0
Imports of Goods and Services	5.4	-4.7	-1.0
GDP	1.2	0.3	1.5
<u>Prices</u>			
GDP Deflation	13.3	13.0	13.8
Consumer Prices	15.5	14.6	14.5
<u>Foreign Trade</u>			
Exports of Goods	4.5	8.5	4.0
Imports of Goods	4.7	-5.8	-1.2

[Table continued on following page]

[Continuation of Table]

	1980	1981	1982 (Estimated)
<u>Employment and Wages</u>			
Wages per Employed Person			
Private Sector	17.5	15.2	14.0
Public Sector	10.5	12.0	11.0
Total Employment	-3.2	-2.3	-1.2
<u>International Transactions</u>			
Balance of Trade	-11.7	-10.1	-9.162
Balance of Payments	-5.2	-5.0	-3.768
<u>Miscellaneous</u>			
Barrel Price (dollars) of			
Imported Oil	30	34	32.5
Exchange Rate (dollars/pesetas)	71.7	92.3	109.0
Industrial Production Index	1.2%	-1.0%	--
Production per Employed Person	4.5%	3.5%	2.7%

Source: Bank of Spain report to government, 15 October 1982

[2 Nov 82 p 30]

[Text] Attention to public deficit and level of reserves: Despite the positive development of the current balance of payments, we will lose 3.000 billion dollars in 1982. The economy that the PSOE will inherit is not only characterized by a low level of activity, a continuation of inflationary pressures and a slight decline in the growth rate of unemployment (see Sunday edition of LA VANGUARDIA). There is also the loss of foreign exchange despite a positive development of the current balance of payments and the difficulties of the anti-inflationary monetary policy as a result of the large public deficit.

The current balance of payments deficit (total of balances of goods, services and transfers) is estimated by the Bank of Spain at \$3.782 billion, which means a significant reduction of more than \$1.200 billion in relation to the 1981 balance of payments deficit. The improvement in the current balance of payments is due to the almost \$1.000-billion trade deficit reduction and to the \$300-million increase in the balance of services (as a result of a good tourist year), as well as to maintenance of the balance of transfers.

However, the reduction of the current balance of payments deficit does not mean a reduction of the Spanish economy's balance of payments problems, since the capital balance surplus (which is decisively helping to reduce the current deficit) in the first 8 months of the year declined from \$3.016 billion in that period in 1981 to \$1.363 billion. Thus the loss of central foreign exchange reserves in the first 8 months of the year amounted to the significant

figure of \$1.649 billion, as opposed to only \$217 million in the same period in 1981. And for the entire year, the Bank of Spain estimates, perhaps somewhat optimistically, that the loss of foreign exchange reserves will be about \$3.000 billion.

Decline of Foreign Credit

The reduction of the capital balance surplus is due to a significant change in the long-term capital balance, whose net revenues were approximately \$940 million in the first 8 months of the year, as opposed to \$3.641 billion in the same period in 1981. This change in the long-term balance of capital is caused by the different behavior of the private sector. While the private sector received a large amount of investments and foreign loans in 1981, in 1982 these investments have declined somewhat and foreign loans have dropped drastically (the net balance of these loans dropped from \$2.000 billion to \$500 million in the first 7 months of the year, in comparison to the same period of the previous year). At the same time, the private sector has considerably increased its investments abroad (from \$156 to \$425 million) and loans granted by Spain abroad, basically loans to promote exports, have jumped from \$300 to \$900 million.

Uncertainty over the development of the peseta's exchange rates should be noted as one of the causes of this significant reduction of foreign loans. This has caused many companies to hesitate to continue contracting debts in strong currencies such as the dollar, yen, Swiss franc or even the pound sterling because of the possible increase in the cost of such debts as a result of a hypothetical devaluation of the peseta. The emergence of a new kind of long-term loan in the domestic market, syndicated loans in pesetas, a procedure recently introduced in our country and in which foreign banks have played an important role, has also been significant.

Fear over Peseta

As a result of the loss of foreign exchange reserves and the growth of our inflation differential with OECD countries, the peseta's value has depreciated significantly during the year. Its depreciation has been particularly strong in relation to the U.S. dollar, losing 15 percent of its value, and more moderately (about 5 percent) in relation to the Deutsche Mark, the Dutch guilder and the pound sterling. On the other hand, the peseta has risen in relation to the French franc (6.5 percent), Belgian franc (9.2 percent), Japanese yen (4 percent) and even the Swiss franc (2.7 percent).

Pressure on the peseta has been especially strong since the general elections were held in late August. The Bank of Spain at first tried to counteract such pressure, suffering foreign exchange losses only to later accept a more pronounced depreciation of the peseta. Thus in comparison to an average exchange rate of 98.42 pesetas in relation to the dollar in January, this exchange rate was 112.97 in September and rose 0.5 pesetas last Friday, the first day after the elections, putting the Bank of Spain's "fixing" at 117.5 with very little intervention by the issuing bank, which seems rather reassuring. At any rate, it is certain that maintaining the peseta's exchange rate, an essential

prerequisite for preventing an increase in the cost of imports, which could be a source of inflationary pressure, is one of the most difficult tasks facing the new socialist government. In this regard, PSOE experts recently told LA VANGUARDIA of their intention to maintain the peseta's exchange rate and pointed out that maintaining its exchange rate will be facilitated by the decline of interest rates in the United States, which should logically involve a weakening of the dollar in world foreign exchange markets.

Public Deficit of 830.000 Billion Pesetas

The steady growth of the public deficit is also one of the main economic problems that the socialists will inherit. The deficit of public administrative agencies, which was 420.000 billion pesetas in 1980, has in fact risen to 610.000 billion, 3.6 percent of the GDP in 1981, and is expected to be about 830.000 billion by the end of the year, which comes to 4.2 percent of the GDP. Even so, Bank of Spain experts point out that this deficit has been reduced as a result of the Cortes having been dissolved and the subsequent impossibility of approving foreign loans. If the Cortes had not been dissolved, this deficit would have approached 900.000 billion pesetas, or 4.5 percent of the GDP.

With a deficit of this size--4.5 percent of the GDP--the socialists should not feel any doctrinal fear, since this percentage is less than that of other European countries and use of the public deficit does not scare European socialists inspired by Keynesianism. However, the importance of this deficit was pointed out to LA VANGUARDIA by the aforementioned socialist experts as a cause for concern. Actually, this deficit is causing the growth of liquid assets (cash held by the public plus bank deposits), which is a source of inflation and which therefore threatens the peseta's exchange rate. In an effort to prevent this, the Bank of Spain is having problems controlling the money supply, as a result of trying to drain excess liquidity from the system, causing an increase in interest rates, which may hamper the economy's recovery. That is why the socialists are talking more and more about the need to control the public deficit.

Revenues and Expenses

Current revenues will have grown by 15.7 percent this year, basically as a result of the growth of indirect and production taxes, while financial expenses will increase by 17.6 percent. The strongest growth among expenditures is in the category of public investment (30 percent), as well as operating subsidies (27.6 percent), capital transfers (25.6 percent) and interest payments (37.5 percent). Among transfer expenditures, a strong deceleration is noted in the case of social services (15-percent growth in comparison to 20 percent in 1981), due to a slight decline in pensions and unemployment benefits as a result of the full implementation of the benefit-period reduction provision of the Employment Law.

Foreign Debt: \$28.000 Billion

As we stated previously, the private sector's reduced use of foreign credit this year will cause a slight increase in such indebtedness and a significant loss of foreign exchange reserves. Thus by the end of the year, the Bank of

Spain estimates a total foreign debt of \$28.000 billion, in comparison to \$27.205 billion at the end of 1981. This debt increase for 1982 is much less than that of past years, since Spain's foreign debt was respectively \$23.700 and \$19.500 billion at the end of 1980 and 1979.

Moreover, unlike the situation of other countries, the existence of this foreign debt does not entail any serious problems for the Spanish economy, since the foreign exchange reserves/foreign debt and total exports/foreign debt ratios are satisfactory. In addition, this debt's maturity, almost entirely long term, is quite appropriate, since Spain will be obliged to pay approximately \$3.000-4.000 billion in the next 4 years.

However, with this not excessively bright deficit outlook, Spain is a country that will have to continue using private international financing in the coming years, which may cause a problem in an international financial system that has hardened considerably because of the difficult payment situation of some countries, such as Mexico, Argentina and most countries of Eastern Europe, starting with Poland. Thus an economic policy that would lead to a greater need for international financing and to a loss of foreign exchange reserves (an unwisely expansive policy) would quickly run into the bottleneck of the foreign sector, as Bank of Spain experts point out.

Debt needs in the coming years will also require a stable exchange rate. Otherwise, the private sector (with a foreign debt of \$15.500 billion, as opposed to \$12.000 billion for the public sector by the end of the second half of the year) will be reluctant to contract debts in currencies that will present the risk, as was the case this year, or even to a greater degree, of a significant loss of foreign exchange reserves. Under these circumstances, companies utilizing foreign financing could later have problems paying their debts.

Nonfinancial Income and Expenses of Public Administrative Agencies

	Amount in Billions of Pesetas		Growth Rates in Percentages	
	1981	1982	82/81	81/80
Total Nonfinancial Income	5,312.6	6,147.6	15.7	17.1
Taxes on Income and Wealth	1,141.2	1,300.9	14.0	10.9
Taxes on Production and Imports	1,265.7	1,554.5	22.9	28.7
Actual Social Contributions	2,044.5	2,309.9	13.0	13.3
Implied Social Contributions	195.5	207.9	6.3	5.8
Current Transfers	329.2	364.5	10.7	17.1
Gross Operating Surplus	64.6	73.2	13.3	15.0
Income from Property	230.1	284.6	23.7	40.9
Current International Cooperation	2.0	3.0	--	--
Taxes on Capital	36.0	44.1	22.5	24.1
Transfers of Capital	4.3	5.0	16.3	22.9

[Table continued on following page]

[Continuation of table]

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>82/81</u>	<u>81/80</u>
Total Nonfinancial Expenses	5,930.6	6,977.9	17.6	19.5
Public Consumption	1,997.6	2,297.7	15.0	14.3
Social Benefits	2,490.1	2,870.5	14.9	20.4
Operating Subsidies	282.8	360.8	27.6	12.5
Current Transfers	256.3	204.0	10.4	8.2
Property Rental (Actual Interest)	136.5	187.6	37.5	16.3
International Cooperation	4.7	6.0	27.7	27.0
Gross Capital Formation	410.3	532.0	29.7	47.2
Net Real Estate Acquisition	19.5	21.3	9.2	1.0
Capital Transfers	324.0	410.0	25.6	37.0
Financial Needs	-610.0	-830.2	--	--
Memoranda Accounts:				
Savings	96.3	91.9	-5.6	32.2
Current Income	5,272.3	6,098.5	14.7	17.1
Current Expenses	5,176.0	6,006.6	16.0	16.0

Source: Bank of Spain Research Department, Estimate of 20 September 1982

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CSO: 3548/28

STUDY ON LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP, MOTIVATION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 29 Nov 82 p 57

[Text] At the end of 1981, 36.8 percent of the working population in Spain was affiliated with unions, according to a study carried out by the Sociological Investigative Team [EDIS] which has been published by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, according to EFE. The study was carried out during the last 3 months of 1981 and involved the use of 2,000 surveys in 114 different locations in Spain, among a group of workers who theoretically were eligible to have participated in the 1980 union elections, involving a population of about 6.5 million people.

By unions, the distribution of members was 897,000 for the Workers Commissions [CCOO], followed by the General Union of Workers [UGT] with 806,000 activists. The Trade Union Workers have 225,000 members; the Basque unions, ELA-STV and LAB and the Catalan SOC have a combined total of 104,000; the independent unions include 98,000 and several others, CSUT, SU and CNT, total 260,000. According to the EDIS team, these figures presume a stabilization of union affiliation after two periods of marked fluctuation.

The first period was the one between 1978 and 1979 when there was widespread union affiliation which surpassed 50 percent of the active population, in this case including officials and the unemployed. The second period occurred after that period, registering a decline in union affiliation which the EDIS team estimates at 20 percent. This up-and-down dynamics of union affiliation stabilized in 1981, resulting in a level of union activism of 36.8 percent of the active working population, not including officials.

Reasons for Nonaffiliation

Union disaffiliation, however, did not affect all unions equally. The independent organizations were the ones that suffered the greatest losses of members which the study estimates at 35 percent. Behind them are CCOO and the organizations that only operate in Catalonia and the Basque region with 30 percent. UGT found its affiliation down by only 12 percent. The only union group that did not find itself involved in the disaffiliation process was USO, as it succeeded in doubling its number of members during the 1978-1979 period.

Workers who had dropped their affiliation or who were not members of unions expressed five reasons for supporting their position. Percentage-wise, about 29.5 percent indicated that they had dropped their union affiliation or did not belong to a union because the unions "are more concerned about party interests than the workers." A second group, comprised of about 28.3 percent, indicated that "being affiliated is the same as not being affiliated." The third reason, with 17.9 percent, was "I do not like hassles." The response of 14.8 percent of the workers was, "I do not join because of the lack of unity and the infighting among union organizations", and finally, 9.5 percent held the opinion that "there is no organization open to all workers with a particular ideological plurality."

The EIDS study divides the five reasons into two homogeneous groups. In the first group would be those who answer that "being affiliated is the same as not being affiliated," and those who say, "I do not like hassles," with a total of 46.2 percent. EDIS assesses the replies of this group as "a clear lack of involvement in union activity."

The second group would be comprised of those who indicate the other three reasons mentioned above and who represent 53.8 percent of those not affiliated or disaffiliated. According to the authors, this second group of responses has in common "a clear and conscious criticism of union conduct, such as favoritism, intolerance, fighting, etc."

The study also considers changes in union affiliation which involves about 18.6 percent of the total number of members of union organizations. Of this group, some 41.4 percent claim that they changed unions because the one they belonged to "did not meet their personal needs." About 33.5 percent stated that they had decided to change unions because of a lack of credibility and efficiency in organization in the union to which they previously belonged, and 24.3 percent indicated that it had been because of the policies of their union in its relations with the employers.

This last response was expressed in two ways; some stated that they had changed their union affiliation because of the weakness of their former union and its unwillingness to stand up to employers, and others pointed out that they had changed affiliation because of disputes and a lack of realism on the part of the union during negotiations.

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CSO: 3548/45

UGT AHEAD OF CCOO IN LABOR UNION ELECTIONS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 26 Nov 82 p 51

[Article by Rodolfo Serrano]

[Text] The struggle for supremacy in the present elections is producing serious confrontations between the CCOO [workers commission] and General Union of Workers [UGT] unions and the administration. The publication of the 31 October election results (see yesterday's edition of EL PAIS) which showed UGT as the winner with 40.65 percent of the elected delegates, announced by EFE and based on data from the Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation Institute, has raised a protest from labor commissions. Yesterday the institute released a statement denying responsibility for the publication of the results.

The data, although appreciably lessening the gap, appeared to confirm the advantage of UGT in the elections. A month ago, the first official count was published in the midst of confusion created by figures supported by CCOO and UGT. At that time, CCOO indicated its disagreement with the results, arguing that pending challenges were not taken into account and that the figures included delegates who were fraudulently elected.

Provisional Status of Results

Felipe Arman, director general of IMAC has been cautioning that the results reported by his organization are provisional, and he has expressed his wish that they not be published until the electoral process is completed in order to prevent their probable influence on the final results. Nevertheless, bowing to union pressure, the labor minister last month announced preliminary results of an official nature which gave the clear advantage to UGT over CCOO.

Although assurances were given at the beginning that provisional figures would be released periodically, an IMAC circular regulating the admission of election certification which introduced an anti-fraud clause and the review of certifications after they have been completed, has delayed the publication of the figures until a dispatch from EFE yesterday announced the 31 October election results. According to these figures, UGT is still in the lead with 40.65 percent of the elected delegates, followed by CCOO with 38.01 percent.

The announcement of these figures has provoked an immediate response from CCOO which yesterday accused the administration of interfering in the electoral process. According to the union, Felipe Arman himself had insisted on the provisional status of the results at a meeting of the subcommittee on union elections, and along with the draft of results, a photocopy was provided in which assurances were made that certifications had been received from almost no provinces, that the provincial IMAC's had not met, and that only a minimal number of certifications had been approved.

At that meeting, and always according to the same sources, it was indicated that based on agreements reached at a previous meeting, the next partial results would be published on 31 November after they had been studied by all members of IMAC and it had been determined that all of the necessary requirements had been met.

Union Reaction

Yesterday CCOO and UGT union leaders began a feverish round of activity with Ministry of Labor officials. CCOO demanded that the administration deny the official status of the figures announced by that agency, and UGT, on the other hand, insisting that the agency recognize the results as official.

The director of IMAC, Felipe Arman, issued a statement to the press at the Ministry of Labor to the effect that while not contradicting the figures, he denied any responsibility for their dissemination. The text of the statement read, "IMAC wishes to clarify that the announcement appearing today (yesterday) in the media reporting that the provisional results of the union elections had been officially published, is not based on any official appraisal, and in any case, if the results reach the communication media, IMAC assumes no responsibility for it."

Later in the statement he emphasized, "IMAC never publishes provisional results, and internal working documents which are available to the permanent committee of representatives of union headquarters and business associations do not represent an official appraisal of the results, only information for interested parties."

Manuel Chaves of UGT confirmed to this newspaper that Felipe Arman had admitted to him that the figures published yesterday were the same ones that had been made available to union representatives. Chaves pointed out that the figures were of course provisional, since it would be necessary to await the completion of the electoral process before recognizing them as official.

CCOO sources, in an interview with the undersecretary of employment, confirmed that he had admitted that the figures could not be considered official.

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CSO: 3548/45

PSOE'S BOYER ON ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, POLICIES

Madrid ACTUALIDAD in Spanish 2 Dec 82 pp 16-18

[Article by Eduardo Ferreira]

[Text] When 45 minutes after the appointed time Luis Coronel de Palma announced from the door of the room where the event was taking place that Miguel Boyer had arrived, he squelched one of the rumors that had begun to circulate among the nearly 300 people present: the "fall of the cartel" of the Socialist deputy in view of his almost certain and immediate appointment as minister of economics and finance in the new administration. This event--which was in fact the debut of the next economic strongman--turned the beginning of a roundtable discussion on "The Spanish Economy Vis-a-vis the Future" (organized by the European Center for the Training of Directors and sponsored by the Spanish Confederation of Savings Institutions) into a political event.

Last Minute Changes

The delay gave the guests time to make all kinds of comments on the magic of power, observing how Coronel de Palma, Fuentes Quintana, Allue, Alcaide and the other participants awaited the arrival of the political celebrity without a grumble. There was also time to dwell on the comparison of the wording of the official invitation (probably printed under very different political circumstances) and that of the announcement of the event that appeared in the press that day. Enrique Fuentes had replaced the president of the European Center for the Training of Directors in the opening remarks, and Miguel Boyer, who in the previous invitation appeared as the last speaker with a presentation entitled "Outlook for Economic Policy," had been given the job of closing the meeting under the more discreet title of "Economic Policy in Spain."

At first, Miguel Boyer tried to burst once and for all the bubble of political expectation that his presence had caused. He asserted that revealing the general lines of the economic actions to be taken by the new administration would be unfair to the future president of the executive (who must explain them during confirmation hearings) by possibly interfering with his immediate task, and would even be unfair to the present administration. But when the man everyone has dubbed the next economic "superminister" began

to discuss economic policy, it was very difficult not to hang on his every word, in keeping with his status as a minister "in petto."

No New Formulas

Miguel Boyer opened the subject by presenting a classic review of the evils that plague the Spanish economy (structural deficiencies, inflation, deficits, unemployment, etc.), "to which we should add, if we are to make a full inventory, a series of specific problems in industrial and financial enterprises that, for lack of attention, have all exploded at once, leaving us now with very little room to maneuver and with very serious short-term issues to grapple with."

Those who expected Boyer to reveal something sensational (which would have been uncharacteristic of him) were soon disappointed: "The fundamental message of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) is based on the existence of solutions that allow us a modicum of relative optimism."

"No one should expect miraculous or original formulas, because unfortunately there are no golden pathways leading us out of the crisis, no special formulas that are extraordinarily brilliant or different from what has been implemented so far. The only general formula is to continue an effort that has already been launched, and to appeal for solidarity, without pettiness, when it comes time to put this effort into practice." The only original contribution Miguel Boyer attributes to his party is the implementation of the solutions with a greater degree of common sense, "which has not been possible until now because of a lack of strength, skill or political will."

The only concrete measure mentioned by Boyer, to be taken by the economic team of the incoming administration, was his intention of merging the Ministries of Economics and Finance in order to achieve greater coherence in economic decisionmaking. "Anyone who has intimate knowledge of government," he said, "has witnessed the internecine struggles among ministries and the problems in meshing long-term reforms with short-term measures. We are not concerned about the concentration of power that this would entail, because the minister will have significant checks and balances, including public opinion."

Neither Stabilization nor Expansionism

Boyer outlined government actions from the macroeconomic point of view, beginning with a rejection of two extremes: a stabilization plan and a policy of extreme depressive rigor that would curb domestic demand and aggravate problems, and an all-out expansionist policy based on domestic demand, public or private, that by ignoring the international context would lead inexorably to a stabilization plan under very unfavorable conditions, to isolation from developed countries, and to the loss of credibility abroad.

Miguel Boyer had no qualms about expressing his near obsession with putting the Spanish economy in a position to take advantage of the international recovery, which he expects by the middle of this term: "We will undertake a

policy that combines the available instruments, aiming at growth rates higher than those attained so far, making maximum use of our own potential for recovery (increased investment, exports, etc.), and adjusting budgetary and monetary policies to those ends. A more expansive situation than one can imagine will be produced, thanks to the recuperation of the Western economy.

"For the first time since the crisis began, this potential for recovery exists, as demonstrated by the fact that in some countries inflation is dropping faster than expected. Of course, short-term growth rates will not be much above 3 percent, but the international context will be much more favorable in 1983-84. When this happens, we will be able to take advantage of the recuperative effects of an improvement in the international situation."

Without naming his French coreligionists, Boyer tried to assuage fears that Spanish economic policy will stumble into the same pitfalls as the Mitterrand administration: "We will continue to wage our battle against inflation with more decisiveness than similar parties in other countries. We are convinced that inflation hammers at the economy indiscriminately, so we will adjust our budgetary and monetary policy to bring inflation down from its present 14 or 15 percent, a figure we think has touched bottom, similarly reducing the differential with the rest of the countries in our area."

Limiting Profits

As for the famous 800,000 jobs that the PSOE promised to create in its electoral campaign, Miguel Boyer was extremely cautious: "Employment, as you know, is one of our priority objectives, but our commitments are for the entire 4-year legislative term, so no one should expect drastic changes in the upcoming months. The creation of jobs depends only marginally on isolated measures; to obtain significant results in this field it is necessary for the entire economy to function well. If our political acumen enables us to obtain an annual growth rate of between 2 and 3.5 percent, we will reverse the trend in unemployment. That growth can be attained on the demand side, as long as we are capable of being united on the limitation of profits."

The only crack in the optimism was presented by Boyer when he discussed the political framework in which the administration will develop. Here he did make a joyful proclamation: "This is the most favorable political context of the century; a manifestation of popular will like that of the recent elections has been able to brighten the political picture in an unprecedented way. The PSOE has an parliamentary majority that is extraordinarily favorable for taking action in economic policy." The errors and deficiencies, then, as well as the successes, will be reviewed in private by the economic team of the new administration.

In Tune with Bank of Spain

After Boyer's speech, the absolute harmony between the Socialist leader's statements and the "Report on the Economic Situation" issued in late October by the Bank of Spain and written at the request of the Ministry of

Economics, became obvious. The surprise stemmed not so much from the fact itself as from the manipulation to which the bank's report was subjected at the time (see ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA No 1,278). Leaked to the press 24 hours before the general elections, it was presented as proof of the failure of the Democratic Center Union (UCD) government's economic policy. This sparked open indignation in the Ministry of Economics as well as the Bank of Spain itself. A reading of the report confirmed later that it confined itself to urging that the economic policy pursued by the government be maintained, and applied more strictly, especially in controlling the public deficit.

Part of Boyer's speech was as similar to that report as two peas in a pod; the report was presented--some say through electoral maneuvering by the PSOE--as a criticism of the government economic team. It was particularly similar to this extract from the last paragraph of the Bank of Spain report: "This report is based on the conviction that the steady incorporation of the Spanish economy into the approaching recovery of the world economy requires that actions continue to correct existing monetary imbalances and to ensure, of course, that they are not aggravated; and it assumes that sustained growth requires a rationalization of businesses to make them profitable and a major effort to reassign productive resources." No one expects the Bank of Spain to sue the former advisor to its Studies Service for copyright violation; the man is highly esteemed in that establishment.

8926

CSO: 3548/53

UGT'S REDONDO ON RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 10/16 Nov 82 pp 25-27

[Interview with Nicolas Redondo of UGT, by Sol Padilla; date and place not specified]

[Text] "We are going to collaborate with the PSOE as a brotherly critic. UGT expects the same thing from the Socialist Party as do the Spanish people who voted in mass for it: the fulfillment of its program and an end to the corruption that still exists in the country." With these words Nicolas Redondo synthesized the UGT position one week after the elections and at the end of the joint meeting between the executive committees of the UGT and PSOE.

Our of this first meeting between the future party in power and the UGT, during which the electoral results were evaluated and the socioeconomic outlook for the next year were studied, a mixed commission was formed to study the most appropriate methods for the collective bargaining for next year. The commission, made up by Jose Luis Corcuera, Jose Maria Zufiaur and Fernando Mendez from the UGT, and Manuel Chavex, Joaquin Almunia and Carmen Mestre from the PSOE, will meet periodically to define the type of coordination and socioeconomic planning which will govern the laboring group in the next year. Hours before this meeting Nicolas Redondo made an evaluation of the current political and trade union positions of the country following 28 October.

EL SOCIALISTA: What meaning does UGT give to the overwhelming triumph of the PSOE in these elections?

Nicolas Redondo: Well, the triumph of the Socialist Party is in part our triumph, because about a month ago there was an agreement in the Allied Committee in which support of the party was unanimously approved and we have made this support known via all the media, through communiques, posters and a letter of mine addressed to the UGT delegates and workers. We did this because the need the country had for change seemed fundamental to us, and we saw that the only possibility to bring it about was tied to the PSOE. Likewise, we are satisfied by the incidence of the "Basic Outline

for Reform Program" that the UGT drew up, having later been adopted, practically in its entirety, by the PSOE in its economic program, which I feel also contributed to helping the PSOE win. Now, what remains for us to do is work toward seeing that this program is fulfilled.

EL SOCIALISTS: It seems that the Socialist Party can postpone the current budgets until it comes gradually to understand the opinions of the socialist forces on wages, etc. How does the UGT outline the subject of wages for the next year? Would the working class be willing to continue reducing their wages in a crisis situation in order to support the most critical groups?

Nicolas Redondo: Well, in general terms the negotiating of collective agreements for next year will be done on the basis of maintaining the purchasing power of wages. One of the commitments of the party program was precisely this, to maintain the purchasing level of wages and to extend the same buying power to the 4.5 million pensioners and to the several thousand officials. In due time the UGT negotiated with the PSOE on this basis, including within the public enterprises where the socialist government itself will act as owner. Therefore, our position is that whatever the anticipated cost of living index may be, wages will be established based upon maintaining the buying power along general lines, which does not mean to say that in some companies with demonstrated economic limitations one cannot bargain below this index.

We are going to adopt, I would say, an attitude of brotherly critic with regard to the government party, also knowing what we are risking since a defeat of this government would be a defeat of all the progressive forces and all the people, and the success of this government would have all the advantages for these same progressive forces and for the people. We know that in order to achieve these successes there are different areas of responsibility: some are political, some for the trade unions, others cultural, etc. We from the trade union have our responsibilities which are not opposed to or antagonistic to a progressive government, but there may be some disagreements at times. It is to be hoped that they will not go beyond that and give way to confrontations. I must say that the UGT is going to support this government with everything from without.

UGT Does Not Want Ministries

EL SOCIALISTA: This is why UGT has decided not to bring any of its members into the ministries.

Nicolas Redondo: Certainly. I believe that this has not been well understood and has been able to bring out some weaknesses in the party. It was a decision that we made at an executive meeting on 19 October. We did not make it known because it could have appeared overly triumphant at that time. But then we decided that none of the members of the executive committee was willing to assume a responsible position in the Ministry of Labor. To me, this seems to be a good thing, because we can support the

government from outside, but we have no reason to create the confusion that it appears that the UGT is governing. We want to maintain our responsibility as a trade union, and we are willing to continue discussing and collaborating with the Socialist government from our proper position, without extremism or edginess. We also want to receive similar treatment from the Socialist government.

UGT's Undeniable Trade Union Subjects

EL SOCIALISTA: How will the trade union actions be expressed after 28 October?

Nicolas Redondo: First, some laws must be defined and modified, such as the Worker's Statute, and Basic Employment, or make organiz laws of the Freedom to Form Trade Unions and Strike, which remain pending. Once the legislative framework is formulated it must be applied and enforced, counting on the support of the trade unions. With regard to the participation of the workers in the enterprises, its development is being studied by some UGT experts. In time, when these studies are finished, we intend to meet with PSOE experts to contrast positions.

Because it must be very clear that UGT intends to form the trade union projects and to go to the bargaining table with our criteria on the subject, and then to confront the party criteria. What we are not going to do is abandon these subjects. I have confidence in the PSOE experts, but I would like trade union matters to be studied by UGT experts in order to defeat UGT criteria before the ministries. And I am sure we will be able to agree.

EL SOCIALISTA: The first sociologic studeis on the meaning of the PSOE vote assure that a large portion of those votes come from workers who at the union level vote for the CCOO (Workers Commissions). Might this fact change relations between both unions?

Nicolas Redondo: I believe a certain distinction would have to be made here between what groups make up the CCOO, with its affiliates and militants who may not be in political parties or in non-communist political parties, and what is the leadership structure of the CCOO, wherein almost all are involved with the Communist Party or with Communist affiliated parties of the most varied range, from Euro-Communists to pro-Soviets. And this trade union apparatus, in my opinion, is not going to facilitate very much the work of the Socialist government. Maybe they do not practice a clear policy either, but, really, I believe it cannot be said that the CCOO is inclined toward the Socialist Party.

Trade Union Committees Or Sections, False Argument

EL SOCIALISTA: Camacho has stated that he would support the Socialist government as long as it does not practice a policy opposed to the company committees. Does this clarification presuppose that the UGT is against these committees?

Nicolas Redondo: This is a false argument, because we, as the UGT, are in favor of the company committees where, among other things, we are majority members. Even during the underground period, the UGT began to form the company committees as a fighting body. Now I feel one must distinguish between the functions corresponding to the committees, which are many, and those corresponding to the trade unions, especially on the subject of collective bargaining.

In the dialectic between both there is no possibility for exclusion of the committees or of the trade union sections. It is not that. Each body, I repeat, has its functions.

From our point of view, if we want to strengthen trade unionism, it is necessary that it be the unions that carry the protagonism of collective bargaining. I know of no country where the company committees negotiate for the collective agreements. On the contrary, it is the unions that negotiate them, and then they may have some determined applications which the committees carry out, but not the bargaining itself. This is clear, and therefore, the idea of trade union committee or section is a false alternative. I do not know if this option is put forth because its meaning is not well known, or because excuses are sought to cause confrontations for no reason.

EL SOCIALISTA: The latest data from IMAC on the trade union election results give a clear advantage to the UGT over the CCOO. Do you believe this rise is due to the image and ability of the UGT itself, or has something to do with the PSOE triumph?

Trade Union Elections. It Is Still Early.

Nicolas Redondo: I do not know. I know regions where for some time the PSOE has been getting an extraordinary victory in the elections, which have not had repercussions on the UGT. It is very difficult to evaluate the relationship of one vote to another, though it is possible that it may have some effect, especially now, after 28 October. But, specifically, I feel we are getting some positive results, more than anything else, from the responsible behavior of the UGT itself, which has been demonstrated during the past few years, and especially since the last union elections in 1980.

Trade Union Inheritance

In any way, I want to show that the differences between the UGT and CCOO results are not abysmal, and much less so when the computation period is over on 31 December when the differences in delegates are going to be imperceptible between the two headquarters. Because, logically, a difference of 2,000 delegates in 33 percent of votes that may be recorded up to now is not the same as 2,000 delegates in 100 percent of votes in December. Also, and I am speaking truthfully, it is still early to cry victory, there may still be some upsets.

EL SOCIALISTA: Will it be with a Socialist government that the dispute over the return of the historic and accumulated patrimony of the trade unions will finally be resolved?

Nicolas Redondo: It would be hoped. This dispute has lasted for some time now and even though in all the European countries like Austria, Germany, France, Italy, etc the problem was solved after long years, it seems to me that it is not good that a dispute exists between a government and a union organization. A democratic government should recognize the right to property of a patrimony that was confiscated from the unions in a context of civil war. I feel that now, when it is 1982, it is time to bring some justice to this matter. It is not going to be easy, we are aware of that. To begin, many of the trade union houses have disappeared, or it is complicated to quantify the value of the patrimony in cooperatives that existed in quantities, from cooperatives for protection, distribution, consumption, etc. But I believe it is the obligation of a leftist government to seek solutions to these problems and to resolve this dispute over historic patrimony as soon as possible.

Then there is the other dispute over the accumulated patrimony which should be resolved as well, and as soon as possible to the benefit of the country and the government itself.

EL SOCIALISTA: Certainly the national government has for now frozen the return of the 800 million being considered for concession to the unions on account of this accumulated patrimony, in response to a demand of the CNT. What do you think of this?

Nicolas Redondo: Yes, I just saw the news, and I have very few facts right now. But, I believe that the return of this money was invalidated beforehand by the brazen support of the UCD for the USO to whom, according to the Worker's Statute, no part of this split should belong, since it had not obtained either a 10 percent representation at the national level, or 15 percent at the community level. According to the Statute, only four of the unions would have a right to this division by virtue of having these percentages of representation: UGT, CCOO at the state level and the Basque union, Ela-STV and the Galician ING.

Therefore, the inclusion of the USO was not right and has been a response to totally discriminatory motivations of the UCD government, which has naturally provoked the indignation of the other unions, among them the CNT, which rightfully asked itself why the USO was going to benefit from the division and not it. Thus, to this matter, which must be studied in greater depth, the UGT will return, and I think the government will have to study it again as well.

9730

CSO: 3548/44

NEW SDP SECRETARY REJECTS FELDT PROPOSAL TO RECONSIDER 'FUND'

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] "There is a big rush for a proposal for wage-earners' funds." That is what Bo Toresson, the new Social Democratic Party secretary, says in an interview with DAGENS NYHETER. He wants not only the proposal to be presented before the next election in September 1985 but also to be handled by the spring session of parliament in that year.

Bo Toresson says also that it is not necessary to regard the passage of the wage-earners' funds as "one big package."

"The proposal concerning profit sharing in 1983, which has been made by the government, can be regarded as a step, and the government can come with the next step next year," he says.

In his new office at party headquarters on Sveavagen, he relates how "the telephone got hot" for 2 days after the "unfortunate" interview of Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt recently in VECKANS AFFARER.

In it Feldt postponed the timetable for the proposal regarding funds to after the 1985 election.

"Social Democrats throughout the country called and wanted to know what was involved. Feldt's statement also led to an important discussion in the party board and in the committee involved concerning the import of speeding up things."

Direct Election

Bo Toresson points out that the timetable, as far as he is concerned, has been clear for a long time. The party leaders are obliged to show, at least to a "substantial degree, how they envisage the funds" for the party congress in September 1984, 1 year before the election.

"One important and serious matter to discuss in the party organization is the matter of the ways by which the boards of directors of the funds will be elected. There are different points of view."

Olof Palme made the headlines during the election campaign by saying that he contemplated direction elections to the boards.

Bo Toresson is a little more cautious.

"One has to find a very good reason for departing from the deeply-rooted principle of direct election," he says.

But he admits that the people are perhaps tired of the entire debate regarding the funds. He himself was so at times during the election campaign when he was the chief Social Democratic editor in Ostersund and tried to find arguments for the wage earners' funds.

"But I think that people are only tired of the technical aspects. There is, on the other hand, enormous interest as to how democratic influence will be exercised."

Counterweight

As chief editor Toresson tried to make the debate on funds more concrete by using different well-known local businesses as examples.

"It was important as a counterweight to the campaign of the Swedish Employers' Association. The latter pointed out only negative features. Take, for example, Svenska Cellulose (SCA) which owns half of the forests in my home community of Bracke. It is well managed, but the company alone decides important questions, for example to use an extreme situation, if the forest will be clear cut or logged selectively.

"Funds can, for example, influence the exploitation of raw material. In regard to Sven Persson's investment firmwood fiber, beer, automobile sales, we calculated how much new investment capital would be made available through profit-sharing."

Grand Slam

The Social Democrats made a grand slam in Jamtland. It went almost completely red. Bo Toresson notes with pleasure that even Krokomb went red and was lost by the Center Party despite its able "election worker", the incumbent minister of industry, Nils G Alsing.

Bo Toresson, former head of the Workers' Educational Association and one of "Palme's boys", that is, a speechwriter in the old government office building, believes that his main task in his new position is "to keep up the good spirits of the party workers on the firing line awaiting positive results."

In the frontline, according to Bo Toresson, stand "the people who during coffee breaks, in the local clubs and in the work places" who should be able to explain that the still increasing unemployment figures, for example, are only temporary.

6893

CSO: 3650/65

NEED FOR UNITY STRESSED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH EEC

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 21 Nov 82 p 3

[Text] The things the minister of foreign affairs, Nikos Rolandis, said a few days ago about Cyprus' relations with the European Economic Community--that these relations are passing through a deep crisis--are being confirmed by related reports which refer to the conferences here in Nicosia concerning this issue which is so serious for us.

Cyprus may be a small quantity for the Common Market, but the problems which exist and are hampering our relations with the EEC are influencing to a great degree the Cypriot economy, a fact which is of paramount significance for us. And the problem is becoming more serious because the prospects internationally relative to economic developments do not appear to be optimistic and will require readjustments by all countries and by Cyprus.

We cannot know with what pressure or influence or power of persuasion we will be able to change the EEC member-countries' present stance which is unfavorable for us. We may also achieve nothing.

It is a possibility, a strong possibility, that the Common Market will stick to its present positions which do not strengthen us, but, to the contrary, create problems for us which are increased by other economic developments. We will not concern ourselves with the reasons for the coalition of EEC countries possibly persisting in its present positions which are disadvantageous for us, no matter how much Greece's equally honored participation in the Community may offer us an important voice for pleading on behalf of Cypriot viewpoints compared to others. But since the principle of unanimity is in force in the Community, the oppositions of France and Italy are likely to prevent new developments opening.

Serious tasks concerning both the present and future lie before us. The problem is one of the most serious. As is the political issue. For this reason, we believe that, even though the Cypriot Government may have responsibilities for its handling, we must not exclude its collective confrontation, by all the political leadership; but under the inviolable prerequisite that it must not be confronted with anything but objective and national criteria, with whatever is in our people's interest. The conclusions of the recent conference in Nicosia, in which Greece's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Varfis, participated, could be placed before the whole Cypriot leadership and could be a subject of common discussion in the form of a national economic council which will deal with this serious problem.

9247

CSO: 3521/106

IMPERIALISM SEEN OBSTACLE TO CYPRIOTS' RECONCILIATION

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 21 Nov 82 p 1

[Excerpts] It is general knowledge that Denktash has recently set aside pretenses and is proceeding to implementation of his dichotomous, chauvinistic policy openly, without any effort to conceal his intentions and final purposes. It is all too clear that this effrontery of Denktash springs from the encouragement and patronage of the Turkish junta, as representative of the occupier Attila. Without an agreement with Ankara, Denktash could not replace the Cypriot pound with Turkish currency, or organize provocative military exercises or proceed to an expensive, dichotomous program for separate ports and airports!

There is positive information that the majority of Turkish Cypriots are firmly and stubbornly opposed to Denktash's dichotomous, chauvinistic plans. The newspapers of two Turkish Cypriot parties, which influence more than half of the voters, are publishing critical comments about Denktash's separative measures and charge that "he has secret thoughts about bisection." Turkish Cypriot parties of the Center and Left insist at every opportunity that the federated arrangement of the Cypriot Republic fully satisfies the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and are intensely opposed to any "dichotomous" solution. These parties support a solution based on the two summit agreements and the UN resolutions.

In any case, we must not be annoyed and identify the chauvinistic policy of the Turkish occupier and Denktash with the wishes, hopes and will of the Turkish Cypriot community. Even more, we must not, in reaction to the dichotomous and provocative acts of Denktash and Ankara, cultivate chauvinism and national hatred which has always been used by imperialism to promote Cyprus' bisection and subjection. Chauvinism--sick, intolerant nationalism--is, furthermore, the principal weapon of Denktash, Attila and the imperialist enemies of Cyprus.

The Cypriot people as a whole, the great majority of Greeks, Turks and other nationalities of Cyprus, desire wholeheartedly to live in a peaceful, unified, well-governed, federated, independent and demilitarized Cyprus. All-powerful common interests--economic, social and political--unite them.

We believe that patriotism is stronger than chauvinism. We base our hopes on rapprochement, reconciliation and peaceful, creative cooperation of the two communities. And we are sure that patriotism, common sense, peace, humaneness, freedom and love will win and will crush the chauvinism which has accumulated so many sufferings in this country and in all the Cypriot communities--Greek, Turkish, Maronite, Armenian and others.

There are no invincible differences between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The essence of the Cyprus problem is not such differences, which could be solved easily and quickly with substantive inter-Cypriot talks under the aegis of the UN secretary general. The ones who are supporting the Cyprus problem for their own interests exclusively are the imperialists. They encourage the implacability of Denktash and Ankara. They cultivate intercommunal tension and "conflict," using their old "nationalist" collaborators. For us it is clear what is hidden behind the new provocations of Denktash and Ankara. Let all patriots of good faith be careful not to fall into foreign traps, however well-built they may be.

9247

CSO: 3521/105

GOVERNMENT WARNED ON DANGER FROM TURKISH-CYPRIOT 'DEFECTORS'

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 15 Nov 82 p 5

/Article by Filippou Stylianou: "Rapprochement and Deserters"

/Text/ This column dealt 2 months ago with the Turk or Turkish-Cypriot defectors as this relates to our defense. Revealing that many of the defectors came into the free territories to surrender, and that they came in unobserved, we said: "These incidents show how penetrable is our defense. If the passing into our lines is so easy, it is easy to understand how many Turkish spies must be walking unobserved among us daily. How can we have any defense when everything is known to the enemy?"

The recent discovery of a spy network among the "defectors" unfortunately reaffirms our observation. Because of the secrecy covering everything relating to defense we do not know exactly what damage the spies have caused. But judging from their number and the lengthy period they have been active, they must have done a great deal of damage. Eight Turkish-Cypriots plowed for years the free territories, collecting information and military intelligence which they passed on to the officers of the Turkish Army, with whom they were constantly in contact on both sides of the "Attilas" line.

In this way the invaders must have learned the location of the national guard camps, the layout of our defense positions and details on their manning and armaments and will have knowledge of highways and other points of military significance. It would not be an exaggeration to say that everything we had been able to create in the defense sector since 1974, the enemy can now take apart knowing where it is and how to hit it.

The responsibility for this serious blow must not be sought merely in the familiar gaps and weaknesses of a security system. It will be more important to pay attention to the political framework within which our defense is organized. This Turkish-Cypriot spies did not enter the free territories secretly. They entered like heroes who abandoned the oppression and misery of the occupied territories to seek freedom and happiness in the legitimate state.

To portray its policy of rapprochement as effective and successful, the government of the Alliance promoted the fake "defectors" as the negation of "Denktash's

paradise." Thus it made them welcome to the public opinion of the free territories, placing them above suspicion and in effect facilitating their spying activities.

The situation that has resulted from this naive policy resembles very much the situation prevailing in Cyprus before 1974 when the Turks had spread their spies all over the place to prepare the ground for their "Attila." Today, as then, there are some who apparently do not take seriously the question of defense. They have the erroneous view that they can replace defense with slogans such as the "rapprochement" and "the Turks are our brothers." They forget--luring with them a considerable section of public opinion--that we face a ruthless and devious enemy who is ready to exploit any weakness or stupidity on our part.

Beyond the investigations that should be conducted by the military authorities on the question of espionage, there must be at last a comprehensive and responsible discussion on defense in the House of Representatives. It is high time to decide if we want to have real defense or merely a military organization for show, just to justify the employment and salaries of certain persons.

7520

CSO: 3521/93

JOINT PASOK, EDEK COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 13 Nov 82 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] The momentous joint communique issued simultaneously yesterday in Athens and Nicosia following the 3-day-long talks in Athens between the two kindred socialist parties PASOK and the United Democratic Union of the Center [EDEK], following an invitation by the governing Greek party PASOK [states]:

1. A delegation of the socialist party EDEK consisting of its Secretary General Takis Khatziaimitriou and its Central Committee members Doros Theodorou, Renos Prentzas and Andreas Frydas, visited Athens between 8 and 11 November 1982 on the invitation of PASOK in the context of the regular contacts of the two kindred parties for mutual briefing and exchange of views. The discussions which were conducted in a warm, fighting spirit were participated in by PASOK members of its Executive Bureau Giorgios Gennimatas, Petros Maralis, Kostas Laliotis and Andreas Khristodoulidis, the member of its Executive Secretariat Menelaos Givalos and the members of its Foreign Relations Committee Vasilis Konstandeas, Periklis Nearkhou and Giannos Kranidiotis.

Agreement on the Problems Which
Concern the Cypriot People

2. The talks reaffirmed once again the complete similarity of views on the issues which concern the Greek and Cypriot people, as well as on the overall problems of the area.

The Papandreou Visit

3. Both sides agreed that the visit of Premier Andreas Papandreou to Cyprus was a major national event which strengthened the morale of Cypriot Hellenism and showed the determination of the Greek government to uphold the line of cooperation with the Cypriot people in their just struggle.

Papandreou's Support--the Most Decisive Factor

4. The national solidarity and the support of the Greek government and Premier Andreas Papandreou in particular are today the most important factor helping the Cypriot cause both locally and internationally.

The Replacing of the Cypriot Cause

5. The "placing" of the Cypriot cause [on a new basis] by the Greek premier as a top national issue and at the same time as a question of foreign invasion and occupation of an independent member-state of the UN is the fulcrum of the Cypriot struggle and the foundation of a broader national unity. This policy of the Greek government protects and at the same time strengthens the state existence of the Cypriot Republic.

First of All--Withdrawal of Attilas

6. They noted once again that after 7 years of intercommunal talks no substantial progress has been made. The reason is obvious. They are being conducted under the presence of the Turkish occupation forces. This presence transforms the dialogue into a dialogue between Ankara and Nicosia instead of a dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This is the reason why the withdrawal of the Turkish forces is a principal condition for the emergence of a new situation.

PASOK and EDEK Will Intensify the Common Struggle for the Return of All Refugees

7. The two parties agree to continue and intensify their efforts for this purpose to bring about the peaceful, just and viable solution of the Cypriot problem. Such a solution must include the right of all refugees to return to their homes and to guarantee the unhindered exercise of human and political rights to every citizen of the Cypriot Republic. The implementation of the UN resolutions and especially the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-alignment of the Cypriot Republic, the restoration of its democratic character and the demilitarization of Cyprus are the necessary elements of such a solution.

The Change in Greece

8. The PASOK delegation briefed the Cypriot delegation on the progress of the government's work for Change in Greece, especially on the major institutional and other measures being implemented.

Strengthening the Struggle of Cyprus

9. The Cypriot delegation expressed their satisfaction at the accomplishments of the Greek government and saluted its independent and many-dimensional foreign policy which made Greece's voice internationally respectable, safeguards the country's national independence and strengthens the struggle of the Cypriot people.

Salute to the Rise of the Socialists

10. The two parties saluted the rise of the socialist and progressive forces in Europe, the most recent event being the victory of the Workers' Party in Spain which constitutes a great achievement of the Spanish people.

The Palestinian Question

11. Regarding the situation in the Middle East, the two parties condemned again the criminal policy of genocide employed by Israel against the Palestinian and Lebanese people and declared their support for the Palestinian people and its permanent spokesman, the PLO, in their struggle for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The continuation of the crisis in the Middle East is pregnant with dangers against the peace in the area of the world.

12. The Cypriot delegation expressed its appreciation for Greece's positive role in the Middle East crisis which received international recognition.

Close Cooperation in the Common Struggle

13. The two parties which have closely cooperated since their inception in the context of their common struggles for democracy, freedom, justice and peace, will continue and expand this close cooperation and patriotic political alliance for the realization of the goals and the program of Change in Greece and for the success of the common struggle against the shrinking of Hellenism, for a free and democratic Cyprus.

7520

CSO: 3521/93

'AKEL-DIKO 'ALLIANCE' REPORTEDLY MAKES OVERTURE TO RIGHT

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 17 Nov 82 p 7

/Text/ According to reliable reports, President Kyprianou is planning to bring into the cabinet former Agriculture Minister Frixos Kolotas in an effort to create an "opening" of the /AKEL-DIKO/ Alliance to the Right.

Specifically Kolotas will be given the Ministry of Agriculture which he occupied earlier under Makarios.

A Founding Member of the Center Union

According to the same reports, the bringing of Kolotas into the cabinet follows a suggestion by AKEL in order to foster certain impressions since Kolotas was a founding member of the Center Union, although his participation in it has cooled lately. Kolotas was also instrumental in the move to promote Georgios Ioannides, the former representative in the intercommunal talks, as an above-party presidential candidate. The meetings on this, as a matter of fact, took place in the Kolotas house. Kolotas is now a legal counsel to the Bank of Cyprus.

Initially there was a thought to have Kolotas appointed minister of education following the death of Panos Ioannou but the idea was given up. The current minister of agriculture is Khristodoulou who will resign. He may be given another post.

Other Moves

At the same time, we are told of other moves in the direction of a well-known personality of the so-called "extreme Right," in order to "open up" in that direction as well. Our information confirms press reports to the effect that these are moves toward "a mute broadening of AKEL-DIKO democratic cooperation with the support of certain important personalities which influence a particular political camp."

The same reports speak of contacts between the Alliance and cadres of a party group.

7520

CSO: 3521/93

CHURCH'S, NATIONAL SUPPORT REQUESTED FOR AKEL-DIKO ALLIANCE

Nicosia I ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 22 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Orfeas]

[Excerpts] The death of Makarios also meant the end of a tradition--the exercise of political and ecclesiastic power by the same agent.

Political power is appearing distinct from ecclesiastic power, even in social sectors which do not fall exclusively into the church's jurisdictions. Even more, it has no interference on any level in matters indisputably ecclesiastic; the church's leadership meets, discusses and decides about these without any direct or indirect interventions and influences from the political leadership.

Care for undeservedly suffering victims of the two-fold crime, refugees or not; building of relief institutions and refugee housing; visits by the church primate to the last camp and refugee shanty; performance of the liturgy at the humblest little refugee church and free performance of rites for the unfortunate displaced persons are certainly in the area of the church's contribution. Words of love, struggle and patience also offer great services to the struggle for justice being waged by our people. Political words, however, under the prevailing multi-party conditions, split, further confuse and fanaticize the people and offer opportunities for interpretation and misinterpretation at will, opportunities for party exploitation.

When Makarios officiated as priest, all the people listened to him. His political speeches united the people. His eloquence was mobilized to persuade foreign leaders and international politicians and other functionaries about his people's rights and to win their support and assistance.

Today, exercise of political power by our successor leadership has become a target of many other claimants. The democratic processes functioned smoothly and led to promotion of the current political leadership. Because of the particularly difficult and peculiar conditions under which our new leadership undertook its responsibilities, it should have unceasing and undivided support both from the political world and the church. In democratic regimes, the exercise of political power which derives from the majority is always respected. Criticism of the political leadership's work is always the opposition's job.

Under the difficult conditions prevailing today in Cyprus, the church's role must show itself to be unifying. Undivided, the church must offer its aid and support to any elected political leadership; even more to the current leadership which is continuing on the road charted by the unforgotten Ethnarch Makarios.

The policy on our national problem proclaimed by both new and older parties, aside from the extreme right, is basically that charted by Makarios. Today it is the same policy which is followed despite the efforts for confusion being made by various parties which aim at seizing power, or obtaining political and other benefits or even justification of their existence.

No one doubts that the church's role is great in the stage which we are traversing today.

Disintegration of cooperation among the parties, aside from the extreme right, is hurting Cyprus. Even though the majority of people currently expresses itself through the AKEL-DIKO [Democratic Party] alliance, nevertheless, Ankara's implacable stand imposes on us a greater consolidation of forces. The margins exist. And let all the claimants to power know that, on Cyprus' peculiar political-party chessboard, the same systems and tactics cannot be applied as in other long-time free and democratic countries where they safely take sides, without painful consequences for the whole Cypriot people.

We believe that, after the party fermentation to satiety which has been completed in Cyprus, the time has come for reevaluation of the positions of the other parties and the church versus the DIKO-AKEL alliance which, with its self-power, guarantees: re-election of its candidate, Mr. Kyprianou, to the presidential post; the definite burial of the politicized, fascist extreme right which is responsible for our country's tragedy; the exercise of power with the criterion being the national interest; and the pursuit of a just and livable solution to the Cyprus problem, which is based on the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations and the summit agreements.

9247

CSO: 3521/105

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIKO, AKEL STRESSED

Nicosia I ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 11 Dec 82 p 3

/Text/ Neither AKEL nor DIKO have claimed that they are identical ideologically and politically, as a result of their agreement to cooperate and their minimum program.

This point was emphasized by Secretary General of the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation /PEO/ Ziartidis in a speech to the PEO General Council. Ziartidis observed that the leader of the /Democratic/ Rally should not waste his time trying to prove that there are ideological differences between AKEL and DIKO.

"Such an identification," he said, "never took place. The two parties differ ideologically. But this is precisely the reason for the great service they render to the democratic movement and the people; the fact that they have put aside their ideological differences and they focus only on the points on which they agree and identify with, and on this basis they have decided to cooperate for the salvation of Cyprus."

Our View

It is true that the opponents of democratic cooperation, from the first day of its announcement, have been spending their gray matter trying to find theses that will undermine this cooperation. They said a great deal. But all their arguments failed to convince while they themselves proved untrustworthy.

One of their arguments was the "discovery" that the two cooperating parties differ ideologically and politically. Or, that one or the other party had subordinated itself to its partner. Now which one has become subordinate depends on who is speaking--DISY or the United Democratic Union of the Center /EDEK/.

Of course neither is true. The "discovery" exists only in the sick imaginations of the opponents of the democratic cooperation. But where the arguments lose substance, untruths and groundless claims are invoked.

In our case the facts are crystal clear. Two democratic parties, putting aside any ideological differences, formed a common front aiming above all at the salvation of Cyprus. There is no confusion, no ulterior motive, no plan for

unification, no question of subordination of one to the other. This is the whole truth, declared not only once but many times since last April when the cooperation was announced. Obligations and other such things were discovered for public consumption. Fortunately for the democratic cooperation our people, alert and with a strong political judgement, are not open to exploitation.

Next to the clearcut theses of the leaders of democratic cooperation, Ziartidis came to present in clear, simple language two facts which are not subject to misinterpretation or distortion.

--The cooperation of the two parties does not necessarily mean their ideological and political identification.

--Their cooperation was based on their desire to fight together for the salvation of the land.

It is impossible to present more clearly the meaning of the two parties' cooperation. Of course we do not expect the foes of the cooperation to understand this truth. It is enough that this fact is understood by the majority of the Cypriot people. This is what really matters because the last word belongs to the people. The people judge on the basis of everyone's contribution to the general struggle for the salvation of the motherland. And the people appreciate--as Ziartidis correctly noted--that two political parties with different ideologies put aside their differences and joined forces for the salvation of this land. Is this not the supreme national contribution? Is this not a patriotic attitude? What can the opposition parties and cliques propose? It is clear that they have only one element in common: their hatred for the democratic cooperation. Such men seek the people's confidence to save them! They are those who care only about power and nothing else. Today, when every last citizen of the republic understands that his supreme concern is his physical and national survival, there come these men who want to be called leaders, to put above all else their personal aggrandizement while they remain indifferent to the future of Cyprus. The difference between the two situations we described above is more than qualitative. For this reason the people are clear on the facts and they know what to do on 13 February.

7520

CSO: 3521/93

BRIEFS

RIGHT TO RELATIONS WITH USSR--There is nothing new about the theme beginning to be played by the extreme-right Istanbul newspaper TERZUMAN which republished a related report by the important U.S. newspaper WASHINGTON POST. Which is that Cyprus is going to become the Cuba of the Mediterranean because that is where its current president, Spyros Kyprianou, is leading it. The fuel for this new campaign to defame Cyprus was supplied by President Kyprianou's visit to Moscow and a Bulgarian delegation's visit to Cyprus. If it were other times, it would probably be unnecessary for us to refute these aspersions. But since we must be mindful of whatever is written about us, we must repeat our position. Our position is: We will not become the Cuba of the Mediterranean. But we have the inalienable right to develop relations with all the countries in the world, because we need every support for our struggle. If Turkey--a country much bigger and more considerable than Cyprus--cares about having good relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist Balkan countries, why does Cyprus not have this right? [Text] [Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 21 Nov 82 p 3] 9247

REPORTED TURKISH SPIES--There are now eight Turks being held for spying against the republic. The order for detention of Yusif Resvan and Dervis Hussein of Paphos is being renewed for another eight days by the Nicosia court which took into account the testimony of Sergeant Kostas Khristodoulos who said that there is evidence that the suspects are implicated and that four other Turkish Cypriots and two Turks from Turkey are being held for the same case. [Text] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 19 Nov 82 p 8] 9247

KLIRIDIS' STATEMENT QUESTIONED--In his recent speech in London, the president of Democratic Rally, Glavkos Kliridis, said the following among other things: "Who will be elected is no longer an issue. Who is most able to solve the Cyprus problem or protect Cyprus is not an issue. Which are the forces on which the government is supported is an issue. And if these forces on which the government will support itself are forces hostile to the western world, then we are sure that the western world will not allow such a situation to remain very long in Cyprus." With that expressed by Mr. Kliridis in the above excerpt from his speech, we ascertain an effort by him to introduce a new method of political warmongering. For this reason, we call on the Democratic Rally leader to give, as he should, answers to the questions: On what does he base his above estimations? Perhaps, in the contacts he has with representatives from the western factor, something specific was said to him which allows the above estimations? On what moral principles and on which frameworks of political morality is his new type of warmongering based? [Text] [Nicosia I ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Nov 82 p 1] 9247

SUCCESSFUL AKEL FUND-RAISING DRIVE--The AKEL Central Committee yesterday issued the following statement: "This year's fund-raising drive by AKEL's Central Committee was in effect a true popular referendum for the party's policies. The goal of 150,000 pounds was surpassed. The total came to 250,434 pounds, 167 percent of the goal. In the all-Cypriot contest among the party's district committees, first came the district committees of Famagusta and Larnaca with 173 percent, second the Nicosia district committee with 167 percent, third the Limassol district committee with 165 percent and fourth the Paphos committee with 154 percent. These unprecedented results reflect the loyalty, devotion and great love of the members and followers of the party for AKEL and its leadership. They also represent a manifest approval and support of our party's political line and tactic, of the democratic collaboration and of the minimum program, and a crowning of AKEL's years of struggle for the interests of the Cypriot working people in general and a forecast of victory in the coming presidential election. [Excerpt]
/Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 14 Nov 82 p 17 7520

CSO: 3521/93

POLL SHOWS SCHLUTER IS PREFERRED PREMIER AMONG NONSOCIALISTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Nov 82 p 11

[Article by Asger Schultz, graduate in political science, director of Gallup Institute]

[Text] The way the situation is now, with Poul Schluter of the Conservative Party as the premier of the four-leaf clover government, there is no doubt in the minds of nonsocialists that he is the preferred premier among nonsocialist voters.

The Gallup Institute has asked the following question of a representative section of the electorate, comprising approximately 1,000 respondents:

"The new four-leaf clover government consists of four parties, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Democrats, and the four party leaders are Poul Schluter, Henning Christophersen, Erhard Jacobsen, and Christian Christensen. Which of the four leaders will you prefer as prime minister in a nonsocialist government, consisting of the four parties?"

The answers to this question were as follows:

	<u>Poul Schluter</u>	<u>Henning Christophersen</u>	<u>Erhard Jacobsen</u>	<u>Christian Christensen</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	60	7	6	1	26	100
To the right of the Social Democratic Party	79	6	6	1	8	100
Social Democratic Party	58	9	3	1	29	100
To the left of the Social Democratic Party	41	7	5	1	46	100

No less than 60 percent of those asked prefer Poul Schluter, while the other party leaders at the most are able to muster one tenth of this support. As will further appear from the survey, Social Democratic voters and voters to the left of the Social Democratic Party are considerably less interested in the choice of the nonsocialist premier, but they, nevertheless, clearly prefer Poul Schluter.

In the following survey, the answers have been distributed among the nonsocialist voters on the basis of party affiliation:

	<u>Poul Schluter</u>	<u>Henning Christophersen</u>	<u>Erhard Jacobsen</u>	<u>Christian Christensen</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Total</u>
Radical Liberal Party	89	-	2	-	9	100
Conservative Party	90	3	3	1	4	101
Center Democrats .	45	4	40	-	10	99
Christian People's Party	53	8	-	13	26	100
Liberal Party	73	16	4	-	7	100
Progressive Party	69	2	7	2	20	100

As far as the small parties are concerned, the figures are rather inconclusive, and this applies especially to the Christian People's Party. But, apart from that, the picture is quite clear. The question that occupied the minds of most people prior to the government formation was apparently whether the future prime minister would be taken from the Liberal Party or the Conservative Party. Now, however, there is no vacillation. Among the voters of both parties, Poul Schluter is clearly preferred. The Radical Liberals are of the same opinion, whereas the Center Democrats would almost just as well see Erhard Jacobsen as prime minister (40 percent as against 45 percent). Most in doubt are the voters of the Christian People's Party, who, however, clearly prefer Poul Schluter, even if, as mentioned earlier, these figures are very inconclusive.

Reprinting subject to indication of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute as sources.

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CSO: 3613/31

PAPER COMMENTS ON IMPLICATION OF POLL REGARDING SCHLUTER

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Nov 82 p 12

[Editorial: "A Feather in His Cap"]

[Text] The name of the premier is Poul Schluter. He is the first Conservative premier under the parliamentary system and has thus been long on his way. On the other hand, his position as chief of government seems to be entirely undisputed. The Gallup poll published by BERLINGSKE TIDENDE today establishes conclusively that there is general agreement among all the parties that Poul Schluter is the right premier. Even among the Social Democrats and those who are even farther to the left, this opinion is widely shared. What a chief he has become!

Some people were of the opinion that Henning Christophersen would have been preferable as prime minister, but, as is well known, there was no real argument which could be used to convince the Conservative Party of this. There is no reason to speculate more about this. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to point out that the Gallup poll shows that also the voters of the Liberal Party are among the supporters of Schluter, although they hardly all of them like him equally much. The poll confirms that the four parties which formed the government may expect their voters to join the cooperation loyally. They recognize that the four-party government will not be able to succeed unless the individual government parties consider themselves part of the whole cooperation and, therefore, place the regard for the others before the regard for themselves. There is no scope for egoistic excesses on the part of the individual parties, and the party which might succumb to the temptation of such excesses will jeopardize the cooperation. There is no doubt that this is something which is understood by the voters, and it is only to be hoped that the politicians, too, will appreciate it. Things are so easy for them during the first few months of government, but things may gradually become more difficult and even more difficult the day when the voters start feeling that an election is forthcoming.

The Conservative Party seems to have the support of the voters and Poul Schluter the popularity. This may be a challenge to the weaker ones among the other government parties, and it may tempt the Conservatives. That is why it is important for the government cooperation and its future that a good working cooperation exists among the ministers. But it is equally important that

this cooperation extends through the Folketing groups, via the party apparatus to the voters. It is not too difficult for ministers to agree, and it ought not be difficult either for the Folketing groups. But in order for the government to succeed in its work, a general support among broad sections of the public is needed, and that requires careful and deliberate efforts on the part of the party leadership.

The Conservatives, therefore, should not become arrogant. They are more than anybody else obligated to safeguard the cooperation. And even if Poul Schluter is chief, he will, undoubtedly, be among the first ones to recognize that he is among equals. The fine feather in his cap constitutes a particular obligation.

7262

CSO: 3613/31

BRIEFS

MAOIST PARTY BACKS PERSHING--The Communist Workers Party now attacks strongly "the forces within the peace movement which safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union." The attack is made in a declaration of support of the struggle for peace and against the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. "If this struggle is to really benefit the efforts for peace, it will be imperative for the peace movement, at the same time, to make clear demands on the other party in the rearmaments race, the Soviet Union, for the removal of nuclear weapons of the East. Otherwise, the Soviet Union will exploit the campaign against the 572 missiles to increase its pressure on Western Europe and to strengthen its iron grip on the peoples of Eastern Europe," the Communist Workers Party says. The Communist Workers Party states that the forces which safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union in the peace movement are "the Joint Committee for Peace and Security" and "the National Anti-Nuclear Missiles Campaign," and that these organizations within the peace movement ought to be weakened and isolated. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Nov 82 p 3] 7262

CSO: 3613/31

BARZEL INTERVIEWED ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 26 Nov 82 p 3

[Interview with Rainer Barzel, Minister for Inner-German Relations: "There is Still a Great Deal to be Done." Interview conducted by RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT staffer Alois Rummel; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Dr Barzel, critics of a government headed by the Christian Democratic Union have repeatedly asserted in recent weeks and even over recent years, that such a government would not be able to maintain continuity in inner-German policy and Ostpolitik. In other words: neither Moscow nor East Berlin would, under any circumstances, accept the Ostpolitik of such a government. Given this prejudice, how can continuity in the area of inner-German policy be guaranteed?

[Answer] Well, the ill-tempered remark of the former chancellor, that while we were anxious for peace, we were not capable of achieving it, still rings in my ears. We have always maintained in this connection that the Soviet Union and the responsible people in the GDR, in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, wherever, were going to take their orientation from their own interests. The truth of this can be seen now that we have been in office for a few weeks: cooperation with the GDR goes on, we continue to hold discussions at the administrative level on future projects and areas of cooperation and even cooperation with the Soviet Union is still going on, despite the death of Brezhnev. This is a situation that I would like to give a particularly positive emphasis to.

[Question] Herr Barzel, if we proceed from the assumption that a kind of modus vivendi has been found between the Federal Republic and the GDR--the Basic Treaty is one indication of this--, how much latitude does the Federal Government have with respect to a new or a different German policy? Is there any room for maneuver which can be given definition?

[Question] For one thing, we're talking about Germany once again. This is something that had not been happening for a long time under the previous administration. We are talking about the treaties and doing more than that, we are negotiating the treaties in the form in which they were enacted into law in the Federal Republic. A part of this effort is the memorandum on German unity. Another part is the demand for self-determination imposed by our constitution--the same constitution upon which I took my oath of office.

We have the treaty and we have seen that there are a number of points where the

treaty itself sets goals that have not yet been realized. I would name a cultural agreement, an agreement on science and technical interchange. These two agreements haven't yet come to pass. It is our goal to achieve such agreements. On the other hand, there are a number of recorded instances which do not correspond to the agreements. Included among these are, for example, the increase in the obligatory currency exchange and the working conditions for journalists in East Berlin. The harassment at the border also does not correspond to the spirit of the treaty. And I would like to add that if we must endure, in historical terms, that the border between freedom and communism has to cut through the middle of our country, then this must at least be a border that is something worthy of human beings, that is free of harassment and killings. In this respect there is still a great deal to be done.

[Question] Herr Barzel, the chancellor, in his inaugural address of 13 October, stated that in the future there could be no unilateral measures taken with respect to the relationship to East Berlin. What does this mean in detail?

[Answer] Let's take the express highway that has just been dedicated. This represents a substantial step forward. But who is to drive on the highway? In which direction? How old does one have to be to use it? What hindrances are to be put in the way of using this highway? I can well imagine, for example, that when negotiations were started on the financing of this highway, that a step-by-step plan with human reference points could have been drawn up. Such as--who is to travel here? How old does one have to be? And that the contributions that we made, that were primarily financial, would be made dependent upon the realisation of such steps agreed upon in advance.

[Question] You stated before the All-German Affairs Committee a few days ago: create peace through freedom of movement. Is it now also possible that the GDR, under present conditions, is in a position to broaden such freedom of movement, or does it still have to bring about such conditions as would allow that kind of freedom of movement to be extended?

[Answer] I believe that it behooves the dignity of all Germans to set high goals. What I mean when I speak of freedom of movement is this: I'm a man of the war generation and I know not only what it was like during wartime, but how things got to that point. We were locked in, we had no youth exchanges with France, we couldn't climb a mountain in Austria nor read a newspaper from England nor even listen to a jazz record from America. Locked in as we were, demagogery was possible. The experience of my life has been: war is only possible where demagogery is possible. Thus the best assurance for peace is freedom of movement for peoples, for the exchange of information and opinions. And on this point I believe that the GDR owes to the cause of peace in Europe greater chances for its development than we have until now attained. I repeat: if we have to endure the fact that we will not in our time witness the political unification of Germany, then the GDR must be expected, in the interests of peace, to take account of the unity of our nation--even on the issue of greater freedom of movement.

[Question] There are two German states upon German soil--as you said yourself before the All-German Affairs Committee. What formulation would you really prefer? What prescribed phraseology would you prefer with respect to the continued existence of the German nation? As you know, there are different schools of

thought heard on this issue in public discussion in this republic. In which one would you include yourself?

[Answer] Well, it's quite clear that what has already been agreed upon must be adhered to. What's at issue is the language of the Basic Treaty. We are dealing with two German states which are independent of each other. At the same time we have also to consider the language of the law which enacted the Transit Treaty: there it speaks of two states in Germany. The Federal Constitutional Court has applied the two terms parallel to each other and I do the same thing, believing that these two states are not just located anywhere, they are both located in Germany. And if the communists over there don't like to hear me talking about Germany, then I will have to take the liberty of pointing out that their own official gazette is still called NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.

[Question] No people has had so hard a time in defining itself as a nation as have the Germans. What does this mean in light of future inner-German relations? Willy Brandt once spoke of the cultural nation. There are also other definitions. What kind of vision does the minister for inner-German affairs hold?

[Answer] He assumes that there is still a Germany, just as there are Germans. He assumes that we will one day achieve a situation permitting freedom of movement. He assumes that some time or other the responsible leaders in Moscow will ask themselves whether their zone of influence in Eastern and Central Europe actually does them more harm than it does good. He assumes that the Germans want to be together. The existence of a second state in Germany does not greatly disturb him. What does disturb him is the reality within this other state; what disturbs him is the unpeaceful condition which cuts straight across Germany and especially that a basic right of every people, namely the right to self-determination, is denied us. This is not something that can be brought before a tribunal. But we can keep alive the consciousness of our belonging together and this is one of the tasks that we have to fulfill here by creating relationships, exchanges among people and that we seek to achieve that freedom of movement that I mentioned to you earlier.

[Question] To achieve freedom of movement between two states that are independent, whereby the GDR has constantly had to suffer from its complexes--that is also going to demand a general consciousness that there is still a Germany. In your speech to the Inner-German Affairs Committee you pointed out how important it was that, for example, in the schools the question of German unity be dealt with more intensively and in terms of its historical background, than had been the case previously. What specific proposals are you planning in this respect?

[Answer] We will be talking to the Laender governments, especially to the ministries of culture. I am personally inclined to the opinion, in fact I am very strongly of the opinion, that one ought to go with a school class on a trip to Weimar before one heads to Florence. Or to Berlin, or to the inner-German border. We will also be talking to the foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Naumann Foundation, the Adenauer Foundation, which carry out specific programs which we support, so that in the activity which they undertake with our European neighbors perhaps some stronger emphasis might be placed upon these problems in Germany.

I would like to add, however, without your having asked, that we will next year be celebrating the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. This is a notable event. The chairman of the Council of State and the secretary general of the SED preside over a committee that is making preparations for the Luther commemoration. These will be major commemorative ceremonies. If you should ever take a look at the communist literature, you will see that Martin Luther has always come off poorly there. They have instead placed their own emphasis on Thomas Muenzer ever since Friedrich Engels' book from the year 1850. Even Bloch characterized Muenzer as the theologian of the revolution. And now they suddenly come along and say: Luther. This is communists saying this, who hold the view that religion is a superfluous, moribund thing. Now, all of a sudden, they are commemorating this man.

We will be doing the same thing here. Here there will be church celebrations, over there both ecclesiastical and state commemorations. And certainly no one can overlook the fact that, whatever form these celebrations take, it is Germans who will be commemorating Martin Luther because Germany is alive, though at the moment it expresses itself in two states.

[Question] Herr Barzel, the assumption that you yourself would participate in such commemorative ceremonies might be conceivable and even desirable. About a year ago Herr Brandt made the suggestion to the Bundestag that that the Federal president should undertake such a trip. Have you given any serious thought to such an idea?

[Answer] Let's deal with the minister first. This minister is both welcome and unwelcome over there. He is welcome because they know what he is doing and what impact he can have in terms of the agreements. And he is unwelcome because of his title. For the regime over there we represent a foreign country. Yet I am inner-German. Thus they will scarcely be able to know what to do with a man bearing this title, although I have noticed that NEUES DEUTSCHLAND a short time ago gave my name for the first time with my correct title. The people over there are semanticists, they manage to find a way to put something like that into its proper pigeon hole.

As far as the official Luther ceremonies are concerned, we have taken that under consultation. Look, I can imagine travelling over there under conditions of good neighborly relations. But these must be conditions of genuine good neighborliness. Try to imagine the following embarrassment: one of the highest representatives of our state were to be somewhere in the GDR at such a ceremony and there were to be shots fired at night along the border. He would then have to cut his visit short. Or should he stay instead? What this means then is that the conditions of good neighborliness must in fact be evident for such a high-ranking visit to make any sense. This is what we are considering. But this is not something that can be decided today and certainly not to be decided on the basis of emotions alone. There have to be realities, an evolution, a condition which allows such a move to make sense.

[Question] On the occasion of the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, the Federal president spoke with Herr Honecker in Moscow. A visit by Herr Carstens to the GDR could proceed from the line set by such a conversation.

[Answer] You can understand, Herr Rummel, that I certainly also have a word to say on such matters but I would rather do this together with the president himself and to discuss it with the Federal chancellor in the cabinet and not in this interview.

[Question] One word on practical politics or, so to speak on an issue of the moment. You are familiar with the concerns about the erratic barrier of the compulsory exchange [of currency at GDR crossing points]. Do you envision anything that the Federal Government could do to get rid of this compulsory exchange?

[Answer] If I were to respond to that then I would be leaving myself open to extortion. You cannot introduce a practice that is contrary to the agreements which have been concluded and then go on to say: what will you pay me for making the practice conform once again to our agreements? You just cannot do that. And I also don't believe that the GDR is going to come forward with such a demand. The GDR has got to be aware of the following: Federal Chancellor Schmidt--and while we're on the topic of continuity, let me cite that after the conferences at the Werbellinsee almost a year ago--, believed that he had solid evidence that something was going to happen on this score in 1982. Relying on this, he then concluded certain agreements on the "swing." But 1982 is coming to an end and nothing has happened on the issue of compulsory currency exchange. I feel that in the future people over there have got to consider what the purpose of such summit conferences is, if a German chancellor comes and expresses such expectations and the year passes without anything having happened.

[Question] Herr Barzel, that certainly makes sense from this perspective. Would you counsel Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl against undertaking a trip, for example, to Werbellin such as the former chancellor made?

[Answer] At the moment, there is not, I believe, any concrete occasion to talk about such a possibility. On 6 March we will be holding elections. It's my impression that the responsible people in the GDR do not want to do anything to influence these elections. For this reason they are not going to display any special measure of good will toward us, yet they are also surely not going to put any obstacles in the way. Herr Honecker knows that he is welcome here. After the visit of the former chancellor to Werbellin, I believe that it is now his turn. But such a visit would only make sense if there were something to follow from it as a result of careful preparations. I would not want to see and I also don't want to be responsible for such high hopes being raised as they were before Werbellin with a major disappointment to follow later. I would rather have people criticizing me because they say that he's doing the one thing too cautiously and the other thing too realistically. That's fine, but not such expectations and afterwards the disappointment, because that can only hurt the whole cause.

[Question] In concrete terms, as you assess the situation now, do you believe that a visit by Herr Honecker to the Federal Republic before 6 March is a possibility?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Could we proceed from the issue of the continuity of German-German relations, of Ostpolitik in general? Assuming that the CDU and the present ad-

ministration as a whole are confirmed by the voters on 6 March--this is your assumption. Can you at this point sketch out a vision of inner-German policy as it will be carried forward at that point?

[Answer] We are not just making an assumption that we will win the Bundestag elections on 6 March, we are also working hard toward that end and even with a passion, because we feel that ours is the better team for a better cause. We are out on the hustings every day--even now.

My vision? I feel one has to be cautious on this point. Elections will be held in 1983 and we will have 4 years until 1987. My goal until 1987 is that we will have better conditions in Germany by then which will also be achieved through agreements between the two German states. And this as a step along the way that I indicated earlier. My very definite conviction is: more freedom through greater freedom of movement, more self-determination through more freedom, and all of this--if you want to call it my vision--then means more freedom, because freedom is, in the end, a question of human rights.

[Question] Does anything like a discussion concerning the attainment of a European security conference play any part within this vision?

[Answer] This is, of course, possible. There are even signs of it already. I am not what you could call a German nationalist; I know that the German question is only going to be resolved to the degree that European questions are resolved. I would like very much to remind people in this interview that the dividing line across Europe is not something that the West invented. In 1947 the United States made its great proposal to aid Europe in its reconstruction. That was called the Marshall Plan. This was designed for the whole of Europe. It was intended for the Soviet Union, it was intended to include Poland and to include Czechoslovakia. At that time Molotov came with a large delegation to Paris for preliminary discussions and only at that point did he say: No, wherever Soviet military influence extends, we will not cooperate. That is when the Soviets dropped the Iron Curtain. And now they have to pay the price. And that is proving to be a very high price indeed as, say, in Poland. In addition to this: a new epoch is dawning. They cannot conceive of equilibrium any longer in material terms alone. It is no longer a question of economic power plus military power plus the size of population. Today the spiritual factor must also be counted, the consensus between the rulers and the ruled.

Mr Walensa is a spiritual force, whether he be in prison or not. This has its impact--for example, upon the Italian communists. They have broken away from the Moscow model. Even the Ayatollah Khomeini has shown that he is a spiritual force--however you evaluate him politically. There was also a spiritual force at work in Dresden last February. It was there that a church had to be made available for a discussion and a street for a demonstration. We had nothing at all to do with that. This is something that is emerging on its own. And this epoch demands discussion; it cannot be constrained by disciplinary measures alone. This is something that the people in Moscow will have to recognize.

In all of this we will move forward peacefully and patiently. This is what is at stake. What I'm talking about is our commemoration of Martin Luther next year--he was certainly no politician. He was also not a statesman. He was a

man of God's word who gave the spirit its pride of place. He refused to intervene on behalf of the Peasants' War or to make common cause with the imperial knights in their rebellion. He wanted none of this, he was a man of the spirit --and in that sense next year will be a good year for Germany.

9878

CSO: 3620/126

EPPLER PREDICTS SPD RETURN TO POWER IN 1987

Bonn DIE WELT in German 1 Dec 82 p 3

/Report of interview with Erhard Eppler by Guenther Bading: "By 1987 the SPD May Be Governing Again"/

/Text/ In the opinion of Erhard Eppler, the 1987 Bundestag election may well produce the "working majority left of the Union," that is the aim of the SPD. He interprets the term "majority" to mean a parliamentary representation able to elect a Social Democrat federal chancellor. Using almost the same words as his party chairman Willy Brandt, Eppler defined the conditions needed for such a new majority in an interview with DIE WELT: "That is possible only if the traditional workers movement, left liberalism and the new social movements converge."

The phrase "left of the union" is nothing new, says Eppler who views his assignment in the SPD to be the work on the committee on basic values, not to take the head of a new movement. As long as 80 years ago Friedrich Naumann posed the cardinal question of a majority left of center.

"Actually I have always considered the social-liberal coalition the first majority left of the Union." Eppler thinks, though, that this coalition failed to observe the eruption of the new social movements, the "dramatic change in consciousness" in our society. "It is not possible to govern a country while only half appreciating its reality." That is the reason why the social-liberal majority has ceased to exist. FDP chairman Hans-Dietrich Genscher evidently recognized this development when he urged his party to declare itself for the CDU before the Hesse provincial assembly election. "Genscher knew very well that there was no longer a social-liberal majority, even if he might have wished otherwise."

Still, Erhard Eppler by no means expects a permanent shift toward CDU/CSU rule. If the SPD were to succeed in integrating the new social movements and, by 1986, to draw up an appropriate program that, though not relinquishing social democratic traditions, "were so to phrase them as to make them intelligible to the 1980's generation," the SPD might well resume the government in 1987. It had been a mistake of the social-liberal government to take as its model the prosperous society of the early 1960's and endeavor to restore it.

Different Functions

According to the SPD politician, the Union hankers back even further, to the reconstruction and growth era of the 1950's. This would arouse resistance and fail. "Just as basically these new movements overthrew Schmidt by destroying the social-liberal majority, they will destroy the Union majority by 1987." Eppler considers rather unlikely, though not totally impossible, his party's success at the Bundestag election planned for March 1983.

This is certainly not the fault of the top candidates fielded by the SPD. The philosopher of the left integrationist party wing is quite in agreement with many of Hans-Jochen Vogel's present pronouncements. "Vogel's way of looking at things is not that far distant from mine." However, the answers to the questions raised are "not identical." Some of this is obviously due to the different roles of the two men. "My role is the arousal of emotion--even if this results in fists pummeling me." Vogel's function, on the other hand, is that of preserving SPD continuity, keeping the party together while pulling it forward. Among other factors Eppler cites their common labors in the committee on basic values. In this intellectually "exciting body" Vogel is working alongside Eppler, and so is Richard Loewenthal who came into prominence last year by criticizing Willy Brandt's policy of integration. All of them endeavor to examine and describe the change in consciousness among blue and white collar workers.

Eppler is quite convinced that Social Democracy will be able to accommodate the new movements. For the second half of the 1980's he expects a "bloc" to arise from the junction between the "peace movement" and the classic workers movement. In his opinion such a development might well gain so much influence as to prevent the emplacement of medium-range missiles. His reasoning: The United States might well gain the impression that the political disadvantages of such an emplacement would outweigh the military advantages.

Arms Modernization Unnecessary

Eppler persists in thinking that the arms modernization program for employing Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles makes no sense at all. He does not credit the assumption of Soviet superiority. As the main reason for his opinion he cites the fact that the Soviet Union is a land power, while the United States has missiles at sea, and these missiles are relatively impervious to attack.

Eppler confessed that he had always considered wrong the philosophy behind the NATO dual resolution, because it involves only one of the two superpowers directly. The Pershing 2 could hit the Soviet command centers in 6 minutes. Though the SS-20 could attack Western Europe, they could not harm the United States. Eppler views the emplacement of MX missiles in the United States as an attempt by the American Administration to secure for itself a chance of survival in the case of nuclear war. However, once a nuclear war seems winnable and the question of a first strike therefore becomes important, the danger of war is bound to grow.

The Soviet Union would certainly not be able to conduct a nuclear war. Other than the United States it could not possibly imagine survival because it is so inferior to the West in all areas--except the military area. The Soviet system is simply

not up to the challenges of a modern industrial society. Eppler draws a surprisingly negative image of the Soviet leaders. He says that the country is "governed by obstinate and frightened bureaucrats, preoccupied with their careers and therefore overly cautious, who use their own ideology merely as a tool of government." The danger is not that Moscow might incite a world revolution. The danger is that the Soviets might be tempted to draw on their military strength to deal with their political and economic weaknesses.

11698

CSO: 3620/135

GREENS' POLICY SEEN TO DIFFER FROM LAND TO LAND

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 26 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Peter Meier-Bergfeld: "The Greens' Rainbow Policy"]

[Text] They have an all-or-nothing attitude toward saving the world; but that lofty goal does run afoul of the requirements of everyday political life. The Greens are vacillating between negation and conformism; between high aims and reality.

The media throughout the FRG are wondering whether the green salad in German political life will wilt or whether it will be served up with a pink dressing following the national elections on 6 March. For all that, no one has really bothered to take note of the fact that the Greens have proved one thing above all: that the system is in good working order. In August 1977, Lower Saxony Minister President Albrecht told some representatives of citizens' initiatives assembled in Hanover: "If you don't like the policies of the established political parties, why don't you go out and start one of your own!" That is exactly what they did and they were successful at it, too. But now they are being criticized all over again.

Still, the Greens are none too happy with our democratic system of government and that in turn is symptomatic of a crisis. At issue is nothing less than the alternative between representative democracy and grass roots democracy; between a free mandate and an imperative one; between politics and soterology.

The attitude toward political life is undergoing rapid change particularly among young people (the 18 to 25 year-olds) 40 percent of whom vote for the Greens. The point is that the system should offer more than student loans and pension rights, self-realization and fun and games. It should also provide for a faith that animates and explains things so that one gets an idea about what it is that holds the world together deep down at the core. This tendency to turn politics into theology is widespread—particularly among the Germans. It may even have a touch of genius about it; but it also is fatal, if not lethal.

By going back to the stage props of Marxism and the crumbs left over from the Hohe Meissner era and linking them to the scientific language of ecology and "latter-days" philosophy, they are in the process of shaping their new

idol: eco-pax. They have an all-or-nothing attitude toward saving the world. It is either the end or the chance to turn things around.

But alas, the force of gravity drags the ideals down to earth. Political life makes its own demands. Anyone who has watched the Greens closely over the years could see it happen--most clearly at their recent national convention in Hagen. Of course they are still the models for the rest of the world. Others are copying them: the Partito Radicale and its sister party of proletarian unity (both of Italy); the Greens in France; the Alternative List in Austria, and a host of Dutch groups.

Integration Also Leads to Splits

The difficulties of alternative life start at home. At the Hagen convention center which has little more to offer than green, all-purpose carpeting and DM 30 million in cost overruns the delegates lived on packaged cake, ultra-pasteurized milk and greasy peanuts--very unhealthy fare indeed. The party treasurer announced that double bookkeeping has had to be introduced because everything was getting more and more difficult. In addition, they are being financed by the government like all the other political parties. That is a shame or perhaps it is merely inherent in the system.

They may be all in favor of life but as for their tired tots they keep them at the convention until midnight. On the one hand, they speak of the "Thermidor of the Green Revolution" like the good revolutionaries they are but on the other hand they never miss an appointment with "the media." Some of them have to beg for money to pay for a cot in Hagen; but Petra Kelly takes her meals along with the other Green notables at the fancy Gigant Hotel.

At the end of the convention, a party court of arbitration had to be voted on. Someone got up and said he would be willing to accept the chairmanship; he was a nice guy and knew how to get people to compromise. Another man got up and said that this was not a job for amateurs; there were procedural rules and appointments and deadlines that had to be adhered to without fail. "It just will not work any other way," he said. And that is how it was. He was given the job; he was a lawyer; a stickler for details. Perhaps the clearest indication of how far the Greens have come was a heartfelt sigh by the convention chairman who said as the presidium was about to succumb to the avalanche of points of order being raised: "We can do a lot of things; but there is one thing we cannot do. We cannot create time!"

The Greens have gotten to be more realistic--in different ways. They are most realistic in Baden-Wuerttemberg and in Lower Saxony, too. The Hamburg and Berlin agenda--which is interminable-- calls for overcoming the system by socialist means. In Hesse and Bavaria, the Greens think along the lines of ecological fundamentalism. And in Bremen, there are signs of a split as political and ecological interests diverge.

There has been a difficult integration process going on ever since the "Alternative Political Association--The Greens" was founded in March 1979. The 500 founding members who met in Frankfurt then came from the Green List for Environmental Protection (GLU); the Action Committee of Independent Ger-

mans (AUD), a pacifist mini-party led by former CSU member Haussleiter; the Third Way Action (of anthroposophic humane socialists); Gruhl's Green Action for the Future (GAZ) and from Beuys' Free International University. When the European Parliament elections were held in June 1979, they already got 900,000 votes or 3.2 percent of the total.

At the actual foundation of the party in Karlsruhe in mid-January of 1980, the "value-conservative" old-line Greens of the Gruhl stripe were boxed in. The issue was dual membership in the Greens and in some other party or rather in the divers contact organizations. To get the party founded at all, the "value conservatives" had to make a concession to the alternatives on the dual membership issue. Herbert Gruhl said at the time "we can live with that;" but that turned out to be a mistake. The upshot was that a socialist party with an ecological platform was born. In 1980, Gruhl left the party an embittered man soon to found his own Ecological-Democratic Party which party has 1,800 members (as against 24,000 for the Greens) and has been leading a rather pitiful life on the fringes of the party spectrum.

By now, however, it would be wrong to speak of a single-issue party. Its foreign policy goals include dropping the U.S. connection; the withdrawal of both German states from the alliances; a nuclear-free zone from Portugal to Poland and, of course, no modernization program for NATO. Domestically, the goals range from gay rights to granting the vote to foreigners in communal elections. But the most urgent political problem—that of unemployment—has thus far defied every effort to arrive at a common policy. Should one invest any more capital into this "death-dealing insane system of exploiting nature?" Would it not be much easier to drop out of industrialism once and for all, if there were as many as five million unemployed, as Rudolf Bahro has said. Should the Greens enter a coalition with the SPD or simply let it be or should they fight the SPD to the death for being an "agency of capitalism?" Those are questions of principle with which the Green delegations in the Land legislatures are faced as well.

Where do the Greens stand in the Laender today? In Bremen, they are split. Three of the four deputies to the assembly see "the line drawn between us and the 'normal' people on the one hand and the SPD and the extremists on the other." Greens leader Olaf Dinné seems so far to the right that Bremen Lord Mayor Koschnick feels that talking to him is useless. By engaging in an adventurous policy of turning the party landscape upside down, Dinné would like to see the CDU assume power in order to be able to reach those 40 percent of the electorate he considers potential Green voters. Subsequently, he would back the CDU up against the wall. Does he think himself a Green version of General Schleicher? He does not think it pays to support fringe groups because this keeps 'normal' people from becoming active themselves, since they have an opportunity to identify with the attitudes and the eventual fate of such fringe groups.

In April 1982, Peter Willers was expelled by the other three deputies and now they no longer talk to each other. There are two different Green views confronting each other today in the assembly when the debate turns to such issues as water supply, the use of asbestos, the pollution of the rivers and the North Sea or to the SPD bureaucracy in Bremen (which in fact has grown to gigantic proportions). The "majority" of the Greens accuses the SPD of as much as spawning the extremist movements.

The Greens in Baden-Wuerttemberg are the "best behaved." They obtained 5.3 percent of the vote and have 6 deputies. But make no mistake about it--their chairman Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, too, raises the issue of the system. But he is for backing out of it on cats' paws by small steps; he holds no brief for making a huge martial spectacle of it. The majority of the Baden-Wuerttemberg Greens has accepted the law and order monopoly of the government--which is something the Berlin Alternatives have not done by any means. They also comply with parliamentary procedure and do not believe in constantly changing deputies or "rotation" or still in the idea of the imperative mandate.

Hasenclever does not like show business politics. He wants to see the Greens "be able to tip the scales and to play that role cleverly, adroitly and openly." Fundamental opposition which is always in the right but never has its way is an attitude he considers unpolitical. At the national level, he is for an agreement to tolerate the SPD while not entering into an actual coalition. The Greens, he says, must face the facts and justify their position to the unemployed by coming up with real political arguments.

The Bavarian Greens--who were unsuccessful in the Landtag election--are something of a catchall for one and all from right to left. Munich historian Klaus Friederich, who worked at Munich party headquarters for 6 months, says the idea seems to be to "satisfy everyone--like Neckermann's mail order catalog--including all the virgins and emancipated women; all the foreigners and all the native Germans; all the would-be anarchists and all the sad sacks."

The Lower Saxony Greens are more politically oriented and more reformist like those of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The issues they stress are solar heat, decentralized energy supply and recycling. They have 2,800 members and operate 47 locals at the Kreis level and another 80 at the community level. They obtained 6.5 percent of the vote which gives them 11 deputies. These are subject to rotation but the rotation process can be revoked by a two-thirds vote of the Land party organization.

Back to the Woods Is No Political Program

In Berlin, Hamburg and Hesse is where the real big shots sit--although they would rather not make it officially known. Rainer Trampert from Hamburg has just been elected one of the three party chairmen. He is an ecological socialist and has experience as member of a works council. In Berlin, Ernst Hoplit-schek is getting a semblance of order into the chaotic Alternative List (AL) and in Frankfurt/Main assemblyman Milan Horacek, a Czech exile, heads the

local organization. And then there is Rudolf Bahro who stands for the extreme view of dividing the world into grass roots constituencies of about 3,000 members each. These four make up the skeleton of the Greens organization.

The nine Berlin AL deputies have voted along with all the parties thus far; at times they even voted down their own proposals—for the fun of it. The AL, which was officially established on 5 October 1978 and was based on a group centering around Otto Schily, a lawyer, at first was run by a few activists belonging to the Maoist KPD. By now, it includes Greens, former SEW members, building occupiers and state monopoly capitalists. Like the Greens elsewhere, they are teachers and social workers by profession, if indeed they have a profession. There is the "spiked helmet fraction" of former KPD members, the Marxists-Leninists and the independents (Greens, spontanists, anarchists and various adherents of the undogmatic Left). Like the Greens everywhere else, most of these have broken completely with socialism of the real kind as it exists in the GDR and the USSR. And they will not have anything to do with DKP fellow travelers, either.

The nine Hamburg deputies are counting on discussions with the SPD—even after the new elections—although the price they ask is (almost ?) out of reach. On occasion, they will vote along with the CDU in turning down a road building project in Bergedorf. Their main demands are to stop the expansion of the port facilities and the construction of the nuclear power plant at Brokdorf. As far as plans for cleaning up the Elbe are concerned, there is no doubt but that they have done some good. Klaus von Dohnanyi admits that he has learned something from the Greens/Alternatives. "They have established a direct rapport with people," he says. But they, on the other hand, would like to see his post abolished. "Hamburg has no need of a mayor," says Thea Bock, a Green member of the Landtag. "We do not even need to be a Land in its own right. What Hamburg needs are small, decentralized heating plants..."

The Hesse Greens are above all "against it." For Milan Horacek, the old slogans against elected SPD officials such as "Rudi Arndt, you lout; soon you will be down and out" have retained their validity. The Greens call for the dissolution of the Bundeswehr; for workers self-administration in the factories; for reforestation of the West runway area and for socialization of banks and key industries. In Hesse, total refusal to share responsibility is at its strongest. Anything else is considered treasonable.

Overall, however, on the national level a "strategy of toleration" vis-a-vis the SPD has gained acceptance. There still is some disagreement on various ways of implementing and interpreting the strategy. Some would already be willing to reduce the areas of disagreement to one particular issue such as the Hamburg port expansion or the runway in Hesse. But they are still in the minority.

But there is one man who will not go along and that is Rudolf Bahro. In his newest book, entitled "Madness with a Method," Bahro holds that the worldwide process of industrialization in itself constitutes an apocalyptic cata-

strophe. It is no longer a class issue, but a species issue. In that sense, there is not too little "but still far too much industrial labor." For this reason, everyone must "live in an entirely different way from before." In essence, Bahro has rediscovered early socialist ideas on community and really seems to think he can move the consciousness of the whole world in the direction of doing without.

Those who criticize Bahro are no doubt right. There is no way we can return to the woods which is to say the pre-industrial era; but soon we will not even be able to return to the forests because of the acid rain problem. It is also true--as Bahro says--that the modernization thrust goes too fast for many people; they cannot cope with it physically or psychologically. The film of modern reality runs so fast that they are unable to supply the words to it any more. For many, the grand desire for the greatest material happiness for the greatest number leads to unhappiness devoid of desire.

But the call for self-redemption at the grass roots level is not much of a help. He who rides the tiger may not dismount. The Greens are torn between wanting to reject and to alter modern-day life. Perhaps they can accept this piece of advice, couched in their own language: it is better to restore than to tear down.

9478

CSO: 3620/131

CONSERVATIVES' CAMPAIGN PLATFORM: COALITION WITH SDP, CENTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Nov 82 p 11

[Article by Ritva Remes]

[Excerpts] Tampere—The Conservative Party is trying to get into the government by means of platform negotiations with the Center Party and the Social Democrats. The Conservative Party is offering agreement on a platform as an alternative to the "elimination contest line" that has been pursued up to now, as party secretary Jussi Isotalo put it.

Party secretary Isotalo presented the Conservative Party's election objectives at a nonsocialist parliament in Tampere on Sunday. Emphasizing ideological discussion and programs, the Conservative Party announced its election platform, whose 12 points stress the common good. On the basis of the platform, a crack seemed to have been left open in some details, primarily for the Communists to knock out Conservative Party dreams of getting into the government.

"You have a right to something better" will be the Conservative Party slogan in the parliamentary elections. The platform refers to the right to job security, to one's own home, to moderate taxation, to the well-being of one's family, to better working conditions and to personal dignity.

As a finishing touch to the platform issues, the Conservative Party among other items approved a recommendation whereby the party administration would be expected to more effectively than before familiarize people with the party's objectives. In the recommendation it was not felt that there were grounds for the proposal that an improvement in the platform effort was necessary since one has the impression that Conservative Party objectives are vague and outmoded, as Erik Herlevi argued in his proposal.

Conservative Party for the Peace Effort

Vice chairman Tapani Morttinen described the Conservative Party's role in the peace effort. Morttinen's message was that Conservatives must support the peace effort on all fronts. To practically effect this, they must join all the peace organizations so that the peace effort does not become monopolized "as the private preserve of some opinion trend as has been attempted in some cases during the past few years."

Morttinen associated the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact, the CSCE, trade with the Soviet Union, natural gas, the Nordic nuclear-free zone and development aid with his peace talk. Nor did Morttinen forget the significance of the EDU [Federal Democratic Union], which has been christened the black union, either. According to Morttinen, the Conservative Party has spread correct information about Finnish foreign policy and disarmament efforts among European conservative and Christian party cooperation organizations.

After Morttinen's speech, the young Conservatives presented the banderoles they had used in the peace march. Party adults demonstrated a favorable attitude toward the youths, but voted down the youths' motion on the exporting of arms at the conclusion of the conference.

The youths proposed that the Conservative Party's decision-making bodies take steps to put an end to Finnish arms exports. The Ways and Means Committee saw no reason for doing so, instead appealing to the Council of State with whose permission these exports are engaged in.

Chairman Ilkka Suominen urged members to vote for the Ways and Means Committee motion. Suominen's argument was based on the fact that the determination to defend the country has always been linked with the Conservative Party.

In the opinion of Tuula Syrjala, who was behind the youths' motion, arms exports should not be confused with the determination to defend one's country. In her opinion, the Conservative Party ought to demonstrate its convictions in terms of practical actions as a conclusion to the lengthy ethical discussion.

The youths lost with their few red slips in the straw vote.

11,466
CSO: 3617/37

STALINIST ORGAN: SAARINEN LIED

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 16 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Persistent Lie"]

[Text] Former SKP [Finnish Communist Party] chairman Aarne Saarinen's claim about the discussions held in Moscow in 1981 between the SKP and CPSU executive committees was once again presented on Television Channel One's "Studio A" on Sunday. Aarne Saarinen is lying. He claims that Aalto and Jokinen took part in an exchange of opinions about Mauno Koivisto. The full reports on the conversations available to our newspaper indicate that Saarinen made up the story. For what reason? Only Saarinen himself knows why.

But why editors do not ask those who were themselves involved about it is perhaps indicative of a fear of the truth, because untruth sells better — on television too.

Just the opposite of what Saarinen says, neither Aalto nor Jokinen uttered a single word about Koivisto. As an old man, Saarinen is given to flights of fancy.

We sometimes talk of dirty politics. Well, at least in this case there may be some truth in it since Saarinen has made such a dishonest showing in this matter.

11,466
CSO: 3617/35

MODERATE-WING CP ORGAN VIEWS CONTROVERSY OVER UNION LOSS

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 13 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Rubber and Leather"]

[Text] The shift in votes that occurred to the advantage of the Social Democratic party and the detriment of the People's Democrats during the Rubber and Leather Workers Union elections was not a big one. It was, however, a clear-cut one and was sufficient to change the relative strength of the union.

The reasons for the change are both general and due to union politics. The change in support among the parties, which manifested itself especially during the presidential electors election, has naturally also had its effect among salaried workers and during the trade union federation elections.

But the trade union policy, which the leaders of the federation in question have engaged in and which SAK [Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions] secretary Simo Elomaa thoroughly evaluated in yesterday's edition of our newspaper, is in part also responsible for it. It has deviated from the People's Democratic League's general line. Those kinds of emphases that have been typical of the TIEDONANTAJA faction and which have no particular support among any salaried worker faction at all, have appeared in excerpts from the writings of league leaders.

It would be quite absurd to draw from the outcome the general policy conclusion that salaried workers widely approve of the Social Democratic Party's latest economic policy line, the decisions on devaluation and others that are having a negative effect on wage earners' standard of living.

The outcome will produce a natural dialogue in the People's Democratic League and above all concerning trade union policy line in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] organizations as well.

11,466

CSO: 3617/35

PAPER VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR UPCOMING ELECTION, GOVERNMENT

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 17 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Doomed to the Government"]

[Text] A government election image of the coming parliamentary elections has been emphatically painted in the different parties. Such a one-sided image is, of course, wrong since under the Finnish parliamentary system elections do not only decide on the distribution of government power to one party or another.

The picture of a Conservative Party that is engaging in the whole election campaign just to get into the government has been just as strongly played up. This image is also one-sided. Scarcely any party is ready to pay any price whatsoever to get into the government, not even after 15 years in the opposition.

But a more obvious issue than that has to do with the normalization of our parliamentary system, its credibility. In the opinion of many, postelection decisions will determine the line we will follow in the future, its balance or imbalance.

The Conservative Party certainly has a great desire to get to participate in the tasks of government, a political goal of every party. Nevertheless, the knowledge that the party's future support will in no way significantly depend on a government or opposition coalition checks that eagerness.

Support for the party will constantly grow in accordance with the evolution of the structure of the society, independently of this immediate decision.

The view years ago that the Conservative Party's bubble would burst if the party were to assume responsibility in the government is in this sense outdated.

The postelection situation must be examined from a broader point of view. From the standpoint of our entire political evolution, it is absolutely necessary for the parties to be able to form at the same starting line, not only in word but also in deed. The parties must assess their relations to the Conservative Party precisely because without a reassessment it will be impossible to readily change any part of the present government coalition.

At the worst, an opposition position will merely mean a postponement for the Conservative Party, but what would then be the fate of the Center Party and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], doomed to be government parties? They cannot credibly strive to achieve individuality in terms of government policy, which would mean a further strengthening of the Social Democrats' position.

The situation is not problematic for the development of support for the SDP [Social Democratic Party]; at the most an exaggerated, even immoderate concentration of power might gradually turn things to the disadvantage of the party's leading politicians.

Two recent reports provide us with information on citizens' thoughts about the government issue. The PARDEM [expansion unknown] poll, taken in labor organizations, is more detailed than ordinary opinion polls. While the sample does not cover the entire nation, in compensation for this it particularly reveals -- to be sure, emphasized by the SAK [Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions] -- the hopes and expectations of white-collar workers and workers. As for the Finnish Gallup poll, it confirms the picture PARDEM has painted: Citizens really want changes in the government coalition.

Even a joint nonsocialist government coalition would get a considerably large amount of support from labor organization members if the result is compared with the support enjoyed by the kind of government coalition we are used here, that composed of the Left and the center parties.

These polls burst one bubble: The Communists have gained positions in both the government and labor, which means a quite excessive share of power and advantage for them and the Left as a whole.

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CSO: 3617/35

BRIEFS

SAARINEN SEES RIGHTIST TREND—The trend will be moving toward the Right in the next parliamentary election. This is what former Communist Party (SKP) chairman Aarne Saarinen feels will happen. In his opinion, the Communists' long-term internal quarrels have been one essential reason for this. The situation can be compared to the commodity market. If two businesses publicly run down each other's products, they cannot be easily sold because credibility and confidence in them is weakened. Saarinen said on Sunday in Helsinki that a product's reputation is, however, protected by a law that prohibits such public defamation. Saarinen reminded his listeners that the SKP has rules that prohibit comrades from engaging in slander. Applying the penalty for doing so and its consequences is, however, a complicated affair. Saarinen said that the voters can do this more easily; that is, they can refuse to vote for those unscrupulous individuals who break the rules and destroy solidarity. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Nov 82 p 11] 11466

ALHO FOR OPPOSITION PARTY—SKP [Finnish Communist Party] vice chairman Veikko Alho has urged his party to reassess its participation in the government. Alho said on Sunday in Tampere that most SKP members, district organizations and Central Committee members support a reassessment at the present time. In Alho's opinion, it is high time for the SKP to dissociate itself from the current government policy, which is directed against the party's chief policy line and the interests of the workers and which binds the Communists like hostages to an erroneous policy. Alho especially criticized the devaluation decisions and the fact that, according to him, the size of the social welfare package prepared by the government was only a couple of hundred million marks. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 15 Nov 82 p 3] 11466

CSO: 3617/35

UDF OFFICIAL ON MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PLANS

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Nov 82 p 5

[Interview with Michel Pinton, secretary general of UDF, by Claude Weill; date and place not specified]

[Text] Without naming him, the secretary general of the UDF was criticizing Giscard when he began an interview with LE MATIN saying that "dredging up the 'disappointments of socialism' does not in itself constitute a political plan."

Acting prudently, Michel Pinton, secretary general of the UDF, is not going into the municipal elections claiming victory in advance. He appears much less optimistic than the secretary general of the RPR, Bernard Pons, because he notes "that the party which fares best is the party of the undecided voters." But, beyond that, Michel Pinton's main point is that the opposition lacks the ambition to make any concrete proposals to the French people. In this respect, he differs from the RPR, which is not making it a sine qua non for taking power, as well as from his "Giscard friends" who are deluding themselves with the thought that "dredging up the disappointments of socialism constitutes a political plan."

Does the UDF have the means to prepare such a plan? Its leaders are counting on its next congress at the end of November. But the main opposition remains among the "social democrats" of the CDS, who want to play their card, and the "liberals" of the PR, who continue to hope for a merger of the elements making up the UDF.

[Question] The opposition parties are generally very optimistic about the municipal elections. Do you share this optimism?

[Answer] A prudent optimism. Up to now the exhaustion of the majority in the polls is not enough to be of help to the opposition. The party that

will make the most progress will be the party of the undecided voters. And they can swing one way as well as another: they can return to the left the way they swung away from us in 1978. It is therefore not certain that the opposition will achieve great success in the municipal elections. I will not make any prognosis. Up to now we deserve our victories less than the majority deserves its defeats. In the cantonal elections last March, for example, it was not so much that we won as that the majority lost. Sometimes I am inclined to think that this victory did us quite an ill turn. The smug optimism of certain men in the opposition frightens me.

[Question] In your opinion, what does the opposition have to do to "merit" victory?

[Answer] The coming elections will be played out on the basis of being for or against socialism. We can win on this ground. But afterwards? The question is to know what we want to do with France. We hope to propose an ambitious goal based on very clear guidelines. Hence the importance of our next congress. We have, for example, to find ways of attracting wage earners and especially management more to our side. They are the ones who made our defeat certain in 1981. It is on this ground that we have to fight. But too large a number of men and women in the opposition are demanding a place on a list in Paris, not in the 20th or the 19th districts but in the supposedly sure districts, the 8th or the 16th. On the other hand, it is not so easy to find candidates in the cities with a difficult reputation, in the suburbs or elsewhere where the wage earners are.

[Question] How do you expect to win them back?

[Answer] Certain values proclaimed by the socialists (more equality, responsibility and power to the citizens, the role of associations, etc.) have a very strong attraction, and they are still attributed to the PS. They are the ones who allowed the socialists to win. Once in power, they have certainly distanced themselves from them. Well we must see to it that these values are returned to us. If we succeed we will have taken a gigantic step.

[Question] It cannot be said that this kind of theme is today at the center of political debate...

[Answer] That's true, but still one has the impression of witnessing a deterioration in the political climate. Certain people question the legitimacy of power, which exasperates the socialists. Mitterrand counters by attacking the RPR at the heart of its power, the Paris city hall and so on. It is true that the independence of Paris, at the heart of a state as centralized as France is, is intolerable for any government. Would it not be the same thing for Chirac himself if he were president and Paris had a left-wing mayor?

[Question] Don't you think, too, that certain critics of the opposition are a little "wide of the mark" at a time when the government is taking a hard line and when--if we are to believe the polls--a growing number of French men and women seem ready to accept it?

[Answer] Attacking the government on the decline in purchasing power is legitimate warfare and is, moreover, justified because we are paying for a year of socialist errors. But only if we do not limit ourselves to that. To propose the maintenance of purchasing power as an opposition program would be illusory--and what a poor goal for a country like France! Can you see de Gaulle waging a campaign on this theme? The language of austerity and effort in my opinion is much more effective than that of complaisance. If the socialists were able to maintain it and show it in their deeds we--the opposition--would be much less listened to. The French are aware of the fact that they have to tighten their belts. If someone tells them this he gets by. That means that there are words and there are acts. The socialist state is austere for the French but not for itself. It allows itself to build up a frightening budget and tolerates shameless expenditures: the future is being sacrificed for illusory immediate advantages. What we need, I repeat, is to propose a true goal for France. That is what Clemenceau and de Gaulle were able to do at difficult times for the fatherland. Mitterrand could have done it. A year ago he enjoyed exceptional confidence. He could have done anything he wanted. He missed a historic opportunity. Today it is much more difficult to find the impetus that the French people need.

[Question] Do you believe that the current difficulties will play in your favor?

[Answer] On condition that we are capable of proposing a great national goal. Dredging up the "disappointments of socialism" does not in itself constitute a political plan. We have to arouse an assembly that will unite, at the proper moment, a vast majority of the French people. If the opposition wins the next legislative elections, the main question will not be whether the RPR or the UDF is in the lead but whether this assembly is being created. Around whom? I don't know. Around the man or around the team that will have succeeded in rising above partisan considerations to an extent sufficient to attract countless followers from very diverse tendencies. Otherwise, I fear that our eventual electoral victory may be dissipated in promises impossible to keep, in quarrels over special interests and finally in repudiation of our own ideals. Then we will lose power as easily and as brutally as we might have won it.

9827

CSO: 3519/137

PAPANDREOU DOWNPLAYS DANGER FROM NORTH IN TALK TO MILITARY

Athens ELEVTHERTOTYPIA in Greek 10 Nov 82 p 7

/Excerpts/ With the cards on the table but behind closed doors (no journalists were admitted) Premier and Minister of Defense A. Papandreou spoke to the officers of the frontier region of Evros about our tense relations with NATO and our neighbors.

According to reliable reports, he characterized our relations with our neighbors to the north as improved. "We see no visible threat from the north," he said characteristically, while with regard to our relations with Turkey he emphasized:

"We have the sad privilege of being threatened by a country with which we are allies." He added emphatically: "While a conflict with a northern neighbor would mean world war, a conflict with Turkey would mean a local war," implying that in possible confrontation with Ankara we will be alone.

Referring to the tension of our relations with the Atlantic Alliance he said in part: "Our country faces difficulties with our reinduction into NATO's military wing. The difficulties refer mainly to the creation of the Larisa headquarters and the procedures which cause problems especially during NATO military exercises."

The premier then spoke about the problem of the "Apex Express 82" military exercise and explained in detail the background of its cancellation.

At the beginning of his speech to the officers of the 16th Division at the Didimoteikhon Officers Club, 1 mile from the Turkish border, the premier expressed appreciation for the briefing he had previously received at the division headquarters. Then he referred to the critical times we face and to the special place occupied by our country in terms of its importance.

He noted the shift of world interest from Europe to the Middle East; that is, from the north to the south. "In the area of the Middle East"--the premier emphasized-- "we have now a war between Iraq and Iran which has lasted for 2 years. We also have the Middle-Eastern problem which for many years has dominated the interest of the entire globe."

He promised to strengthen the armed forces in spite of the difficult economic conditions facing our country, as he said, and he expressed satisfaction over his experience during the time he has been in charge of the Ministry of National Defense in which the officers have worked with self-denial and the level and fighting ability of the armed forces has much improved.

The premier's speech to the officers of the 16th Division lasted 45 minutes.

RECORD NUMBER OF SECURITY PERSONNEL REPORTEDLY TRANSFERRED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 2 Dec 82 p 1

/Text/ In the Chamber of Deputies, PASOK was charged with one more sad record: In the 1 year since it assumed power, it transferred 9,000 officers and men of the Security Corps.

The charge was made through an interpellation made in the chamber by 11 ND deputies: K. Sapsalis, S. Gigas, N. Gelestathis, G. Manikas, G. Bougas, Il. Vougiouklakis, A. Kzikos, Kh. Ermeidis, Th. Papadopoulos, D. Frangos and I. Stathopoulos pointed out that:

1. During PASOK's year of governing, about 9,000 transfers of officers and lower /grade/ employees of the Security Corps have taken place.
2. A recent order (not published yet) transfers 130 men of the Gendarmerie Mechanized Service /YMKh/--most of them to islands. Some persons who dared complain about their transfer were told that the reason for it is that they were reading newspapers of "anti-national content" such as are AKROPOLIS, VRADYNI, APOGEVMATINI, ESTIA and TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS...
3. The Special Missions Section of the Gendarmerie /EAKh/, where officers, non-commissioned officers and gendarmes specially trained for difficult and dangerous missions served, is being abolished. Some of them are being transferred now and, according to reports, others will be transferred soon.

The 11 ND deputies asked the minister of public order if it is true that about 3,000 of these transfers are unwanted. They also asked him for the reasons the YMKh men are being transferred and why the EAKh section is being abolished. They also point out that to their repeated charges the responsible authorities here turned a deaf ear and that this situation continues despite the frightful increase in the crime rate.

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GSO: 3521/107

KKE NOTES DAILY NEGATIVE REACTION TO PLANNED BUDGET

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 1 Dec 82 p 1

/Text/ The KKE Parliamentary Group made public yesterday the following statement about the new budget /the government/ submitted to the Chamber of Deputies:

"The new budget shows that 1983 also will be a year of substantial one-sided austerity. In order to cover the budget's outlays the government is loading the tax burdens again on the people. It not only maintains the high percentage of the indirect taxes but it also imposes new ones. It also makes it apparent that there will be an increase in the cost of the services offered by public utilities. The government prefers these measures instead of abolishing the tax privileges of the big capital, instead of crushing tax evasion and cost voucher inflation.

"The budget's overall picture shows that the government's income policy aims at reducing the income of the working people. Assistance to the agrarian economy is reduced. The positive increase in public investments does not suffice in coping with the rise in unemployment. Also, despite the small increase in social expenditures (health, education) the largest percentage of the expenditures is earmarked for directions contrary to the people's hopes. The budget maintains the high level of military expenses which fall within the framework of NATO's economic plan.

"Finally, the tremendous budget deficits will accelerate the inflationary procedures and will lead the economy to a dead end.

"KKE cannot accept this budget and economic policy orientation. It struggles for and supports another orientations which will contribute to the stabilization of the economy and to a way out of the crisis in favor of the working people."

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CSO: 3521/107

NATO'S 'MORAL DEFEAT' STRESSED IN LIMNOS ISSUE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Nov 82 p 5

/Text/ Is it, we wonder, a mere coincidence that NATO was willing to cancel the exercises in Northern Greece in order not to recognize the legality of the naval and air base in Limnos at the same time an agreement was being signed between the U.S. and Turkey for the modernization of two air bases in Erzurum and Batman and the creation of a third base in Mouz? We doubt it.

These three American air bases on Turkish soil constitute the closest launching point for American planes against Soviet forces that might act in the Persian Gulf--according to the WASHINGTON POST. It is therefore logical--according to NATO logic--not to reject at this moment Turkish demands in order to accept Greek suggestions. Especially when the question of agreement for the American bases on Greek soil remains open, a certain "pressure" on Athens may be regarded as necessary to assure a more favorable result.

It is hard, however, to understand the argument justifying NATO's decision to cancel the exercises. Luns said that there must not be allied exercises on territories disputed by member-states of NATO. Who, however, disputes the Greek identity of Limnos? The Turks? Not even them. Only Ankara disputes Greece's right to fortify Limnos and certain islands in Dodecanese. But in what essence does this Turkish view support NATO's reservation that Limnos is a...disputed territory? Why did NATO refuse to defend Limnos as a Greek territory? And when NATO takes such a position, is it not as though NATO determines that Limnos is not Greek territory?

In the Limnos case, the Turkish intervention at NATO headquarters to prevent the launching of allied airplanes from the Limnos air base during the exercises nullifies the famous "moratorium" which supposedly obligated the two governments to avoid any action of any kind which might worsen the climate of Greek-Turkish relations and could undermine in advance the talks between the two countries for the settlement of those problems which make a "good neighbor" relationship impossible. When Ankara tries to "put" NATO against the dissolution of its army of the Aegean which was set up as an aggressive threat against the Greek islands, and which acted as the reason for the fortification of the Greek islands, it simply seeks a one-sided solution of the issue which can be settled only through mutual arrangements. What would be the reaction of the Turkish government if Greece

asked NATO not to use the military installations on Turkey's Aegean coast since such installations constitute a threat against Greece's territorial integrity? Would they not denounce this as an action contrary to the search for a constructive dialogue?

This is enough so far about Turkey's respect for its obligations under the "moratorium" which in any event do not contradict Turkey's constant foreign policy. The attitude of the NATO leadership (whatever the strategic importance of the Turkish territory compared to the Greek territory, which justifies some privileged treatment for Turkey by the "allies") is an action void of any inter-allied objectivity and impartiality. It also undermines the allied unity itself which is the subject of so much talk by the U.S. since it tries to move ahead of the results of the Greek-Turkish dialogue, in fact, in a way that even exceeds the Turkish demands against our country.

If the NATO command and the organization's general secretariat truly wished to avoid any action that might give the impression of intervention in the Greek-Turkish dispute, they could propose many other solutions instead of refusing to defend Limnos because it is a "disputed" territory. By insisting on this solution it is as though they declare that they do not wish to oppose a "legitimate" territorial claim by Turkey! The Americans and those in the "alliance" that embrace their views certainly believe that whatever we suffer from NATO we will take because "we have nowhere to go." In other words, we will accept it because reality--and not KKE's slogans--dictate that our only alternative is to become another...Poland! In other words, Luns is preferable! Unfortunately, there is a lot of truth in this. But this truth constitutes NATO's moral defeat.

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CSO: 3521/88

KKE SEEN SOFTENING STANCE AT 11TH CONGRESS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 17 Nov 82 p 12

/Article by Ap. Apostolopoulos/

/Excerpt/ We foresee that KKE's unyielding phase is coming to an end. This phase was determined by its fight against KKE-Interior for the dominant position in the area of the traditional left. KKE-Int. after a series of errors came to cooperate with PASOK--a party which is outside of the /left/ tradition. KKE is now entitled to claim in its propaganda that there is now evidence that KKE-Int. is an appendix of other forces. In any event, the area /of the traditional left/ was left empty to be taken over by KKE. KKE did so.

At the same time it prepared and successfully waged its effort to distance itself from PASOK prior to the municipal elections, persuading in this way even the most distrustful about the party's autonomy and increasing influence on the masses. It is now time to move over to a flexible policy which is the privilege of the strong.

But if, as we believe, KKE decides to shift to different and newfound positions it will do so very unobtrusively:

--Without allowing the rival KKE-Int. to raise its head.

--Without allowing PASOK to regain any followers that moved away and without slowing down the movement to KKE of those disappointed with PASOK.

--Without alienating any conservatives that voted for KKE in the municipal elections; not because it hopes to keep those voters but because it has to take into account the country's history. It must persuade that there is no reason for concern if it ever comes to cooperate in one way or another with the government. The example of the French Communist Party is inspiring.

We may expect an insistence on leftist rhetoric reflecting a more conservative political orientation in the 11th Congress.

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CSO: 3521/88

CRITICAL COMMENTS ON POLYTECHNIC ANNIVERSARY MARCH

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 17 Nov 82 p 12

/Excerpts/ Already 9 years have gone by since the night of the Polytechnic /School episode/--9 years for the creation of a legend which is now "celebrated" on the 15-16 and 17 November. For 9 years now, these 3 days have given the opportunity to the well-known official and semi-official "Exclusive Representatives of Democratic Fighting Spirit in Greece" to make speeches, give interviews and make themselves look like heroes "praising" and exploiting the heroism of other unknown persons. Thousands around me do not miss an opportunity to tell me that they were, all of them, there that terrible night behind the gate that was crushed by a tank. Only one was absent, it seems!

Of course, I have no excuse but what can I do? I just was not there! You see, I could not imagine that the time would come so soon when the title of the "Resistance Fighter" and "Democrat" would become "merchandise" to be sold at a good price or exchanged for "office" in the bazaar of politics. Neither had I thought that the day would come so soon when the "Polytechnic festivities" would become a "county fair" to line the pockets of certain profiteers.

I was absent from "inside" the Polytechnic that night and for this reason I did not see all those events I read about in the newspapers or heard about from the mass media. I only saw the simple events and it seems that I am the only one who saw them because I have not heard anybody else talking about them. I just cannot understand it. Why do they keep silent about them?

I don't know exactly what the "few students" were doing who were "organized" by the "leaders" (my God, what a fraud!), who acted "inside" the Polytechnic but I know very well what was done by those "outside." I know because I saw thousands of people of all ages engaged in street fights outside and around the Polytechnic. Those Unknown, Anonymous people put up street barricades, set buildings on fire, broke into stores and fought with the police, resulting in hundreds of wounded and an unknown number of dead. They did all this without the need to be "organized" by professional "leaders," without having anyone to supply the slogans, without guidance--simple, autonomous acting. With their fighting spirit at its peak, they rose not only against the junta but also against the daily oppression and broke out, these thousands of people.

But today no one talks about them. The newspapers do not mention them, the radio and TV do not talk about them, and even worse, the people do not talk about them! One should try to find out why all publicity focuses so intensely on the inside of the Polytechnic, the "small" Polytechnic and they leave in the dark the outside, the "big" Polytechnic! This may be another attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the people so that they will not become conscious of their power and so that they will "rise" only when "ordered to do so"--to make the people learn to "celebrate" freedom in marches instead of fighting to preserve it.

Today there is going to be another march to celebrate our freedom. The "celebrants" will gather where the "leaders" tell them. They will start marching at the hour set by the leaders, they will stop when they are told, they will shout the slogans that will be given them, they will go to the point they are told to and then they will disperse "quietly" as told. Then they will go home to watch TV or to the neighborhood tavern for a steak, happy that once again they celebrated their freedom. Beginning tomorrow they will start complaining again, in a low voice, about the "destructive measures against private cars," about the "cloud of death," "the bad quality of life" and the "uncertainty that causes anxiety." In a low voice until next 17 November when they will be able again to shout "Bread, Education, Freedom" with the loudest voice without risking anything at all!

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CSO: 3521/88

BILL WOULD INCREASE ICELANDERS PARTICIPATION IN OWN SECURITY

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 82 p 2

/Article: "A Purposeful and Coordinated Icelandic Disarmament Policy Must be Created"

/Text/ The Independence Party Althing delegation has presented a draft decree to the Althing on disarmament and arms limitation. If the decree is enacted the foreign affairs committee would be required to appraise the current views on disarmament and arms limitation with special reference to Iceland's position, international support and cooperation. Based upon this appraisal a way would be sought for cooperation between the political parties on a coordinated policy in this area. It was stated in the preamble of the draft that it would not be abnormal for the foreign affairs committee to cooperate with the security committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in drawing up the appraisal discussed in the draft.

The Independence Party Althing delegation proposal, with Birgir I. Gunnarsson as spokesman for the group, begins as follows: "The Althing resolves that there is a critical need for the peoples of the world, especially the nuclear powers, to agree on a practical policy in disarmament that can lead to agreements on mutual and multilateral disarmament to be guaranteed by international supervision."

It also says, among other things, that: "There is more agreement now than ever before, on an Icelandic security policy. The foundation stones are membership in the Atlantic Alliance and defense cooperation with the United States. There have been proposals on increased Icelandic participation in its own defense within these terms and discussions on this are well known to all. There are two approaches in security matters, if we may say so: one approach involves entrusting Icelandic security to military preparedness and the other involves disarmament and arms limitation..."

"The peace movement that has had such an enormous impact upon politics in Western countries in recent months is, in fact, primarily concerned with finding means to limit arms and reduce armaments. Discussion about this is

going on wherever politicians and government officials meet in the international arena. Icelanders have had little or nothing to say in this area but there is little against a more collective policy in these matters. Icelanders usually let it suffice to say that they are an unarmed people and that no people is more disarmament minded in the world. Such simple arguments are no longer adequate, either in domestic discussions or abroad. A purposeful and coordinated Icelandic disarmament policy must be created that reflects Icelandic interest. A precondition for the creation of such a policy will be a general appraisal of all views in Iceland on the subject as proposed here."

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CSO: 3626/16

MANY IN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE CONCERNED OVER UNION INFLUENCE LOSS

Labor Wing Defeat in Executive Committee

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 82 p 46

[Article: "I Am Very Much Ashamed for the Minister"]

[Excerpt] Things went as expected at the meeting of the People's Alliance Party council held last week, in the view of those expressing harsh criticism and disappointment at the government and the performance of People's Alliance ministers in it.

Criticism of the government and dissatisfaction with party ministers none the less often found indirect expressions in the discussions, for example, the very harsh rebuke of former People's Alliance chairman Ludvik Josepsson by Throst Olafsson, assistant to the minister of finance. Josepsson, however, defended himself vehemently against Olafsson in the discussions and the former People's Alliance head told Olafsson in no uncertain terms that he had no place in the People's Alliance. Olafsson said the following in an interview with MORGUNBLADID when asked about this: "They are taking out their disappointments with the government on me to some extent and I am, to a certain degree, very much ashamed for the minister."

Thus it is clear that the way that the party council meeting treated the leaders of the labor movement in elections to the party executive committee will have serious consequences for the party. According to MORGUNBLADID's information, there is much ferment among the leaders of the labor movement on account of their treatment in the executive committee elections. According to MORGUNBLADID's information, Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson, who walked out of the party council after the outcome of the executive committee elections was announced, later let the party leadership, including the People's Alliance Althing delegation, know what he thought about what had been done at the meeting. MORGUNBLADID asked Gudmundsson yesterday what he had meant with his words, when walking out of the meeting, that: "He had little need to remain any longer." He said that he did not wish to say anything more at this point but that there was difficulty in the labor movement on account of what was done at the meeting and that it might be said that he had not said his last word on the subject.

Union Leaders Tell Disappointment

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 82 p 25

[Article: "It Amounts to a Judgement by the Meeting of My Acts and Policy"]

[Text] "Ludvik Josepsson and I have long held opposing views and have taken different positions in some political areas, but they are, to some extent, taking out their disappointments with the government on me and I am, to a certain degree, very much ashamed for the minister," said Throstur Olafsson, assistant to the minister of finance, when asked for the reasons for the harsh rebuke suffered by him at the hands of former People's Alliance chairman Ludvik Josepsson last week at the party council meeting.

Olafsson was later asked what he thought the reason was that he had been dropped in the executive committee elections at the meeting. He answered: "I have little to say on my own behalf about that. I wasn't, to be sure, overjoyed by this. It amounts to a judgement by the party of my acts and the policy that I have pursued within the party, or at least by this party meeting since I do not wish to imply that the party is in total agreement." Olafsson was asked whether or not he was to be associated with the labor movement since he had worked actively with it within the party. "That is true to a degree," he answered, "but there is more to it than this."

MORGUNBLADID also spoke with others among the labor leaders dropped in the executive committee elections. They were asked whether or not they had noticed a change in the basis of the People's Alliance and whether or not the party was going to support the labor movement financially. What follows are their answers.

Gudmundur Th. Jonsson, chairman of the Icelandic Association of Industrial Workers, said: "I only hope that it was just a mistake. I don't deny, however, that, in my view, there has been a pretty definite change of views that is perhaps too serious to ignore. Hitherto, I thought it a matter of course to have the best possible connections with the labor movement. Now things appear to be different, at least in terms of those participating in the party meeting. I had, in fact, no choice but to attend it and was dropped immediately when there was election to the delegates council at the union meeting in Reykjavik."

Edvard Sigurdsson, former chairman of Dagsbrun, refused to make a statement but said: "I don't think that we will wait and see what happens."

"I did not attend the meeting myself so I know nothing about it. I think that there is no danger of these things happening and have no doubt that things will be put to rights," said Gudmundur Jonsson, one of the leaders of the Reykjavik Tradesman's Union.

Gudmundur Arnason, one of the People's Alliance leaders within the Teachers' Association, said: "I can say now that I think it unfortunate that more representatives of the labor movement will not be on the executive committee,

but I was not at the meeting and have not had the opportunity to find out what was done there. Thus I will not say more."

"It will be nothing new of itself for me to be out of office for a while. I have been either an alternative or regular member of the committee for some time. All new regulations have been enacted for it and their significance remains unclear. I have nothing more to say on the matter. One will just have to put up with it," said Gudjon Jonsson, chairman of the Union of Ore Workers and Shipbuilders.

In addition to what has been stated above, MORGUNBLADID is also aware that Bodvar Perursson, of the Reykjavik Tradesman's Union, and Gretur Thorsteinsson, chairman of the Reykjavik Carpenters Union, were dropped in the executive committee elections but we have been unable to get in touch with them to ascertain their views.

People's Alliance Organ Fails to Explain

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Nov 82 p 7

[Commentary by Staksteinar: "They Have Been Thrown Out of the People's Alliance Central Committee"]

[Text] It is worthy of note, and likewise instructive, that the "labor movement chiefs" were dropped one after the other from the party executive committee at the People's Alliance party council meeting. Those dropped included Edvard Sigurdson, present chairman of Dagsbrun. Others getting their travel papers at the elections were Gudjon Jonsson, chairman of the Ore Workers and Shipbuilders Union, Gudmundur Th. Jonsson, chairman of the National Association of Industrial Workers, and Bodvar Petursson, of the Reykjavik Tradesman's Union. Minister of Finance Ragnar Arnalds was singled out for particular praise by the meeting when his advisor, Throst Olafsson, was expressly dropped in the executive committee elections.

Feathers Fly at the Party Council Meeting

When the self-appointed "intellectuals division" (so-called by those involved) pushed the labor movement representation of the party out of the party executive committee, as it turned out, a great many feathers flew at the party council meeting of the People's Alliance and Gudmundur J. Gudmundsson, chairman of the Icelandic Association of Industrial Workers, walked out on the spot. The party leadership, which approved of what happened, was completely astonished when the reactions of the working people representatives at the meeting became clear. They then resorted to the strategem of sneaking those dropped in by the back door. It was agreed to leave it up to a proposed People's Alliance national convention to be held next year to set an allotment of seats for labor movement leaders within the party and that Althing members should hereafter have a seat on the party executive committee ex officio. It was not thought advisable for them to be members under the "new order" agreed upon at the party council meeting for the future!

Political Changes of Mood

THJODVILJINN has, as is to be expected, few words to say about the party council meeting's actions in disgracing, so to speak, working people, or rather their representatives, in the party executive committee elections. The editors have much more to say about the fact that women did well in the executive committee elections. It was thought more advisable, as things stand now, to make more of an appeal to women than before. But how lasting will be the political change of mood obvious in the executive committee elections of the People's Alliance. Since when is it convenient, politically, to usher women into the same mess that the delegates of the wage earning class are now in.

A Tithe at Christmas

The working class will lose a tenth of its purchasing power at Christmas on account of the purchasing power cuts of the government, that was the Christmas greeting of the People's Alliance at the same time that the "labor movement leaders" were falling at the executive committee elections of the party council meeting. Disasters never come alone in the "class struggle" of the People's Alliance and "elections are wage struggles," etc., all of which people know well. It may be said that "agreements have been made," for once and for all, at a meeting of the "highest council" of the People's Alliance, although in a peculiar way.

Emergency Program

The People's Alliance has been the leading party in the government during the entire time since 1978. It should be, judging from the party's election promises, that every area of the national household would "roll in prosperity," that inflation would be overcome and that the purchasing power of the wages of the poor would be preserved. But is it so?

What is the answer of the party leadership of the People's Alliance itself? Are they going to deliver on their glorious promises?

Svavar Gestsson, the party chairman, and his friends see the need to set in motion a four year emergency program to save the economic independence of Iceland, no more nor less: import restraints, rationing of all luxuries, as is properly practiced in the "model states" of the East Bloc.

The election platform of the People's Alliance offered to the public is thus well named: emergency program [lit.: "program for distress"].

9857

CSO: 3626/17

EDITORIAL VIEWS ON COMPOSITION OF NEW GOVERNMENT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Nov 82 p 7

[Editorial: "Strong Cast"]

[Text] Nearly 2 months after the Second Chamber elections, the Lubbers CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] cabinet is ready to be sworn in. The strength of an administration is never determined solely by the sum of the qualities of the individual ministers, but it must be said that, generally speaking, Messrs Lubbers and Nijpels have, in the name of their parties, secured a qualitatively strong cast. The low average age of the incoming ministerial team emphasizes something of the unmistakable personal generation shifts which occur in national politics. The fact that the VVD succeeded in nominating two women ministers may be seen as a reason for rejoicing. It is too bad that the CDA had to limit its contribution to men, even if the quality of a minister is more important than the sex.

If the distribution and assignment of seats at the end of last week produced a few surprises, the filling of a number of ministerial positions is also surprising. In this respect, one should think about the experienced CDA members De Koning and De Ruiter respectively in the Ministries of Social Affairs and Employment and of Defense. These two Christian democratic heavyweights do provide some confidence in the seriousness of the enterprise to the extent that their party comes into play. The question is whether both of these gentlemen will be able to maintain their sound management reputation and their authority within their own circle in their new and difficult positions; what is certain is that they will greatly need that authority.

Good ministers are ready to take over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education and Agriculture, in the persons of Messrs Van den Broek, Deetman and Braks, who -- in addition to De Ruiter and De Koning -- can also be referred to as being thoroughly conversant with their jobs. There are blank pages among the eight CDA ministers, specifically Messrs Ruding (Finance) and Brinkman (Welfare and Public Health). At least politically blank, because the former won his spurs in banking and, in spite of his youth (34 years old) the latter is one of the recognized heavyweights in the civil service world. With four former KVP [Catholic People's Party] members, three former ARP [Anti-revolutionary Party] members and former CHU [Christian Historical Union] member Deetman, the blood group relationships within the CDA have turned out in

such a way that Antirevolutionary Party members who yearn for the past may well be somewhat comforted. Given the inherent and political problems which await them there, the fact that the Ministries of Social Affairs and Defense will be managed by former members of the Antirevolutionary Party is certainly not a coincidence. In terms of this aspect, Lubbers certainly made a good choice of individuals. Indeed, what has become known meanwhile about the state secretary candidates strengthens this impression.

And then there are the liberal ministers. Partly because of their experience, Messrs Van Aardenne and Rietkerk (Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs) promise a definite soundness; up to now, an excess of originality is not what has made them stand out very much.

If political leader Nijpels hopes that "his" ministers will stand out, he will be able to rely especially on the publicity conscious Mrs Smit-Kroes (Traffic and Waterways) who immediately started appearing on television, all helmeted and armored. The capable lawyer Korthals Altes, who was president of the VVD for a long time, will perhaps make his contribution at the Ministry of Justice. It will be interesting to follow the actions of the female liberal minister of development cooperation, E.M. Schoo. It is to be hoped that in judging policy here, the combination of sex and political color will not lead some people into unbusinesslike confusion.

The natural science and organizational expert Winsemius must be the kind of manager which his political leader Nijpels likes to see in a ministerial seat. Well, there will be enough to "manage" within the wide scope of the Ministry of Housing and Environment or to mismanage. In any case, political management makes its own demands. Careful waiting is the word.

Finally, there is Prime Minister Lubbers himself. The most important question in his case remains whether he will manage to combine the leadership of his administration with the actual leadership of the CDA, which is all the more conspicuous as "his" Second Chamber party suffered a very serious drain. Lubbers has never been without reserves when it comes to such a double function. His choice could be decisive for the cohesion, and thus for the ability to act of his administration.

8463

CSO: 3614/16

IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF LABOR PARTY ANALYZED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Nov 82 p 7

[Article by Jan Alkema, LE SOIR special correspondent: "The Netherlands: More Stars Than New Ideas"]

[Text] The Hague, November--The Labor Party, which on 8 September 1982 again became the largest party in the Netherlands with more than 30 percent of the vote, is once again excluded from power. Worse, the party which gave Europe the father of the Agricultural Common Market, Sicco Mansholt, and science a Noble prize-winner in economics, Professor Tinbergen, has no response to the economic crisis which is being expressed here in a dizzying explosion of unemployment: close to 600,000 unemployed (or 13.5 percent of the working population) plus an equal number of those unable to work for medical or social reasons.

✓ You don't have to look any farther than this lack of imagination as the reason for the PVDA's [expansion unknown] passivity for the past 5 years. In March 1977, it caused the fall of Socialist leader Joop den Uyl's government in order to hide internal divisions in economic matters. The Socialist minister of finance at the time, Wim Duisenberg, who was accusing his political friends of managing public finances haphazardly, is president of the National Bank and he still employs this same cautious language of which his predecessor, the very conservative Jelle Zijlstra, would not disapprove.

After the 1977 elections, the Socialists allowed themselves to be excluded from power because they did not have any other response to the crisis. After the 1981 elections, they tried for 5 months to clip the new Right's wings by participating in the Dries van Agt coalition. Faced with the electoral catastrophe of which this vain attempt ran the risk, they again took shelter in the opposition in May 1982. The 8 September elections allowed the Christian Democrats and the Liberals to keep them there for good, despite the restoration of the ranks of Socialist elected officials.

By categorically opposing the deployment of NATO's new nuclear missiles in the Netherlands and "reviving" the hopes of the ecologists by totally rejecting

electric power obtained from nuclear sources, the Socialist easily recovered their place as the largest party in the country. And, through these choices, they closed the door to government cooperation which would have obliged them to apply the Right's economic prescriptions as they could not impose a non-existent, Socialist-inspired alternative.

A Muddled Message

During these 5 years of procrastination, the Socialists have been able to propose to voters worried about the economic crisis only a muddled and often contradictory message on adjusting purchasing power and a hypothetical recovery in employment.

Before embarking on a sailing trip around the world last spring, Sicco Mansholt, who at the age of 73 is no longer involved in politics, called upon his young Socialist friends to take things a bit more seriously.

The PVDA program envisaged what was called here a twofold route: on the one hand, to reduce the state deficit which has become unmanageable, and, on the other hand, to finance a recovery in employment while maintaining the purchasing power of the most disadvantaged (most of the time those who are receiving public assistance).

According to this program, a growth rate of 2.5 percent was to enable these objectives to be attained financially. No one knows where the authors of the Socialist program went to find this fantastic rate. Growth in the Netherlands is zero, and no change is seen on the horizon.

"They are freewheeling," said Sicco Mansholt in cycling talk, in commenting on this attitude, proposing a policy nourished on illusions of the past decade in 1981.

Internal Dissension

Internal dissension, barely concealed by Den Uyl's charismatic personality, had led the Socialists to halfheartedly propose this inconsistent program with no future.

Among the voters, an old guard is still counting on the Labor Party to defend a welfare state. Today one of its founders, the elderly Willem Dries, age 96, (prime minister from 1948 to 1958), admits some of the excesses. This old guard knows that it can count on Joop den Uyl who reiterates: Dutch social welfare is not responsible for the international economic crisis and this crisis must not be used as a pretext for dismantling social achievements.

Part of the union movement employs the same language, but several union groups are complaining that there is definitely too little difference between those who get up at 5 am for a meager salary and those who do not work and receive their benefits in the mail. The supporters of distributing resources according to effort would not be opposed to dropping the most disadvantaged.

However, we must not make the picture too black. The union movement and the PVDA agree with a reduction in purchasing power, for example accompanying a reduction in working hours, provided that the savings are allotted to creating employment. The fact remains that it is not easy to implement this theory within the enterprise.

Out of Breath

Short on inspiration, Mr Den Uyl recently considered leaving the political scene, simultaneously revealing the shortage of personalities from which the PVDA, like the other parties, suffers.

Among the candidates mentioned to succeed him, Andre van der Louw, former burgomaster of Rotterdam and minister for culture for 5 months, caused an uproar among young people by recommending, without having explained his project, a type of Spitaels plan for putting the young unemployed to work in exchange for unemployment compensation.

In a society where children are sent to daycare rather than to their grandmothers (who are in homes themselves anyway) and where gas meters cannot be shut off when bills are not paid, unemployment compensation is considered to be as inalienable a right as the air that one breathes. Mr Van der Louw might just as well have saved himself the trouble.

Thus occupied with vainly seeking solutions from one day to the next in a world clinging to its consumer habits, so far the PVDA has not been able to consider the two basic questions which come up: Why is Europe deindustrializing itself? And why has the economy seemed to have become uncontrollable over the past 10 years?

Het Biefstuk-Socialism

The PVDA has economists capable of considering these questions, but they are rarely listened to. In two books which he has recently published, Hans van den Doel, a disciple of Tinbergen, continues to talk to a brick wall. The titles of these books speak for themselves: "Het Biefstuk-Socialism and The Economy" (needs no translation) and "The Economy of the Unpaid Invoice."

Heavily based on considerations that would be termed scientific if Professor Raymond Barre had not demonstrated the limitations of this science of "bone-setting," Van den Doel's theory is attractive and easy to understand.

In 1776, Adam Smith, the forefather of modern economics, had thought that the invisible hand of the market regulated supply and demand: the butcher and the baker supply our food because that is how they survive, he noted.

Since then, and since 1933, with Professor Tinbergen we have understood that this theory was inadequate:

--The volume of what is produced does not depend on need but rather on the price offered at a particular time. Thus, when pork prices are profitable,

all the stock breeders fatten livestock prolifically and several months later there is too much pork on the market.

--Investors often do not take into consideration what their competitors are doing (the steel and petrochemical industries, whose expensive investments have been shelved, know something about this).

--The effects of outside disturbances, such as the price of petroleum for example, are multiplied on the domestic economy.

Two types of power intervene in order to correct these "false notes" in the market economy: the technostuctures discovered by the American Galbraith, in other words the managers of large enterprises and interest groups who tend toward unlimited expansion of their respective sectors on the one hand, and political power in the form of representative democracy (the parliamentary system), on the other.

But, these two forces have only limited powers of intervention because they cannot totally eliminate the laws of the marketplace and particularly because they must reckon with what Van den Doel calls "cooperative democracy."

Most of the time this cooperation determines expenditures and the administration is then obliged to find the resources without which there is no coordination between the two. Thus, the administration discusses subsidies with the organizations that benefit from them, prices and taxes with employers, and wages and taxes with the wage earners. Management and the unions deal with one another, agricultural and military expenditures are established in Brussels and Parliament only has to endorse the bill by approving the budget--the rush toward deficit spending.

Van den Doel thus denounces the phenomenon tackled from a different angle in France by Francois de Closets in "Toujours Plus" [Always More]. He stresses that responsibility for this situation is not always attributable to unions and interest groups, but rather to "a process of decision which forsakes any connection between profits and sacrifices."

But, like many PVDA intellectuals, Mr Van den Doel does not have the ear of the party leaders who accuse him rather quickly of being "antiunion."

Born with industrialization, for three-quarters of a century the socialist ideal has been able to direct the distribution of its profits. Wouter Gortzak, another socialist intellectual and editor in chief of the Amsterdam paper HET PAROOL, notes that the Socialist Party is less capable of "managing austerity" and especially of admitting that the people of the Netherlands are living beyond their means. As the PVDA is far from being a revolutionary party, it yields to the communists, the fringe groups and the French Socialists the privilege of a "pursuit of the rich" whose limitations it perceives anyway.

The fact remains that the freezing of the system, denounced by Van den Doel, is felt with confusion everywhere, which has resulted in the president of the PVDA, Max van den Berg, being told: "If things are not going well for the PVDA, it is because things are not going well for the entire political world."

9693

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ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE ENVIRONMENTAL PARTY NOTED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 13 Nov 82 pp 203-205

[Report by W.G.J. Bavelaar: "Small Red Does Not See Much in Green Initiative."]

[Text] Green is fashionable. In the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium the Greens seem to be becoming a factor of some significance. PPR [Political Party of Radicals] Senator Bas de Gaay Fortman "discovered" a political hole in the market and wants to gather all that European green with a view to the Euro [European Parliament] elections of 1984. In our country Bas is aiming at the participation of "the small left" [parties] but they're not tapping their feet with impatience there.

Red, brown and gold are the dominant colors in the Veluwe [central Netherlands] landscape in the fall. In order to reach PPR Senator Dr B. de Gaay Fortman's home, environmentally pleasing to the eye, all these variegated colors are seen in abundance by the automobilist. There is not much green left. But that is not unusual in the month of November. In the coming period of "closing drapes" and of gasmeters clicking away at an unpleasant speed, a small group of ecological zealots is going to think out and develop plans to pursue "ecology" on a European scale. Bas de Gaay Fortman came with a remarkable initiative: "the green platform."

"Let's sit over here; this is the only heated room," the member of the first chamber welcomes us. With this somewhat "sheltered" acting representative of the Political Party of Radicals splinter group we are going to discuss the "green platform." Bas and his comrade in green, the environmental publisher Wouter van Dieren, registered a few names for listing with the Election Council, with the description Green Party of the Netherlands and several variants on that, whereby the adjectives "green" and "ecological" were used. In order to right away clear up some misunderstandings, De Gaay Jr explains that this registration does not have the purpose of establishing a green party functioning at the national level. The pair merely wanted to prevent the concept "green," now in the political elevator, from coming into the hands of opportunist politicians who are only interested in political gain. "Just like D'66 used to be bothered by career seekers who profited by the growth of that party."

Bas and Wouter, with the successes in mind of the "Grunen" of our Eastern neighbors and the rise of similar movements elsewhere in Europe, want their party to be part of a green parliamentary group which possibly will start functioning after

the Euro elections of 1984. The campaign was launched just for that purpose. The technical point of that election premise is that the small parties here, "the small left, for example," would not have a chance at all if they were to participate individually in this second direct election of the members of the European parliament. In this election, namely, an election threshold of 4 percent is being used; for little clubs such as the PPR, CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands], PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party], EVP [European People's Party] and also D'66 [Democrats '66], these are towering obstacles, speaking relatively.

"Surely it would be ridiculous if there were no Netherlanders in the European green parliamentary group," exclaims co-originator De Gaay Fortman.

He and Van Dieren are the founders of ECORAPA, the European ecological movement. Ecological parties, environmental movements and peace groups collaborate in that, amongst other reasons to acquire a strong representation in the newly to be elected Europarlament. "We might be able to get a parliamentary group of 20 to 30 people." But before it is so far, there will have to be a lot of evangelizing in our own country. Each of the "small left" clubs individually, namely, pretends to be doing a lot already with respect to "environment."

The first reactions from that side are a little miffed. People feel somewhat taken by surprise by the "rather arrogant" action of the senator to have recorded names from environment lists "just like that." Furthermore, it turns out that the concept "ecology" has to be taken rather broadly. Matters such as industrial policy, energy problems, questions of peace and security ("thus, rejection of nuclear arms") and of income and work opportunity also should be included in the policy objectives of the European greens. The Dutch political parties which are being considered and which are expected to align themselves behind the green ideal will have to abandon a few of their pet topics as far as "Europe" is concerned. "We must not use the word 'leftist' or 'socialist.'" By the way, the 'left' also has done a lot of bad things for the environment."

That request of possibly participating parties to relinquish "a little" loss of identity will meet resistance, also in the eyes of the originators. "But it is simply a matter of known power relations. The three big currents -- socialists, liberals, christian democrats -- can acquire that power. The small ones will be left out and cannot become a power factor on their own strength." Hence the appeal to join hands in order to be able to bear some ecological witness in that European arena. With three Netherlanders in the future green parliamentary group in Strasbourg, that sound, adjusted to a modest volume, should be audible.

The green plan, thought up to get a little piece of the pie in the rise of environment activists abroad, meanwhile has led to spontaneous applications from our country. But the party offices of the "small left," whose cooperation is indispensable, for the time being are adopting an attitude of wait-and-see or even of rejection. Moreover, the organized protectors of the environment are not cheering either.

The Organization of Environment Defense is reacting rather mildly: "We don't think we should go into politics ourselves; environment policy must be initiated within the existing parties. Too much is being done already by the small left. A national

banding together does not seem sensible; perhaps at the European level such collaboration would make some sense.

The spokesman of the Nature and Environment Foundation on the other hand says he has his doubts as to getting the existing political parties involved. Primarily the recent pushing around of "environmental hygiene" during the [cabinet] formation game causes the foundation to fear the worst. "Nature conservation now goes to Agriculture. Everyone knows that farmers don't care too much about protecting nature. An inimitable blunder."

The PSP calls "such a separate action" by PPR members "a little strange." With a view to "Europe" they certainly have an interest in collaborating with parties such as the CPN and PPR -- some contacts already exist -- but that does not at all include a joint ecological action. "A little arrogant," the pacifists describe the action of the pair to go to the Election Council of their own accord, without consulting with potential partners. De Gaay Fortman on that: "Our plans became known prematurely. We wanted to prepare everything calmly; at the end of November a group of people will get together for a first discussion." The PSP does realize, however, that participating separately in the Euro elections is senseless. The small left, working together, could join with similar -- proletarian [word missing]

The CPN doesn't give any supporting commentary either. They also are working on studying forms of collaboration with the PPR and PSP in the Euro elections. They emphatically add that the PvdA [Labor Party] is not excluded from that. The communists thus also question the newly introduced green element. "In the FRG it is completely different. The SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] did very little about environment. That explains the rise of the Grunen."

A similar theory can be heard from Mrs Ineke Lambers-Hacquebard, the former secretary of state for environment of D'66. According to her, D'66 does not belong in De Gaay Fortman's little line-up of the small left. "The success of the Greens in the FRG would not come about here. The established parties there did not do anything about environment. Here the parties have included in their party programs the ideas which were launched by us," she says. "It is bad for the environmental policy if you isolate this element. The large parties will then take it easy and will say that environment will be taken care of. 'Environment' must be integrated." D'66, which is now represented in Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg, expects more of collaboration in the European context with liberal kindred spirits with whom they can also collaborate on other matters. "Going along with Bas "is not likely; we won't have to," according to Ineke Lambers of D'66 which calls itself the pre-eminent environmental party.

De Gaay Fortman, however, would especially applaud that party's participation. "If they go along, we can be sure of an electoral spot."

Thus at home there is no boisterous approval yet. According to De Gaay Fortman Jr that must be changed in the coming months, determined as he says he is to carry out the green endeavors at the European level. For that matter, without acting as the first man. "If the PPR does not participate, then it should continue without me." Does that mean resigning as a party member? That is indeed the case. "Surely it is unthinkable that the Netherlands do not make out part of a green parliamentary group in Europe in 1984?"

CHRISTIAN PARTY MAY JOIN COALITION AFTER LEADERSHIP FIGHT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Dec 82 p 19

[Article by Bjorn Lindahl]

[Text] Oslo, Saturday--A tough battle over who will be chairman of the Christian People's Party--Norway's third largest party--is currently in full swing. The battle's outcome will also decide whether or not it will be possible to form a coalition nonsocialist government before the next election.

The frontrunner in the race is 35-year-old Kjell Magne Bondevik, currently the party's deputy chairman and leader of its parliamentary group. He is in a strong position in the balloting in which each section of the country is to decide which candidate it wants. Bondevik has so far received the support of 11 of the 19 county parties, while Kare Kristiansen, the incumbent chairman, has been nominated only in Oslo and Bergen.

Of the two, it is Kare Kristiansen, 63, who is more favorably disposed to the government. He feels that if the nonsocialist parties are to have any chance of winning the 1985 election, they will have to form a coalition government before then, and that coalition ought to have at least 2 years in office before the election.

Kjell Magne Bondevik is more cautious and does not want to challenge directly that section of the party which has put up a barrier against all cooperation in the government until the law granting Norwegian women abortion on demand is changed.

Even though Bondevik is ahead in the balloting, it is not certain that the party will dare to oppose Kristiansen. Both candidates are exerting as much pressure as they can. Bondevik, for example, has stated that he will not seek reelection as deputy chairman next year, but that he is otherwise willing to take on the duties that the party wants to assign to him. For his part, Kare Kristiansen has threatened that there will be a very disagreeable scene if he is not elected.

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NEW JUSTICE MINISTER ON PLANNED LEGAL REFORMS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 4 Dec 82 pp 16-17

[Interview with Fernando Ledesma, minister of justice by Francisco Gor; date and place unspecified]

[Text] Upon receiving his Law degree at Salamanca University, Fernando Ledesma, justice minister of the first Socialist government worked first as public prosecutor and then magistrate. His professional career culminated in his election in 1980 as member of the General Council of the Judicial Power. From this entity he went on to fill a solely political position in the executive branch. As prosecutor he was especially concerned with the defense of human rights in his procedural dealings with "political delinquents" of the dictatorship; and as magistrate he formed part of the court which directly applied for the first time, the constitutional principles in the decision to legalize freemasonry. He reveals to EL PAIS some of the measures to be immediately adopted by his team in the area of justice.

Question: What criteria have you used in the selection of your team?

Answer: In the first place, an ideological coincidence with the Socialist program in general terms; secondly, an impeccable democratic trajectory, then professional and personal honesty, and finally, technical competence, working spirit and the capacity to work in a team, because definitively it will be as a team that we will work.

Question: You are the only independent member of the government with no party affiliation. In your case what does the word independent mean?

Answer: If by independent one means not having a party card, not being militantly active in a party, then I am in effect independent, and I am, as I have said on other occasions, in compliance with the Constitution which prohibits me, as the magistrate that I am, from belonging to a political party.

But for some time now I have been on the battle lines for a democratic system, for the recognition, respect and support of individual rights,

public freedoms, and in that struggle I have involved myself, creating together with others the democratic justice which I joined when I began my functions in a legal career, and in which I work now to spread its principles and ideas throughout Spain.

By that I want to say that my commitment to the struggle for democracy has been constant and that, specifically, my agreement with the socialist tenets dates back many years. In that sense it cannot be said that I, who consider myself to be dependent on my ideas, am at all independent of the program, of the set of values and of the project for a socialist society.

'Democratic Justice'

Question: An old member of Democratic Justice has become the Minister of Justice. This historic event requires an explanation to the public of the meaning of this movement of judges, magistrates and attorneys during the last days of the dictatorship, and if the program that you proposed has been achieved in the democratic state.

Answer: Democratic Justice meant the concurrence of a broad group of judges, magistrates and attorneys who understood that it was not possible to achieve fully the judicial function within the context of a dictatorship, and that one may only be a judge who upholds fundamental rights where those fundamental rights are recognized.

The irritant represented by the army to the judicial function within a context totally antagonistic to that idea, was what fostered the grouping together of those judges and attorneys, who from the outset by their efforts, struggle and responsibility, espoused the necessity of contributing to the restoration of a democratic system in Spain.

To that end, together with other citizen organizations and with the then outlawed and persecuted political parties, Democratic Justice, running serious risks, became involved in attempting to bring to Spain what it finally got with the enactment of the Constitution in 1978.

With regard to the program and ideas of Democratic Justice, they are in large part gathered into the Constitution. Democratic Justice always spoke of the independence of the judicial branch, and even proposed the creation of the General Council of the Judicial Branch, and happily, this was adopted into the Constitution. But, democratic justice is justice that is always in the process of advancing, that is never a finished reality, and in that sense it cannot be said that what we aspired to is totally achieved at this time.

Question: In what ways could the change advocated by the Socialist Party in the area of justice take form?

Answer: For that it is necessary to depart from a realistic and authentic examination of the current situation. The present situation reveals that

a crisis of confidence exists with regard to the administration of the justice system. The change rests with recovering that confidence. In recovering the confidence of the citizens, in giving hope to those who serve justice, in making all the judicial machinery function precisely for the purpose for which it was intended, that is to say, that it be truly one apparatus, one organization that serves to bring to the citizens greater levels of freedom and equality. The change even rests with the judges and courts being aware that the Constitution commits them to the task of removing the obstacles which prevent the realization of these values. The change consists of the judges' understanding that through justice society is transformed, it advances, that laws do not shut out all the solutions, that there are spaces open to the creative and progressive interpretation of the judge, and in this sense the change must be brought about.

Naturally, this change also demands that, on the scale of priorities that forms the basis of economic programming for any government, justice be placed at the level that corresponds to it in order to be able to perform this important work.

Question: Previous governments have also recognized, at least in word, that the budgetary provisions for justice are poor and scarce. The question is if the new minister of justice and the government of which he is a part have already decided to increase this allotment during the next general budget session.

Answer: As I am speaking with you now, the government still has not met, and, therefore, no decision has been made. This is evidently a decision to be made properly by the government itself. What is there is the electoral of the party, and in the statements of the current president of the government is the confirmation that the Justice administration should receive treatment at the juridic and economic levels, different from what it has received up to now, which implies the recognition of a priority that it has not had up to now. The commitment is made in the electoral program and, logically, the electoral program designs, determines and establishes which goals are to be pursued. There cannot be any lack of cohesiveness between what was said there and what later will definitively be.

'Speed Up the Judicial Machinery'

Question: During his investiture session Felipe Gonzalez spoke specifically of the gratuitousness of judicial taxes.

Answer: That will be a decision that the government will adopt at the moment it considers to be appropriate, which naturally, supposes a document that will facilitate access by the citizens to the services of justice.

In this way an obstacle is removed which could obstruct the basic right to protection by an effective judicial system. With the gratuitousness of judicial taxes that barrier disappears and the possibility of protection becomes something more attainable.

Naturally, one must be very aware that this barrier is not only one of an economic nature, that there are others. But this one, which is dependent upon a political decision, is clearly considered in the party's electoral program.

Question: A matter that concerns the citizens is the slowness of the judicial procedures. What instruments is the new team of the Justice Ministry thinking of using to create the necessary conditions to make it possible to speed up the judicial machinery?

Answer: The slowness of the judicial machinery is produced as a consequence of the conjunction of a series of factors. On one hand, generally in all jurisdictional orders a written procedure is applied, full of rites and transactions in which the parties always have within their reach the possibility of preventing the process from advancing with the desired speed. Then, there is a separation or division of the work that has not been brought to date. When I talk about a division of work, I am referring to the division between jurisdictional units. In the third place there is an anachronistic judicial office lacking the adequate technological facilities. Also possibly influencing the slowness is a feeling of disillusion that it is all the same whether or not the matter is delayed as a result of the non-existence of elements that might achieve the pursuit of the effectiveness of the service given.

This is all corrected by the introduction into procedures of judicial immediacy, verbal communication, greater human contact and a greater personal audience. It is corrected through some processes in which the lengthening transactions can be avoided, giving greater powers to the judge so he may avoid the slowdowns caused inadvertently. It is also corrected by the introduction of instruction and instruments controlling the lending of services.

Question: Will all of these measures be able to be enacted during the 4 years of the current government's mandate?

Answer: I think so. From the moment that the electoral legislative program anticipated the reform of the processes and the economic potentiality for the resources allotted to the justice system, a new judicial demarcation and a new fundamental law were anticipated and there was a concern for the selection and perfecting of the judicial officials, the mechanisms and techniques for solving these ills have been taking shape. These corrective measures will be applied at as quick a pace as possible, keeping in mind the preparation time involved for the laws and the financial possibilities.

Question: The subject of jails has been a source of conflict for some years. What short term measures can the new justice team apply to resolve the situation:

Answer: A partial reform of the Penal Code is expected, which will lead to a new regulating of the evaluation of some circumstances which coincide

with crimes against property, in the sense that the penalties which take away freedom should, as much as possible, be avoidable. By extension, this supposes the reduction of the provisional prison and the reforms necessary for such a reduction. Along with this, and when the inevitable entry into the penal establishment comes about, it must be assured that inside them only the penalty of deprivation of freedom is applied, conserving a whole series of rights that must be protected, and which are under the care of the judge controlling the sentences.

That is to say, one must do away with the idea that the principle of legality is a principle which operates outside of the penal establishments. No, it must also operate and develop all of its requirements inside the prisons as well.

Question: But, concretely, what is going to be done to end the disproportionate number of avoidable prisoners awaiting trial for months, and in many cases for years, now populating the Spanish jails?

Answer: The time of waiting in provisional prison will be reduced from the moment compliance with the article of the Constitution that establishes the limited duration in said prison, begins. Once this period is exceeded, logically, the provisional prison situation cannot be upheld. This already supposes, therefore, a reduction and at the same time is imposing on the courts the need to conclude summary proceedings with greater speed.

On the other hand, from the moment one proceeds toward the creation of new judicial bodies, a greater work capacity will be generated, and consequently, a greater acceleration will be produced. Because the problem is basically centered in the courts of the large population nuclei. These courts are the ones which must have preferential treatment with regard to the makeup of their bodies, and the means which are assigned to them.

9730

CSO: 3548/46

PCE OFFICIALS ON PARTY'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 3/9 Dec 82 pp 40-42

[Interview with Francisco Romero Marin, head of the Finance Secretariat of the PCE Central Committee, and Agustin Gomez, member of the PCE Central Committee, by Antonio Mullor; date, time and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Since the effort made by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the electoral campaign and its poor vote turnout, what is its present economic situation? What debts does the party owe, and how can it meet them?

[Answer] Let us look at our expenses first. The budget for the PCE electoral campaign was 456 million pesetas, which was covered by the 150 million from the aid campaign, the 36 million in bonds sold and liquidated so far, and bank loans totaling 275 million pesetas. This amount, therefore, is the party's current debt, and can be broken down into three loans: one from the Central Bank, with a 1-year term, for 75 million pesetas; and two for 100 million each, from the Peoples Bank and the Bank of Bilbao, with 3-year terms.

To deal with this debt and enable the party to continue working, between now and the end of the year a great effort will have to be made in the aid campaign to come close to the 200 million pesetas we need; we will also have to step up the sale and liquidation of bonds, which could bring in 150 million. Another thing we must do is try to regularize the payment of 25 percent of dues to the Central Committee, establishing a minimum quota of 200 pesetas per month, as agreed a long time ago. These measures, along with the results of the PCE Fiesta, will allow the party to continue in its work, although naturally with some belt-tightening.

[Question] What was the 456 million pesetas spent on?

[Answer] Basically on advertising and publicity, an item which totaled 280 million. The second-biggest item was travel, for 29 million. That, along with the expenses involved in organizing rallies and the direct subsidies to the various party organizations for the election campaign, made a total of approximately 150 million pesetas. The amortization of the loans, although that will depend on the time (and the limit is 3 years), could mean some 26 million pesetas.

Our initial budget was 500 million, and we have not exceeded it, given that we felt that the results we would get would be lower than what we had gotten so far, although those results, and therefore the subsidy we obtained, were indeed less than we expected. Now, the fact that we did not exceed our overall budget does not mean that some organizations of the party have not exceeded their allotments, because among other problems, there are still some comrades who do not have a sufficient grasp of finance and get carried away in a flurry of spending without considering the consequences that exceeding the budgets could have. These budgets always represent a balancing of certain needs and certain possibilities; disrupting that equilibrium is always dangerous.

[Question] In some groups it is observed that there have been discrepancies in the amount of publicity mailings. Was that a significant factor in spending?

[Answer] From the beginning of the campaign there were constant consultations regarding the amount of posters and materials necessary for each organization, and there was an enormous difference between the statistics originally compiled and the actual results, because the opinions of the organizations were taken into account. This does not mean that in the end there were not certain imbalances, and that in some places there were overestimations and in others, underestimations. But that has not been the overall trend. Perhaps the greatest discrepancy, and we will have to bear this in mind in the future, was in the placards. Because it was a new development, and because of their characteristics, etc., the placards were not appreciated or utilized to the extent desirable; but the rest of the publicity materials were used correctly.

[Question] Having only four seats means a smaller subsidy than what you had before. In general, the party will have fewer economic possibilities, but there is an even greater political need to organize the party, not to mention immediate commitments such as the municipal elections. Isn't that a difficult cycle to break?

[Answer] For the municipal elections, we have already mentioned the need for a greater effort in underwriting and selling bonds. We will also have to increase our debt by asking taking out new loans. But in general we must try not to touch the party's political workers, who are decisive for the development of a party of the masses. If we cut down on the political work, we are creating more problems in order to solve our financial situation, because any investment made to free comrades for political work, to develop the party, entails an effort to overcome our economic situation. We believe that if dues are regulated, and an effort is made with the bonds and with the Fiesta, then we will be able to pay off this debt and meet the party's financial needs. But to do that the entire party must join the effort, and above all the leadership must view financial matters as a fundamental political task.

[Question] In the financial sphere, has there been too much local autonomy among the various organizations of the party?

[Answer] As a matter of fact, there is something that must be rectified in the party. It must be accepted that the party is an entity as a whole; that it is necessary to come to the aid of all the organizations so that they can branch out. Those who have the most should give the most to those who are behind in organizational development. There is a great economic diversity between industrial regions and rural areas, where unemployment is endemic, wages are much lower, and of course dues are always much lower. Some organizations must assume that spirit of solidarity in relation to the rest, contributing more aid to the PCE leadership so that it can invest in the development of the organization in other regions where the party is still in a tenuous position.

The open subscription by the Central Committee in September was an extremely important step toward eliminating localism, but that trend persists, and it is one of the economic problems that plague the party. Analyzing contributions, we can see that primarily, they have come directly from the grassroots organizations and from members and sympathizers who understood the need for a centralized campaign stemming from the Central Committee. Available data reveals that in provinces and regions where the issue of finances has traditionally been understood and dues are paid regularly to the Central Committee, contributions are higher than in provinces or regions where this issue has not been addressed, and not even the regional leadership has taken on this responsibility. A considerable number of people in the party understand perfectly well that money has to come in, and this goes hand in hand with the sale and liquidation to MUNDO OBRERO, because that is precisely where the most money has come from for the subscription: MUNDO OBRERO, the best channel for selling and liquidating bonds.

I will cite another example to show that we still have much to do to convey the importance of finances in the party. There are organizations that have still not forwarded to the Central Committee the proceeds from bonds sold a long time ago, and these are exactly the same organizations that have contributed the least to the subscription. That is why we often think that certain rank-and-file groups have a better understanding of the struggle against localism than some intermediate committees, which are able to make use of certain funds such as the proceeds from the sale of bonds or of MUNDO OBRERO, funds that they should simply pass on.

[Question] Might this change in the coming months?

[Answer] Naturally, it is in the upcoming months that our efforts, before the municipal election campaign, must be aimed at paying off the debt acquired by the Central Committee on behalf of the entire party in order to carry out the campaign on behalf of the entire party, and at raising the financial situation as a whole to the appropriate level. A very high percentage of party members understand this, but the leadership of various party organs must also grasp this concept and organize the payment of dues, the sale of bonds, and MUNDO OBRERO subscriptions and sales accordingly. Those responsible for finances must be accorded due importance, and I think this is possible. In the various committees, the appropriate people must be chosen for this task, without leaving the matter till the end of the agenda and dealing with it in a routine manner.

We should begin thinking about preparations for the PCE Fiesta, which will be a very important stage in the party's recovery in all senses, political as well as economic. Participation in the Fiesta should not be viewed as something static, but rather it should be prepared through the combination of a series of activities by the different organizations, so that all the fairs and festivities held in the locals, in every town, in the provinces, will be a platform to advance the objectives of the main PCE Fiesta. They should not represent just one place, but the entire PCE. The Fiesta should be viewed dynamically, so that we do not run the risk of making it a fiesta of provincial delegations.

[Question] Economically speaking, will the municipal election campaign be similar to that of the recent general elections?

[Answer] By nature, municipal elections require a more decentralized campaign in which all the local factors weigh more heavily. This, of course, entails a major effort by grassroots organizations to deal with the problems of each locality and to explain our program to their neighbors, as well as an economic effort.

8926

CSO: 3548/54

FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDS POLICIES: DENIES 'BODSTROM' DOCTRINE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "The Doctrine is an Invention by the Ideologue Ahlmark"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom is in a fighting mood. To be sure he is rather peaceful, but he has sharpened his ironic arrows well. It is about the Bodstrom doctrine, the one that is not supposed to exist, but, through the stubbornness of the opposition, persecutes the foreign minister.

An invention by Per Ahlmark, who had a need to exhibit a foreign policy "test of strength," says Lennart Bodstrom, barely politely.

Is it fun to be foreign minister? There is nothing that indicates that Lennart Bodstrom does not like his new position, and he looks quite at home in the magnificent drawing-room of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is his office. He also knows since long ago how to answer without actually answering. Thus: Is it fun to be foreign minister?

"I want to stress that it is evident through my contacts with foreign countries that one is not as interested in my advice about how one should react there, but more in the development in Sweden."

It was like that during Lennart Bodstrom's TCO time, and he does now as he did then; he asks questions abroad as well, and uses the experiences where they can be useful.

But what he does not like is the constant discussion about the so-called Bodstrom doctrine. It will follow him, he realizes that, and he has a well thought-out explanation of its origin and success. What Lennart Bodstrom said in an interview and what has been called his doctrine, was that Sweden should react to events in other countries and explain why we oppose them. But Sweden must not discuss the right of other countries to chose their own system.

Pursuing an Ideology

"Doctrine"--that is an expression invented by Ahlmark (Per, former leader of the Liberal Party) and Wastberg (Olle, former Liberal Party member of the Swedish parliament) who are constantly pursuing an ideology. When they had read this interview, they pulled out one single statement and said, as the ideologists they are, that this is a doctrine!

Wide-ranging solutions, least of all a confrontation, says Lennart Bodstrom as a description of the foreign policy in the country. If it is anything, it is a doctrine of pragmatism, he declares from his blue silk chair and looks annoyed at having been so misinterpreted, or misunderstood, or whatever.

Test of Power

When Per Ahlmark, in an evening newspaper article, attacked Lennart Bodstrom for what he had said, he had a definite intention, says Lennart Bodstrom.

"I have looked upon this article by Ahlmark as a test of power, where he wants to show competence in foreign policy, and it was shortly before he started his attacks on a former foreign minister (Ola Ullsten). And ten days later, the one who more than anyone else, according to Per Ahlmark, is suited to become Liberal Party leader shows up (meaning Olle Wastberg) and does the same thing, wants to show that he understands foreign policy. The naming of an expression, that is the Ahlmarkish phrase about the Bodstrom doctrine, was enough for Olle Wastberg. That he has not read the original interview himself becomes clear from what he writes."

The attacks are not serious, sighs Lennart Bodstrom--but if one always runs the risk of a disconnected quotation becoming a doctrine, it becomes impossible to keep an open attitude.

"In that case we will have politicians who do not say anything. Per Ahlmark says he is the great ideologist, but nothing was accomplished with his battles and territorial security was not improved by it. I want to question Per Ahlmark and Olle Wastberg in their special interest area instead: Is Israel's invasion of Lebanon, which Sweden strongly condemned, a result of Israel's system? This is the conclusion of their criticism of the 'doctrine.'"

Be Open

Foreign Minister Bodstrom knows exactly how Swedish foreign policy works and he sticks to what he has said earlier. Freedom of alliance is the foundation.

Peaceful coexistence is the main thing, conflicts should be solved through legal systems like the ones of the United Nations.

"The talk of the doctrine has now moved from Per Ahlmark to the cartoon level," says Lennart Bodstrom. "The step was maybe not long, but I am not pleased by it. And I can do nothing but remain open. What I mean is that, as an individual or an author of an article, or as a speaker at a party convention, one

has a different opportunity to express oneself than when one represents a country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not write any essays or debate contributions, but makes positions into concrete questions."

These questions are not the least about how people's fundamental rights should be met and how territorial respect should be preserved.

"Correct to Stay"

What does Lennart Bodstrom say about the reputation of the foreign policy? Has it been tarnished by the Social Democrats' turn around in questions concerning East Timor, loans to South Africa, and, above all, continued participation in the Inter-American Development Bank, IDB?

No, there is nothing wrong with the reputation, the foreign minister answers, of course. It must answer to the principles he mentions, of human rights, national independence, respect for international law and peaceful conflict solutions. Nothing in the decisions by the Social Democratic government goes against these principles, he says:

"I think it is difficult if isolated statements or decisions are taken out of context and brought up to positions of principle. With regard to IDB, we are convinced that it is right to remain, as we still could not break our commitment until in the 90's."

"And," says Lennart Bodstrom, "a group of countries in Central America, with which Sweden desires to have good relations, have the opportunity of borrowing from the IDB. There are not sufficiently strong reasons for not participating in the new replenishment of capital. Even here the trade policy has an influence: Swedish industry produces just such products that are bought by the countries with which IDB works. This is a fact that should preferably not be mentioned, from what I understand. But it should not be kept secret. I understand that assessments can be made differently. In this case the reasons to remain are in the majority."

9843

CSO: 3650/64

ULLSTEN EMERGES UNSCATHED IN LIBERAL PARTY VOTE-LOSS INQUIRY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 82 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson: "1-0 to Ola Ullsten"]

[Text] The Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten, won the first round about the report by the commission of inquiry regarding the reasons for the election catastrophe. The portion about the reasons for the election defeat will only be put aside and will not be put to a vote when the party leadership meets next Saturday.

Should a majority of the party leadership vote for the so-called confession, Ullsten will immediately be forced to resign as party leader.

The political committee of the Liberal Party met all through Monday to discuss the handling of the report by the commission of inquiry before the meeting with the party leadership on Saturday.

The report by the commission of inquiry is first an analysis of the reasons for the Liberal Party's election catastrophe. The commission had also been instructed to make suggestions of measures of both political and organizational character from this starting point.

The commission of inquiry presented in its report a nine-point proposal and, after a long discussion, the members of the political committee sanctioned, on the whole, this proposal.

According to the first point, the main task of the Liberal Party will be to work for the liberation of the individual.

Otherwise, the Liberal Party shall give priority to the position of neglected people in a time of economic tightening, and demonstrate how Sweden shall reach economic balance through a consistent resource-producing policy. A liberal weekly newspaper and a liberal institute of ideas are also part of the platform.

Stinging Criticism

The well discussed portion of the report by the commission for inquiry has the title "Reasons for the Defeat." That portion is these days called the confession.

The commission of inquiry criticizes the party leadership's policy of agreement during the 70's, its lack of profile, its deficient realism, and the lack of consistency that has characterized the activity of the Liberal Party.

That the party leadership has not paid enough attention to the organization and to the members is mentioned among other neglected areas.

The confession contains a stinging criticism of the actions of the party leadership during all of the 70's, that is not only from 1978, when Ullsten became party leader.

A majority of the political committee members said that one could not vote on a historical description of the reasons for the party's election defeat.

This part of the report by the commission of inquiry will thus be put aside without a vote, which in that case is a defeat for the party secretary, Lars Leijonborg, and the chairman of Volvo, Pehr Gyllenhammar, who principally stand behind the report.

The meeting is described as calm and constructive. Most considered it a better thing to look forward than to remain in the past.

The party leadership will meet Saturday to decide on the recommendations by the political committee regarding the report by the commission of inquiry.

Mistrust

Should the majority of the members of the party leadership believe that the confession should also be included in a political decision, it will mean a vote of no confidence in Ullsten.

Ullsten must in that case immediately accept the consequences of this no confidence and resign. The nomination committee should be ready with its suggestions for party leader and members of the party leadership at the latest by 10 December. Ullsten cannot jump off at a later date.

Even the members of the party leadership have in practice stood behind the policy pursued by the Liberal Party during Ullsten's time and even before.

If Ullsten's line wins in the party leadership, everything points to Ullsten's being a candidate for party leader, in spite of the attacks he has been exposed to in the newspaper debate and in the report by the commission of inquiry.

The Liberal Party's countrywide meeting will convene on 15 January to elect a party leader and members of the party leadership and to take a final position on the report by the commission of inquiry.

According to beforehand calculations, Ullsten has a majority of the meeting delegates on his side. Criticism against Ullsten comes principally from Goteborg and Malmo, and some other constituency unions. The position in Stockholm is divided, and in Norrland Ullsten has solid support.

9843

CSO: 3650/62

PAPER EXPRESSES DISAPPOINTMENT OVER LIBERAL PARTY REPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg: "The Propaganda Party"]

[Text] The Liberal Party's commission of inquiry is trying to break down the party's present direction with lashes and self-criticism. Out of this unique self-tormenting shall by 1985 be born "a new self-confidence, a new identity," as it is expressed in the report "Fighting Liberalism."

A new identity? It looks as if the team wants to form a whole new party. What then is this party? It is not rightwing, not leftwing, not a special interest party, not a spokesman for the privileged, not socialistic. It is not even a "middle party," the team explains, having bought the Moderates' campaign of many years that the position of a middle party is designed to be right between the Moderates' position and that of the Social Democrats.

Anyone who so wished could easily have understood that the idea of middle means a position on the old Right-Left scale. But attitudes about tightening, funds, energy, planning, or help to underdeveloped countries, just to mention a few concrete examples, are not automatically put in between.

The Liberal Party appears, according to the team, as the party that is not. The chance is that this will happen if the team's prescription is followed. The new identity the group wants to give the Liberal Party means that the party shall stand alone, not seek cooperation with other parties and put propaganda before the exercise of power. It sounds great--but it can easily end by the Liberal Party becoming a "demand machine" without contact with the daily problems of ordinary people, of which there no doubt will be many during the 80's.

The point of the team's reasoning is directed against the effect policy the Liberal Party pursued during the 70's. The fighting liberalism that now shall take over has, however, its point directed against the Social Democrats.

Having established that cooperation with the other parties is only possible with a clear profile of one's own (which the group seems to question as it later refuses cooperation with other parties), the group writes:

"To shape opinion, to offer moral leadership, is just as urgent as to form governments and parliamentary majorities." Well, that fits with the goal of becoming a propaganda party. But it does not fit with the group's statement only a few sentences earlier: "The Liberal Party is ready to take part in the formation of, or to be part of a nonsocialist government that on a liberal basis conducts a realistic war policy."

What happened to independence and propaganda?

There are questions that are right for propaganda: problems in independence, a more human technology, understanding of what is different (immigrants) and what is far away (aid).

But a central thought in liberalism is also that policy should be made in the interest of the whole, in the interest of everyone. This is difficult, but important. It demands that a Liberal Party participates in the political process, is ready to influence and to compromise. Should the Liberal Party renounce that opportunity, the voters will find it difficult to understand why they should chose just that party.

9843

CSO: 3650/62

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

YOUNG LIBERALS OPPOSE ULLSTEN--Ola Ullsten must resign. The Liberal Party in Stockholm district behaved very poorly when they expressed their support for Ola Ullsten last Tuesday. The information that the meeting was unanimous is false. The Greater Stockholm District of the Liberal Party's Youth Association (FPU) said this in a statement last Thursday. We young Liberals know that there are competent candidates for the office of party chairman. They can show a change in the marketing of liberal ideology and also show that we in the Liberal Party have taken the voters' criticism seriously, it also said in the statement. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 6] 9843

CSO: 3650/64

BIRAND INTERVIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 14 Nov 82 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilter Turkmen by Mehmet Ali Birand]

[Text] The referendum is slowly influencing Turkey's relations with western Europe. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs is the person who first perceives this at the official level. He attended the Council of Europe meetings in Strasbourg and will hold talks with the Greek foreign minister within the next few weeks. Turkish-American relations are full of rumors which create suspicions in a number of circles. Finally, Turkish-Soviet talks will be held soon. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilter Turkmen gave his views on all these topics to Mehmet Ali Birand.

[Question] Following the referendum, in what direction will our relations with Europe proceed? More precisely, what do you expect from Europe now?

[Answer] If we look at it from the viewpoint of the Council of Europe, there was essentially no breakdown at the governmental level in our relations with the council following the 12 September. From the standpoint of eliminating disagreements that arose among us, the referendum, of course, constitutes an important plateau. In fact, we have observed this week in Strasbourg the very positive imprint the referendum has left on both the members of parliament and the ministers. There is, of course, the effect of seeing the great support for the referendum.

[Question] Very well, what do you expect? Will they, for example, abandon the human rights case?

[Answer] Of course, not all problems were solved from the standpoint of Council of Europe relations. Some nations divide the problems into two categories. Yes, not much more can be said about us from the standpoint of the democratic process. There is, however, a problem from the standpoint of human rights. This will be seen in the case opened by five nations. They say, "We do not view Turkey as an enemy, and we expect Turkey's full participation in the court procedure." Yet, they are not presenting Turkey any new compromises or proposals on the issue.

[Question] Does Turkey expect this case to be closed, expect the five nations to retract their complaints?

[Answer] It would be reasonable for this case to be withdrawn. However, it is also too optimistic to expect all nations to act in a rational manner. I do not predict that they will abandon this case. We are also conducting an investigation from our own viewpoint.

[Question] Can you say that, following the referendum and in the period ahead, there will be a leveling-off in relations between Turkey and the Council of Europe?

[Answer] I believe we can say that. The atmosphere we perceived at the recent meetings was such.

[Question] Could the parliamentary body make a decision in January to expel Turkey completely from the council?

[Answer] If such a decision were reached, it would fall into a grave contradiction. Wouldn't it be very strange if it carries out at this stage of progress what it did not do until now?

Turkish-EEC Relations

[Question] There are problems with the EEC. More exactly, there are Turkey's expectations, such as the financial protocol, which has been frozen. In your opinion, will the referendum affect these expectations?

[Answer] We anticipate positive developments in our relations with the EEC following this referendum. I believe that the EEC nations are also thinking along these lines. Our problem with the EEC, from a political standpoint, is the freezing of the fourth financial protocol. I predict that actions to revive this will begin within a short time. The EEC must appraise this well. What is important is not the money within the fourth financial protocol. What is important is that relations with Turkey evolve within a conventional framework. It is necessary for the EEC to realize the value of this. However, the financial protocol must not become involved in problems such as those regarding t-shirts and cotton thread. The reasons for these are different. The issue of the financial protocol can be settled. The textile problem, however, will endure. These are completely different things.

[Question] Do you anticipate that foreign states' credits, which remain within the structure of the OECD, generally speaking, will now begin to be made available?

[Answer] One reason for the failure to make OECD credits available is Germany's inability to announce its participation because of the change in government. There, too, it is not the result of a negative atmosphere, but is the outcome of the failure, because of the change in government, to provide the necessary report to the appropriate parliamentary commission. It is

necessary, too, that the report be submitted in the weeks ahead. I do not know the exact date, however.

[Question] Germany is in the position of being the nation that holds the key to Turkey's relations with Europe, whether it be the Common Market or the OECD. When will Bonn start to take action?

[Answer] We did not have a big problem with Germany from the standpoint of economic assistance. It was entirely a delay caused by a change in government.

[Question] While we are talking about Germany, Ilter Bey, let me ask, could a problem with the new Kohl government develop over the treatment of Turkish workers? Kohl's position is a great deal different from that of the Schmidt government. It is clear that Kohl is attempting to reduce the number of Turkish workers.

[Answer] There is no difference, as far as can be detected, between the two governments. At first, it appeared as if there was a difference. However, Kohl's government thinks like the former government on several principles. Neither the return of any workers whatsoever using force nor the retraction of rights and a consequent deportation of workers is being considered.

Turkish-American Relations

[Question] In recent weeks and months, it has been claimed that America has been making various preparations for a rapid deployment force in Turkey. Reports appeared in the American press. It is said that a new military base will be established in Mus. And all of this, like it or not, increases the suspicion, which maintains its validity today, that the renowned rapid deployment force will be able to come to Turkey. Because I, too, am one of those who suspects this, I wish to direct this question to you in a clear manner.

Whether within the framework of a bilateral agreement or of NATO, will a new military base or won't a new military base be established in Turkey?

[Answer] The establishment of a new military base in Turkey is not under consideration. As for the modernization of other installations, this will be carried out within the framework of the economic and defense cooperation agreement signed 2 years ago and of NATO plans. This entails the development of various existing installations in Turkey. They will be brought to a state such that they will be able to meet needs.

[Question] Will additional building be carried out at the present sites?

[Answer] What if it is? Is there anything to prevent this?

[Question] From where will the money come for this?

[Answer] From the NATO infrastructure.

[Question] No, there is no such thing in the NATO infrastructure program. Moreover, there is no money for this in the budgets.

[Answer] And, what if there is not? The entire question is one of carrying out this modernization for NATO defense. Turkey has no other obligations outside the NATO region.

[Question] However, such an assumption can always come to mind and does.

[Answer] My friend, the fact that there is no such obligation as of now is inherent in the issue itself. An announcement was issued following the NATO defense ministers' meeting. It is necessary for each nation to make its own decision about responsibilities outside the region. The cooperation we are providing is entirely within the framework of NATO.

[Question] Let, us, however, think along these lines. Several bases are being modernized. Additional structures are being built. These structures are very important. They include barracks and fuel and munitions depots.

[Answer] What is being undertaken is the modernization of several airfields. That is all.

[Question] Wait a minute. Turkish and American pilots, separately or jointly, will land and take off at these fields.

[Answer] They have always done so.

[Question] It is extremely natural to think that, after awhile, after they are modernized, these bases will be able to be used for the rapid deployment force.

[Answer] Whom does it interest that these bases reach the state in which they can be used for the rapid deployment force? In other words, the fact that the capabilities of an installation will be able to be used for other purposes in case of necessity does not mean that this is not appropriate to NATO defense plans. It is appropriate to NATO defense plans, and, at the same time, bases will be used for another purpose if necessary. However, the entire issue is not one of an obligation on this topic. Still, the present installations can also be used (for the rapid deployment force).

[Question] In other words, we are modernizing bases, but you are saying that we have no obligation for their use for another purpose.

[Answer] In our plans, there is absolutely no reference of forethought to the rapid deployment force (to be used outside the NATO region). However, if necessary, all the existing installations can be used for this type of unit. The use of all these installations for this type of unit is conceivable. As I said, we have no obligations on this issue. Everything can be used for the rapid deployment force, not only in Turkey, but in other countries as well. Installations can be used in Greece and also in Italy. However, this does not mean that they will be used without fail. We have never discussed the topic

of the rapid deployment force with the Americans. The Americans have not even presented any proposal whatsoever on the topic of the rapid deployment force.

[Question] While talking about Cheysson and the European peacekeeping force sent to Cyprus, I wanted to ask about a rumor I heard. The possibility of Turkey's participating in the Beirut peacekeeping force is being mentioned. Is such a thing possible?

[Answer] A request on this issue has not been made to us.

[Question] What would your approach be if one were?

[Answer] We would study the request.

Turkish-Greek Relations

[Question] I would like to ascertain one thing before asking you about the level reached in Turkish-Greek relations. What is the moratorium? What is implied by the agreement? What could not be done and by whom? Will you, please, speak openly about this here?

[Answer] The term, moratorium, has been one that we have never used. The Greeks used the word, moratorium. We called this a "gentleman's agreement." Its purpose was to create a healthy atmosphere. It was Greece that wished to create this healthy atmosphere, but it was also Greece that acted in opposition to the spirit of detente.

[Question] I wanted to bring that up as well. In your opinion, do Papandreou's frequently repeated statements such as, "the Turkish threat," violate the spirit of moratorium? He told me that he, in fact, is not doing so, that he is doing nothing but voicing the feelings of the Greek people. In other words, we probably perceive a moratorium as one thing, the Greeks, as another.

[Answer] Papandreou made a very interesting interpretation. His meaning is to say that he will talk, we will keep silent. There will be no such thing, of course. Let me tell you one thing. Do you know how we can best describe what the Greeks call a moratorium? It is not to make the statements Papandreou makes.

And our position is this. We did not feel it necessary to take part in such an exercise in order to negotiate with Greece. In our opinion, two nations that have a dispute should, before everything else, hold talks to resolve the disagreement. Negotiations, in themselves, signal the existence of a problem. Therefore, we have not laid down any conditions whatsoever for talks.

[Question] I am most curious to know what you will discuss with the Greek foreign minister during your talks to be held in December. For example, Papandreou states that it is not necessary even to bring up the subject of the Aegean continental shelf. His position is very clear.

[Answer] I have not perceived that Papandreou has said anything notably definite. He both says this and he agrees to hold talks. This is not to say that I am going to the talks with high hopes. We do not have high expectations. Despite this, while there are serious problems between us, every opportunity to discuss these must be taken advantage of.

[Question] These talks have been going on since 1974, and not much progress has taken place. The status quo is something that suits Athen's interests more, isn't it?

[Answer] Each party is maintaining its position on this issue. There is also the existence of the Bern agreement. The need to solve the problem is stressed there. Let me tell you one thing. It was, in fact, very difficult to resolve the question of the continental shelf with the former government. There were large differences between our views. For this reason, we pursued the method of step-by-step progress, and we first attempted to resolve the issue of air space. We also were unable to succeed at this to any extent.

[Question] If no progress is made in Aegean continental shelf talks, will it be possible for Turkey to send research ships to the Aegean again?

[Answer] Neither party is conducting research. It is necessary that neither party carry out research.

[Question] But, Greece did for awhile.

[Answer] Greece said that it did not. At the least, it is not doing so now.

NATO, Command-Control Problem

[Question] Turkey presented Greece with a beautiful bouquet. It signed the Rogers agreement and approved Greece's return to the NATO military wing. There were some who expected something in return. General Rogers made some promises. It was determined in the agreement that areas of responsibility would be redefined. Athens announced that it did not recognize the Rogers agreement. And everyone became silent. Now, nothing is being done -- either by NATO or by Rogers. Everything was quickly forgotten. And should we expect anything to happen?

[Answer] There probably is no possibility of agreement with Greece on this topic.

[Question] Come on, sir. Such a thing (going back on an agreement) can possibly occur between people, but is it possible between states?

[Answer] It can also occur between nations. In fact, it does.

[Question] Will Turkey look on with its hands tied?

[Answer] No one's hands are tied. There is no longer anything called a command-control responsibility region in the Aegean. There is not the least

regulation. There is not the slightest ground rule. It is being administered entirely through temporary measures.

[Question] Going back to Rogers, how did you react to the general's recent strategy and his proposals for increasing conventional arms?

[Answer] I reacted very positively.

[Question] They created a great tumult within NATO, because they carry with them the meaning of a change in this strategy.

[Answer] Yes, they did. However, NATO's assessments are correct, in my opinion, from the standpoint of security.

Soviet Union Trip

[Question] You will be making an official trip to the Soviet Union soon. What will be the framework for this?

[Answer] The date has not yet been announced. I can only say that our relations with the Soviet Union permit such a trip and that its purpose will be to foster the development of good-neighbor relations between the two nations.

[Question] Turkish officials have gradually begun to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is behind Armenian terrorism. Won't this create uneasiness?

[Answer] We have not said any such thing, nor have we accused the Soviet Union openly in any manner. We said that there are several focal points that support Armenian terrorism. This is clear.

[Question] Does the Turkish state have concrete evidence in its hands about sources that support Armenian terrorism?

[Answer] We have some evidence, of course.

[Question] Among this evidence, is there proof that there is intervention in both the East and in western nations?

[Answer] Please excuse my not going into detail on this subject.

[Question] Thank you.

[Answer] I thank you.

11673

CSO: 3554/63

BIRAND SURVEYS REFERENDUM IMPACT ON EUROPE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Nov 82 p 9

[Text] Strasbourg--For the first time since the referendum, the topic of Turkey has come before the foreign ministers or permanent delegates of the 21 member nations of the Council of Europe.

This was the government organ of the Council of Europe. And, to date, at the same type of meeting, many of which we have witnessed, the Turkish ministers of foreign affairs met with the harshest of criticisms and were even forced to fight for hours to be able to issue a press communique.

For this reason, the atmosphere of the meeting following the referendum was awaited with extreme interest. And it turned out as expected. In other words, discussions were exceedingly short. It can even be said that criticism was not directed toward Turkey. However, it was also understood that specific restrictions have now begun to come to the forefront and that, henceforth, emphasis will be placed on this issue. The fact that, when the Norwegian foreign minister, talking with those sitting with him at a private dinner, said, "The topic of Turkey is very complex. A definitive view cannot be put forth at this stage," he received the approval of the Danish and Swedish ministers sitting next to him demonstrates the general opinion.

One of the points that attracted attention at this meeting was that the Scandinavian countries, which are required to be very harsh, have adopted a moderate approach. Moreover, the position of France has tempered to a degree that will surprise a great many people.

And the joint communique that was released was the shortest since 12 September. It can be said that it was a communique in which not one article that could be termed critical of Turkey was included.

In short, the capital cities are, at this stage, choosing to wait and to arrange.

The referendum clearly changed several things in the Council of Europe government organ and eroded positions. It is natural that their not yet being able to examine the constitution also played a role in the ministers' approaches at this time. Another element is that the ministers are awaiting the decision

that is to be made in January by the parliamentary organ of the Council of Europe.

The fact that no one in Europe at present has a complete, official translation of the constitution increases the unnecessary contradictions in approaches. Very strange summaries are in nearly everyone's hands and are making the rounds. Some have been obtained from ambassadors in capital cities, some from the translations of various groups. The clearest example of this is that Steiner wrote in a report that the head of state has the right to veto laws.

There is great benefit in eliminating these faulty interpretations.

After being taken up by the Council of Europe's government organ, the issue will, of course, come before the assembly. The council, itself, feels it necessary to reach a decision at the January meeting after examining the constitution.

However, no one yet has a clear idea as to how a decision will be made.

While Turkey maintains relations with Europe, there are points that both parties must heed.

1. If European parliamentary institutions and governments act as if they are bringing before a court the constitution approved by the Turkish people and if they attempt to make a value judgment, they will have failed to accept the will of the Turkish people, and this Turkey cannot accept. The governments, too, do not wish to fall into such a situation. They know that it is necessary to respect the vote.

2. Now, following the referendum it will be extremely beneficial for Turkey to cause some restrictions to be relaxed slowly, not for Europe, but for itself. Just as this will create a feeling of relief at home, it will ensure detente in foreign relations as well.

11673

CSO: 3554/61

FIGURES EMERGING AS POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEADERS

Istahbul MILLIYET in Turkish 13 Oct. 82 p 5

/Text/ While work continues in connection with the presentation of the new constitution to popular vote, discussion concerning preparations for the establishment of new political parties as provided for by the constitution is increasing.

According to information that has recently been reflected by newspapers, certain names are already being emphasized as candidates for the jobs of founders and leaders of political parties to be formed in the period following the adoption by the constitution of a law for political parties.

A number of those who are being mentioned as candidates are individuals who are members of the Consultative Assembly and who assumed government jobs following 12 September 1980. As indicated by our writer Teoman Erel's editorial for today, discussion concerning the positions of Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu and former Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal who both belonged to the former government in addition to their positions in the present government, has further intensified over the last few days.

In any case, former Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal did not deny rumors concerning this matter in a statement which he gave to our newspaper following his resignation from the position. Ozal gave the following response to a question concerning this matter by our colleague Emin Colasan: "If I have to serve any further it would have to be in politics. This is so because I have by now reached that level. Anyway, I am 55 years old and retired."

According to recent news that appeared in newspapers, when asked about his intention to enter politics, Bulend Ulusu who has been serving as Prime Minister for the past two years has stated that such an eventuality does not exist at this time. However, he gave the following reply to a question asking whether or not it is possible to discuss such an eventuality for the future: "Naturally, it is not possible to know the future progression of

events or the kind of service that will be required by the country. I will think about it if service should befall me and I should become convinced that the country needs me. There is no point in talking about this at the present time."

In spite of news items that have appeared in the press on the basis of such words by Prime Minister Uluşu, our writer Teoman Erel does not find it highly probable that Uluşu will become a party leader. Erel indicates that Uluşu might once again choose to go into diplomacy following the completion of his term as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, speculation on Uluşu's name among certain circles has not come to an end.

According to a news item prepared by Hayri Birler who is a parliamentary correspondent from our Ankara Bureau and which focuses on the status of future political parties and their leaders within the Consultative Assembly, the names of Sener Akyol who is the spokesman of the Constitutional Commission and of retired General Esref Akinci are among the candidates for the leadership of future political parties. Hayri Birler's report concerning this matter reads as follows:

Following the establishment of the Consultative Assembly after 12 September 1980, it became evident that differences of opinion concerning certain topics had emerged among the members. It is particularly noteworthy that Orhan Aldikacti who is Chairman of the Constitutional Commission began holding special meetings with a group of members whom he perceived as being close to himself. These meetings took place during the period in which the constitution was being prepared. This group gave itself the name of "Pro-Ataturk Liberals" while labeling another group as the "Social Democrats" and describing certain members as "Radicals." Aldikacti's meetings came to an end after the matter was taken up by the press.

While the constitution was being discussed at the General Council of the Consultative Assembly, still another group emerged and became known as the "Group of 34." The members of this group primarily included those members of the Consultative Assembly who came from military backgrounds. Rumors circulating within the assembly maintained that these individuals were "persons close to the National Security Council."

Many members belonging to the group of Pro-Ataturk Liberals have stated that the old process of group formation has come to an end but that several of their colleagues had already made the decision to enter politics during the new era of democracy. Some persons have stated that Orhan Aldikacti will definitely not become involved in politics and will return to university life following the completion of his assignment at

the Consultative Assembly. These persons have also indicated that Sener Akyol who is Aldikacti's spokesman is not considering a return to university life. According to the information obtained from these members, the members who are to enter politics within the group of Pro-Ataturk Liberals will either seek to form a party under the leadership of Akyol or will attempt to place themselves under the leadership of Akyol in new political parties to be formed during the upcoming period.

It has been determined that the members of the Consultative Assembly who allegedly belong to the group of social democrats have not at this time undertaken any activities that would lead towards the formation of the nucleus of any political party. However, it has been learned that some assembly members within this group might occupy positions in a yet to be founded political party having social democratic attributes while other members do not intend to enter political life.

It has been announced that the members of the Group of 34 are directing their efforts towards the formation of a political party under the leadership of Esref Akinci. Alaatin Aksoy who is a member of this group has said that they will form a political party that will have General Esref Akinci as its chairman general. Nevertheless, it has been claimed that Akinci will reconsider the matter of entering politics after having placed his name as a candidate for the Chairmanship of the Consultative Assembly during the second legislative year of the assembly and receiving only 31 votes.

Hamza Eroglu stated that he belonged to the same group and that "he would occupy a position in a Pro-Ataturk party to be formed during the new era of democracy." However, because the constitutional article pertaining to political parties stipulates that all political parties must be pro-Ataturk and conform to Ataturk's principles, it has not been possible to determine the party within which Eroglu will hold an office.

Among former politicians, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil and Ismail Erez are having their names mentioned in connection with a political party or political parties to be established in the future and to be based on "conservative" as well as "liberal" segments of society.

While Deputy Chairman General of the Justice Party, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil was elected to the Presidency of the Senate in November of 1979 and severed his relationship with his political party. As a result, he remains beyond the scope of restrictions imposed on politicians who had served as party leaders. As another former politician, Mesut Erez had served as Minister of Finance in Justice Party Governments, and after having left

this position also left his seat as a member of parliament.

Newspaper reporter Melih Asik writes the following in connection with Caglayangil's candidacy for party leadership: "It is being rumored that in an approximation of the acronym of the old Justice Party, the new party to be founded will be called the Anatolian party. The name of Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil is also being widely circulated as the prospective leader of this party. While those who belong to the Anatolian Party are busily coaching Caglayangil at ringside, it is being said that they are also attempting to move closer to the new leader. This is being said by the party members themselves...."

According to another newspaperman named Bekir Coskun who writes about the same matter, it is being claimed that the following has been said to Caglayangil by one of his "trainers": "Listen to me closely Ihsan... You are to take the flag and to run with it. At the end you are to give me the flag without letting anyone else grab it. At that time you can retire and rest."

In addition to not denying the speculation surrounding him, Caglayangil has confirmed that he has been intensely involved in making contacts. Concerning his contacts, Caglayangil has said the following: "We are being invited to dinner four or five times a week and are only able to return to our homes at midnight."

The latest announcement that Mesut Erez has provided in connection with his preparations for the formation of a political party which are allegedly being conducted independently of Caglayangil's activities reads as follows: "Political life in Turkey has not yet begun. At this time, there is no ongoing activity. Some conceptual work is being conducted. Our friends are making certain proposals."

The names of Muhsin Batur and Necdet Ugur are the two that are being mentioned as probable founders of political parties among the ranks of former politicians from the Republican People's Party. Muhsin Batur who is a former Commander of the Air Force, a retired general and a former senator has told Milliyet the following in connection with speculation concerning his name: "At this time, activities involving political parties remain forbidden. For this reason, any group activity also remains impossible. This matter can be discussed only when conditions develop and opportunities are provided. The matter of forming political parties can not be discussed at a time when opportunities do not exist and permission has not been given."

Nevertheless, Batur stated that political activity of a "conversational" nature may be conducted at the present time.

He said: "Any statements made at this time can not go beyond informal conversation."

Necdet Ugur is also being mentioned as the potential founder and leader of a political party. He is a former member of the Republican People's Party and served as a Minister of National Education. He has been pursuing an intense travel itinerary which has taken him from the Aegean to the Black Sea and from the Marmara region to the Central Anatolian region. In response to MILLIYET's question concerning the speculation that has been directed towards him he said: "The formation of a political party is a societal phenomenon. The answer to your question lies not in a decision taken by an individual but in a decision taken by the popular segment which would constitute such a political party." It is expected that speculation concerning the new political parties to be established will assume new dimensions in the weeks to come.

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MUMCU BEMOANS PITFALLS IN HEC POLICY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 18 Nov 82 pp 1,11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu]

[Text] The administration of universities and faculties has been transferred to university presidents and faculty deans in a specific political and ideological direction by means of the HEC [Higher Education Council]. We reported in previous articles, using documents as evidence, who they are and with which political parties and associations they have relations.

At a time when restrictive statutes have been set down with the constitution on the issue of the freedom to form a society, the appointment of faculty members who have relations with a society called the "Intellectuals Club" was truly thought-provoking. What type of standard was used by the HEC to seek out and find faculty members who have close, friendly ties with a political party leader who is on trial is also a valuable question to be asked.

The process of "purging," which has been begun at our universities in recent days gives the suspicion that dismissals are being carried out in the name of a certain political ideology. It is inevitable that the purging being conducted at the level of assistant professor today will leap to the level of associate professor and professor tomorrow.

The public, like we do, awaits with curiosity the explanation that will announce, on one hand, the secret that "there is a teacher shortage" and, the release, on the other hand, of assistant professors, who are the natural source for faculty members.

High-level administrators of Gazi University, which has had its share in the "mass liquidation operation" at universities, has been known for its work in a specific political direction. We are of the opinion that it is necessary to follow carefully the procedures pursued by these administrators, who are intimate with a sector which is given the name, "Idealist."

Let us concentrate on a concrete example today.

Among those dismissed, with a two-line notice, from their jobs at Gazi University is the daughter of Staff Colonel Haydar Tunckanat, a former permanent

senator. The procedures used against Figen Gulalp, who completed work for her doctorate in economics, truly attract attention from the standpoint of learning what the understanding of the law which rules over Gazi University is.

On 3 November 1982, Prof Dr Turgut Onen, dean of the Faculty of Economics and Commercial Sciences, sent to Dr Gulalp Notice No 25-89 in which she was informed that she was assigned to the "teaching staff" of the faculty in accordance with Article 32 of Law No 2547. This notice did not neglect to "wish her success."

Twelve days after the notice telling Dr Gulalp that she was "appointed to the teaching staff" was sent, the same university, Gazi University, the same faculty of economics and commercial sciences, and the same dean, Prof Dr Onen, sent a notice from the university president's office, Notice No 23-119 dated 15 November 1982, which stated, "Under statutes of Law No 2547, it is not appropriate for you to be employed on the research and teaching staff."

Now, let us ask, can an instructor who has completed his doctorate be assigned to the "research staff" or to the "teaching staff" under the HEC law? Article 32 of the law gives the authority to make such appointments to the faculty dean. One wonders if the dean finds it difficult to interpret and understand the law.

Let us say that it is necessary, in order to be able to be appointed to the teaching staff, to fit the description, "a person who is known through his work and his accomplishments in his own field of expertise." If we look at this from this aspect, it is, perhaps, difficult for assistants who have obtained their doctorates to be appointed to the "teaching staff." However, the same article, with the definition, "those who assist in research, experiments, and supervision," gives the title of "research staff members" to those who have obtained their doctorates, but who have not yet put in the time required for "assistant professor" status -- to assistants under the former law.

Let us say, "Enough." Dean Onen has been unable to perceive these distinctions. However, in assigning as "research staff members" those who have the status of assistants under the old law, what type of legal obstacle is there under the law? If the dean does not know, who will?

Since the law recognizes a "status" termed "research staff member," there is certainly a "political" reason why those who worked as assistants under the former law are not being assigned this status and for their dismissal by the university president's office with faulty abstract and legal reasoning such as, "It is not deemed appropriate for you to be employed as a research and teaching staff member under statutes of the law." At the very least, such a suspicion arises.

The law has recognized a status termed "research staff member." In that case, the reasoning that making an appointment is not deemed appropriate under this law is based on a procedure of the president's office that is "subjective" in nature rather than a legal objective position and, therefore, is based on

"foreordained authority," which opens the door to this process. This "foreordained authority" can be based on a political motive, which results in a form of "misplaced authority," many examples of which are seen in Turkish administrative law.

The renowned "incident of the 147" of the 27 May era was solved within a short period of time. We fear that these wounds opened by pediatrician Professor Dogramaci will not be able to be bandaged for a long time.

Whereas not even the dust on the desks of "holding company professors," who sit cross-legged on the mounds of payrolls worth hundreds of thousands of liras and who push the public into these traps of brokerage fraud, can be wiped off, this "purging operation" being conducted against the young researchers at the universities will not be able to be erased from consciences and memories for many long years.

11673

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TOKER ASSESSES FUTURE MULTI-PARTY PERIOD

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 21 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Metin Toker: "Parties and Possibilities"]

[Text] In the absense of any imminent "compelling and reasonable cause," the natural thing is to prepare for elections in October 1983. No amount of nit-picking and foot-shuffling --not commendable, easily understood though it is -- on the part of certain members of the Consultative Assembly will alter the timetable set by President Evren for the transition to democracy. Since the timetable calls for the establishment of political parties first and then the holding of elections, the political parties law undoubtedly will be passed first and then the electoral law prepared.

The astounding 91.3 percent vote in the referendum certainly cannot be expected to have no effect on party formation efforts. Whether a vote of this size can be converted into a political party, or, more accurately, channeled into it, is a question impossible to answer but by speculation. It is possible, however, to say how the 91.3 percent vote looks as an indicator of parties' chances, barring any change in the conjuncture. Thus it appears that a serious central party will stand the best chance in our next elections. It would not be surprising to have such a party come to power alone and with a comfortable majority if it offered credibility as regards controlling terrorism and continuing the economic stabilization measures. In any case, slogans which have burned many a tongue such as "Guh-reat Turkey" or "A Fair System" -- when the nature of it is not yet clear -- cannot be drawn in little balloons issuing from people's mouths in these first elections. We have seen, in fact, what those bring. Since it is a foregone conclusion that no one wants the terror to return, there are no grounds for debate of that issue. Economically, neither business nor the public can be conned. Past experience has taught both to be realistic. As they will keep their feet on the ground for some time to come, promising the moon will be just so much pie in the sky to most people and improvement will be expected as the outcome of a known process, not instantaneously with the wave of a magic wand...provided it is a logical process with a predetermined outcome.

One point must be clarified here. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that all parties will have equal opportunity of formation under the parties law, within constitutional bounds, of course. Otherwise, one party would be singled out for favoritism, it would be called "the central party" and advantage would be taken of those democratic rights, and, even if other parties were formed,

their hands would be tied by being "a" party, not "the" party. Our democracy would become in fact "token democracy." No one, whether at home or abroad, would be convinced that it would be acceptable in the medium term to the country's solid forces. There will certainly be some who recommend this. Let us hope that common sense will prevail in today's halls of power.

There would be nothing undemocratic, if the hypothesis holds true, in the central party's adoption of a "central party to support President Evren" cachet. If "the party to support de Gaulle" would be considered democratic in France, it would not do to consider its equivalent in Turkey untoward.

However, in order for this party to be taken seriously, it would have to incorporate certain features. Its leadership would have to bear the stamp, not of a bunch of amateurs, but of professionals. And those were all in the pre-12 September parties. Let us put aside the ones under "10-year" prohibitions. But the "5-year" ones, even if they cannot be founders and officers, can make their preferences known by running. Certain others who made names for themselves in these party organizations are also capable of action. Let me mention two by name, as they are no longer with us: If JP member Cihat Bilgehan and RPP member Turan Gunes had believed that the country's only chance to return to solid democracy would be through the formation of such a central party and had, each of his own volition, stood together within this same party, it would have given the idea viability, or rather, political viability.

JP member Bilgehan was closer in thought to RPP member Gunes than to many in the right wing of the JP. RPP member Turan Gunes was closer to JP member Bilgehan than to many in the extreme left wing of the RPP. There are many such living men of politics. The possibility of their coming together, at least for the period ahead, and forming a central party was apparent the very morning of 12 September. But it had to be done "by faith," not by pushing and prodding. For there was no leader to bring them together. They would easily find their leader after 12 September in one who put his imprint on wiping out terrorism and stabilizing the economy. This would constitute the second part of the action.

Do you know what would kill the central party? Trying to put it together from a witches' brew of snips and snails and puppy-dog tails, with a spoonful of vinegar and some salt thrown in for good measure, in the form of a few retired generals, a few Consultative Assembly members with no political ability but political ambition, a few antiquated political relics and one or two routine ministers from non-routine governments. For if the climate is to be the climate of democracy with which we are familiar, the JP trend, the RPP trend and other trends which the former leaders represented will be reorganized in political-party form. An attempt to make a purse out of a sow's ear, as it were.

Let me reiterate that in saying a central party would have a better chance than any other in the period ahead, I am acting on the assumption that the rule of uniform motion in a straight line will hold true this time. Otherwise, people will turn to the crackpot mathematician who invented the theory of a geometrical system in which parallel lines collide in the opposite corner.

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CSO: 3554/60

EREL SPECULATES ON POLITICAL FUTURE OF ULUSU, OZAL

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 13 Oct 82 p 5

[Text] Why did Finance Minister Adnan Baser Kafaoglu postpone to after 7 November the introduction of his package of economic measures? Why has work in connection with this matter been postponed until after the referendum?

Various replies have been given to these questions. Some have said that "the postponement was deemed appropriate by the President of the Republic" and that "Evren did not want any announcements that could lead to errors or polemics prior to 7 November."

Another explanation is being provided through the possibility of a change in government. It is being said that "the government would tender its resignation following the adoption of the constitution and that Evren who would have just assumed the title of President would charge a new government with running the country. At the same time, the government would be given an identity that can address economic matters and that the formation of a team to remain in charge during the period remaining until the elections would be undertaken."

"Would Ulusu once again form the new government in the event of a change in government?"

"That aspect remains unclear. If one is to look at the speech that the Chief of State delivered in Tokat, Ulusu should remain on the job. However, it is possible that Evren was referring to the period remaining until the referendum when he stated in Tokat that the Prime Minister would remain on the job. In other words, it is possible that Ulusu would voluntarily leave his position as Prime Minister in order to prepare for a longer assignment in November."

It is being claimed that when the time comes, Ulusu will shoulder an assignment as Chairman General of a political party that is to be formed in the future. Many months ago, Ulusu had

given the following reply to a question inquiring whether or not he would enter politics:

"How will events develop in the future? What is the kind of service that will be required by the country? Naturally this cannot be known at this time. I will think about it if service should befall me and I should become convinced that the country needs me. There is no point in talking about this at the present time."

A considerable amount of time has elapsed and many events have taken place since Uluşu made this statement. Meanwhile, it has been repeated that Uluşu had received certain serious offers to assume the position of General Chairman when major parties that have been banned are re-established. It has been stated however that Uluşu had announced his decision of not taking part in politics. This was followed by the resignations of Turgut Ozal and Kaya Erdem which led to changes in the rumors that had been circulating.

After Ozal resigned and retired to Side, a verbal duel began between himself and the new Finance Minister; Adnan Baser Kafaoglu. It was well known that Chief of State Evren and Prime Minister Uluşu were not pleased with this duel. At that time, Prime Minister Uluşu who had gone to Antalya for the holidays, paid Turgut Ozal a somewhat lengthy visit. It later became evident that the verbal duel between Kafaoglu and Ozal had come to an end and that persons known as members of "Ozal's team" among high levels of the bureaucracy had come under the protection of Prime Minister Uluşu. In addition, Uluşu implied during the General Council of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry that there would be no change in economic policy or in the team implementing this policy. As it appeared that the new Finance Minister was becoming more withdrawn, the following information was leaked by sources close to Turgut Ozal: "During the Side meeting, Prime Minister Uluşu told Mr. Ozal that the Chief of State had been insisting that he (Uluşu) assume the leadership of a political party at the appropriate time. It is possible that Turgut Ozal will also belong to this party."

It appears that Ozal will enter politics within the ranks of a new political party. Ozal himself has not denied this eventuality. Nevertheless, the claim that Uluşu will form a political party and enter politics together with Ozal is a raw allegation that has been furthered by a known source.

It may be that Chief of State Evren has asked Prime Minister Uluşu to form an organization that will maintain the spirit of 12 September 1980 at the political level in years to come.

Nevertheless, it is more probable that Uluşu has not yet reached a firm decision concerning this matter or the time frame that it would involve and the team that it would entail.

It is even being insistently stated that in the end Uluşu will choose to enter diplomacy. "Following his retirement as Commander of the Navy prior to 12 September 1980, Bulend Uluşu was to have gone to Rome as Ambassador. As he was destined to become Prime Minister, he was unable to go to Rome. Nevertheless, a decision to choose diplomacy over the wearisome environment of active politics once his tenure as Prime Minister is over would be more compatible with Uluşu's personality.

Today, we thought that we would relay to you some of the political gossip in Ankara. However, as new political activity has not yet begun in the official sense, political eventualities have not yet matured. At this time we are still at the stage of preliminary activity.

9491
CS0:3554/25

GREEK DAILY GIVES BALANCED APPRAISAL OF TURKISH POLITICS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 24 Nov 82 p 1

[Article by K. Kolmar: "The Turkish Scene"]

[Text] There is an increasing tendency in this country to distort and underestimate events, in a manner which is not only unhistorical but dangerous. For instance, on the occasion of the recent referendum in Turkey for the country's gradual return to a representative form of government, many of our own mass media have represented General Evren as an oppressor of the Turkish people and Turkish politicians as blameless doves whose political rights are being curtailed.

It is likely that both characterizations are partially true. But, at the same time, the same "information" media extol Kemal Ataturk as the reformer of modern Turkey and Bulent Ecevit as a consistent socialist, democrat, etc, etc.

Frankly, we do not see any great or qualitative differences--except in historical stature--between Kemal and Evren and we are not forgetting that the tearful poet of civil liberties in Turkey, Mr Ecevit, was the ruthless conqueror of Cyprus. But if this does not bother our belated internationalists, we remind them that under Ecevit Turkey had not been able to elect a President--so much did the "consistent" socialist respect democratic rule.

However, beyond such undeniable eclectic affinities among those who wield power in Turkey, we must acknowledge that General Evren managed to avert a further decline in the Turkish economy and, in a wider sense, the total social disintegration of our neighboring country: a state of affairs about which we should have no cause to be happy, despite the fact that both its "democratic" as well as its oligarchic leaders harbor treacherous designs on our national territory, the reason being that when our neighbor's house is on fire, we should worry, not rejoice!

Barely 2 years ago, Turkey was not on the verge of chaos but in chaos: inflation was galloping at a rate of 130 percent, political strikes had paralyzed every form of productive activity, the deficit in the balance of payments was insurmountable and the Turkish people were even deprived of

necessities (such as, for instance, electricity and liquid fuels). However, they had more freedom. Particularly the freedom for one Turk to kill another....

Today, when a small step is being taken toward restoring democracy "with restrictions" in Turkey, General Evren is able to point to some achievements. Not only in the field of internal security and order--at the heavy cost, of course, of 30,000 prisoners and the violation of the most elementary human rights--but also in the field of the economy: a first measure toward restoring social order.

For the first time, since the founding of the modern Turkish state, this present turn from statism (etatism) to a more liberal economy has already borne fruit in the Turkish economy. The yearly rate of inflation has dropped from 130 to 30 percent and the Gross National Income increased, from a clearcut recession in 1979 and 1980, by 4.5 percent during 1981 and, probably, 4 percent this year. Turkish exports have risen from \$2.9 billion in 1980 to \$4.7 billion in 1981 and they are increasing (AKBANK data for July) at a rate of 30 percent this year, in foreign currency. In fact, exports of industrial products have doubled and now constitute 50 percent of Turkey's export revenues. The increase in the rate of the imports is limited to 5 percent and to the level of \$9 billion and the short term debt in foreign exchange is \$2 billion against 7 billion in 1978.

Unemployment, of course, continues to affect 20 percent of Turkey's working population as 500,000 workets are added each year to the Turkish labor force (due to a 2.2 percent annual population growth). However, without some form of economic order and a controlled growth of the GNP, it is certain that the unemployed will have no hope whatsoever of finding jobs. Indeed, the Evren government was able to limit the money supply to a 22 percent annual rate of increase, as against 48 percent last year and 100 percent before the military coup. Also, foreign loans to Turkey were resumed, after a moratorium, although clearly at a slower pace.

We are aware that no economic success is a substitute for freedom and that democratic procedures cannot be given a price. It is not enough for Mr Evren to dress in civilian clothes to be regarded as a "politician." Nor will undeniable achievements in the domestic sector by long-lasting if stabilization does not go hand-in-hand with genuine constitutional freedoms. In any case, Mr Evren knows well that Turkey's expulsion from the Council of Europe is imminent if violations of human rights continue in Turkey (this being permissible in Cyprus according to the Council of Europe). But we remind all those of us who, either through romanticism or naivete, now feel solidarity with the "democratic" Turkish leaders excluded from the political game, that the latter had authority in their hands twice and that twice they lost it: in 1971 and in 1980. And as we Ionians (Yunan in Turkish) say: "A wise person never makes the same mistake twice."

12278

CSO: 3521/98

ISLAM AS RESURGENT POLITICAL FORCE EYED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Nov 82 p 11

[Article by Nur Vergin, associate professor of sociology on the faculty of political science at the University of Istanbul: "The Turkey of Silence and Hope When Islam Again Lays Siege to the City..."]

[Text] After more than two centuries of reforms aimed at the Westernization of Turkish society and after more than 50 years of secularism, there is again talk about resurgence of Islam in this Moslem country, the first one to attempt to divorce politics from religion. The Kemalist revolution had instituted secularism for reasons of state and had made it the touchstone of its modernization policy.

Sunni Islam was in theory to disappear from public life, even though the regime's modernists still conceded it the power to mould consciences and give meaning to things in life. At one stroke Islam, the political religion par excellence, became a private matter, and the state had to keep a watch on it so that the state could better gain the affections of lay society. Starting from the first years of the establishment of a republican order, the Kemalist elite promulgated laws and edicts to make secularism the keystone of the new power of the state.

Supporters of the republican form of government and the new centrist elite that had moved to Ankara held scrupulously to the principle of the separation of religion and politics; this was the first experiment within an almost completely Muslim society in patterning a secular state on the prevailing Western model. Turkish Islam, in both its Sunni and Shiite versions, went from being triumphant and in the center of things to becoming the heritage only of the masses and of rural Anatolia, a reservoir of religious and mystical traditions several centuries old. Being thus confined to the periphery, banished from politics, and often suppressed, Islam was not able to develop within traditional religious organizational frameworks. In fact, religious orders and brotherhoods, Koranic sects, "medrese" and "zaviye" were declared illegal by a 1925 law which saw them as centers of obscurantism and disbanded them for engaging in reactionary conspiracy.

But was Islam wiped out of peoples' consciousness and driven out of politics for all that? On the contrary, it appears that Islam, being banished from the field by the ruling class, thereby rapidly became a focus for what was politically at

stake in the country. Religious orders and brotherhoods, drawing their inspiration from the "tasavvuf"--Muslim mysticism--continued to exercise considerable influence over the Anatolian masses and kept winning new followers susceptible to their esoteric symbolism.

But the susceptibility of the masses to the religious symbolism peddled by the Nakshibandi and Kadiri brotherhoods, to mention only the most important ones, is not due only to the feeling of frustration engendered by the nonreligious nature of the Kemalist state. It is also an expression of the rejection of a society which does not recognize itself except in an Islamic cultural context. It is the reflection of a fear of seeing cultural identity become diluted and disappear under the everincreasing ascendancy of the Western way of life.

In fact, all aspects of the country's behavior subsequent to the institution of the republic--from Turkey's entry into a multiparty system modeled after the Western democracies to the slow but nonetheless real industrialization of its society--were bound to be patterned after the foreign model. And from the impossibility of fusing the threatened cultural identity with the new course initiated by the republican institutions, which were not very concerned about deep historical roots, arose a new quest--a quest for a return to fundamentals, to the moral well-being Islamic precepts are so full of, and to the piety that ruled the social order at the time of the Prophet.

By way of response to the impiety of the state, considered to be the source of all contradictions within the country, new fundamentalist "schools" were to proliferate, such as the Nurcu (Nourdjou) [Nurcular] sect, the revelations of which came through the Risalei Nur (the Epistles of Light) of Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi, and which in 1948 already had more than half a million followers according to the estimates of a state prosecutor. Nurcu followers favor a process of spreading Islam through persuasion and winning people over through their consciences; their politics is consensus politics even with regard to non-Sunni Muslims. In addition to that sect, which aims to reestablish the "shariat" (Koranic law), another one arose in the 1950's, the sect of the Suleymanci, who are more vengeful and do not hesitate--far from it--to turn to weapons and violence for the transformation of the sociopolitical order.

How many of them, the Sufi followers of the traditional brotherhoods and the disciples ("talebe" and "murid") of the new Islamic sects, are there in Turkey today? Since the activity of these orders is illegal, and they certainly do not operate according to a party or political association model with registration files and membership lists, it is difficult to gage their weight in terms of numbers. Nevertheless one can refer to the figures obtained by the National Salvation Party (PSN) of M. N. Erbakan, who is currently imprisoned and brought to trial for breach of the secularist principles of the republican state and for infraction of the well-known Article 163 of the penal code which prohibits any reference to religion in the area of organization of economic and political activity.

The first ideological and sociological outlines of the "party of religion" took shape as soon as the parliamentary system of government was introduced. At that time Islam really started to weigh heavily on the course of political activity

in the country, and religion in its manifold forms came to life again. The parliamentary system with the type of political participation it established could not contain the aspirations of the masses and maintain coexistence between the center and the periphery without genuine interpenetration of those two poles of society. How was one to call for participation from the rural masses in the periphery while continuing to support the ties that link them to religion and that keep them in darkness and oblivion? When in the 1973 elections the PSN received 1,265,771 votes, which was 11.8 percent of the votes cast, the process that started as of 1946--the year the country started down the democratic path--was legally established on the political scene. In spite of a slight setback 4 years later, the PSN, the first political party with an explicitly Islamic program, maintained its position. With its 1,269,918 votes in 1977 it received only 8.6 percent of all votes cast. But it continued, nevertheless, to play a leading part in politics with respect to the formation of successive coalition governments up until the inevitable collapse of the system in September 1980.

Its relative decline from the one election to the next was a relief for the supporters of unbridled secularism, who saw in that political formation an obstacle to the flow of history--a mishap of democracy. And a simple look at the election results could in fact allow one to assume a waning in political Islam--in its resurgence movement. But one would then be losing sight of the fact that the Islamic vote, leaving aside the PSN, had in fact gone to join the ranks of other parties on the political scene, particularly the Justice Party, which benefited from being endorsed by Nurcu sect sloganeering right on the eve of the 1977 elections.

It might seem reassuring to see militantly Muslim voters coming back into the fold of that big catch-all party to carry on their struggle within the system and not against it. In actual fact, these movements back and forth from one party to another do not signify a decline in Islamic strength but rather a tactical withdrawal owing to changing circumstances. Some apparently chastened voters are indeed going back into those ranks, but others on the young end of the spectrum are leaving them in greater numbers. The latter accuse the PSN of being soft and of collaboration with the avowedly atheistic government. During the period preceding the army's intervention in 1980, various small groups of young people called "Muslim gangs," smitten with the teaching of Ali Shar'iati and refusing to have anything to do with the PSN and its youth organization Akinci (the Islamic Knights), were advocating radicalization of political confrontation in order to succeed in the rapid reestablishment of an Islamic Republic which, although inspired by the model of its Iranian neighbor, would in Turkey be specifically and exclusively Sunni in essence and in orientation. At the time those young people, linked with the Tevhid (Union) and Dusunce (Thought) movements that brought together elements disappointed by the incorporation of religion into the political system thanks to a PSN they considered to be "taken over," did not balk at organizing themselves after the fashion of leftwing extremist groups on the model of clandestine groups with a subversive mission.

At the Bottom of the Social Ladder

But one might ask whether Islamic resurgence--this increase in the number of politico-religious movements, groups and associations--stems solely from rejection of the political order "stricto sensu" and from the need to reaffirm an identity repressed by the incursion of the materialist West? In other words, are the four million souls who are joining together to "attach themselves to the rope of God," as the Koran advocates--are they doing this solely in response to the humiliation created by cultural pride held up to ridicule? Are the foundations of the new religiosity only psychological?

In this regard it will be noted that the springing up of religious movements and brotherhoods with explicit political objectives has taken place mainly in the areas affected by economic development and where budding industry has led consciences astray by disrupting social customs. Social crisis engendered by economic development and gradual integration into a standard type of capitalist urban society makes the traditional periphery of society aware that it now finds itself in a class society in which it is at the bottom of the social stratification. The modernizing state itself created the myth of development. Resorting to religion, then, is a response to the state's incapacity--owing to economic shortcomings--to sustain the myth it has been the promoter of. The failure to impart the cultural ethic of productivity derived from the West to Turkish society has resulted in feelings tinged with indifference, sullenness, subdued hostility, or violent opposition that some people harbor toward the republican form of government, a half century after its having been established.

The structural transformations carried out by the Kemalist state fed hopes long ignored by Turkish society for improved living standards. And indeed, "hope is violent," the poet says. Will it lead in Turkey's case to revolution of the Iranian type? The answer can only be no--not right away. No, because Sunni Islam, whose adherents are a majority in the country, does not have a clergy formed into an autonomous, structured and hierarchical institution. There is no Sunni priesthood to train and mobilize the believers. No, also because the twelfth imam Shiites who are followers of the sixth imam Caferi Sadik, not content to oppose the institution of a religious government, are still most fervent supporters of Kemalist secularism in which they see the only means for them to counterbalance the traditional hegemony of Sunni orthodoxy. As violent as the confrontations can be between supporters of secularism and Islamists on the one hand, and among various religious groups on the other, neither the political system nor religious reality are conducive to upholders of Islam taking power. In the course of the 30 years of gradual democratization those upholders of Islam have definitely begun to influence the political system but they have hardly succeeded in reorienting it.

Thus religion is increasingly being paraded in various sectors of economic, political and cultural life, but that is less because of the organized fighting spirit of Islamist groups than it is due to the structural transformation of a society in which already half of the population is undergoing--often dramatically--rapid urbanization. The destitute country people, who now live in the suburbs of

cities, are increasingly taking an active part in the country's economic activity and are starting to make their presence felt in national plans. The government is increasingly permeated with the religiosity of the masses who are imperceptibly imposing their way of thinking on the government elites as well as on the army, the guardian of republican values. Therefore, even though the leaders of the PSN and several hundred upholders of Koranic law are in prison, it is no accident that the generals of the "transition government" are, right in the middle of an era of Kemalist restoration, making increasingly explicit references to religion in their concern to enlarge popular consensus to a maximum and in order to legitimize, as it were, the Republic which some feel has been lacking in the foundations that religion provides a government. We are thus witnessing simultaneous strengthening of secularism and of the influence of Muslim values in the handling of things, and that is what is giving rise to talk about resurgence of Islam in Turkey.

But can one really identify a religious "revivalism?" It seems that the kind of assessment that identifies such a revivalism is mainly the product of the Western ethnocentricity with which Turkish elites are themselves imbued; they foresaw a retreat of Islam as secular teaching dispensed by the state became more widespread. But the introduction of Western methods and rationalist positivism into Turkey has never seriously shaken the course of Islam. While there has been change, the change has been not a relegation of Islamic values to the background but it has been in the equalization of opportunities which permits young people from ordinary levels of society to have access to public education and to mass media culture. Economic development had provided the environment for the moulding of professional-level people able to provide leadership and organization for a Muslim ideology which was long kept quiet. The democratization of society will have the effect of reducing that ideology's political impact.

9631

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OUTCOME OF NATO CONFERENCE ASSESSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Dec 82 p 12

[Article by Adelbert Weinsten: "NATO: Colossus and Paper Tiger"]

[Text] Brussels, 5 December--One could almost call it an Atlantic marathon. For 4 full days last week, the NATO defense ministers met and for 2 full days this week, the foreign ministers of the Alliance will get together for discussions. The topics are not the same; but they are similar to a large extent. And as for the final communiques, they will resemble each other like the political twins they are. NATO unity will be stressed; differences of opinion will be relegated to the footnotes. Promises are writ large in this alliance; as for keeping them, that is another matter. When the ministers meet in Brussels, deterrent strategy rhetoric assumes truly colossal proportions. But once they return to their home capitals, Western security policy turns into a paper tiger once again. This is the reality with which the Alliance--which numbers 16 member states by now--has lived over the past three decades. This winter meeting will do little to change that.

Nonetheless, there are grounds for cautious optimism. The defense ministers' meeting did have some positive aspects. There is no doubt about the fact that the United States, the largest member state, has reassumed its leadership role. Secretary of Defense Weinberger achieved what he set out to achieve and that was possible only because the Americans operated with diplomatic skill. The roles were divided up. The unpleasant news was given by the Atlantic commanders. The military experts reached the conclusion that the members of the Alliance would have to raise their financial contributions by an additional four percent. The American secretary of defense stayed out of this discussion. And it was NATO Secretary-General Luns and not the political head of the Pentagon who chided the member states for not having fully met their projected military contributions during the past year.

The presentation of the so-called Rogers Plan was skillfully orchestrated from a psychological point of view. The supreme Atlantic commander provided the hard facts and Defense Secretary Weinberger added some strategic ideas and technical details. The German defense minister came out in support of these ideas and at the same time called for European participation in weapons procurement--pushing the two-way street concept in other words.

At this meeting, the Americans got their allies to agree to President Reagan's decision to deploy the MX missile. This projected reinforcement and modernization of the American strategic nuclear arsenal was viewed as serving to streng-

then the Atlantic triad. The American delegation also had an opportunity to inform the other member states in detail about Washington's assessment of the Geneva disarmament conference. The Soviet contention was refuted that the United States is not in the least interested in an improvement of the strategic situation and wishes to deploy the Pershing II's as well as the cruise missiles in Europe at all costs. The Soviet fast shuffle calling for 300 missile systems on each side was unmasked as a simple trick with numbers. Moscow wants to have the French and British systems counted as 250 units and as a consequence, permit the Americans to add just 50 new systems of their own. The Soviets, on the other hand, would have 300 systems which means that the Kremlin would get to keep all its SS 20's.

The Americans also were able to voice their concern about making more Western high-technology items available to the Soviets. And since the Americans wholeheartedly agreed with the Europeans' unanimous call for keeping an open mind vis-a-vis the new Kremlin leadership and for making a serious effort to continue negotiations on the limitation of medium-range missiles, the meeting of the defense ministers concluded with a reaffirmation of the NATO dual resolution.

Just how reliable the individual members will turn out to be, only the future can tell. This also goes for the agreement of the Alliance to render assistance outside its territory. Nonetheless, the Alliance did make a surprising leap forward in this respect. The declarations concerning cooperation in vital areas outside NATO territory may be vague--also as concerns the promise to share the load; but the American call for Alliance assistance to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in strategic areas such as the Persian Gulf--either in the form of logistic support or by "showing the flag"--was accepted in principle.

Does this mean then that the conference turned out positive? Yes and no. The fact is that the many assurances are mainly of a diplomatic nature; they represent acceptance of American initiatives which does not cost the individual partner very much and is given with the proviso that the parliaments and governments concerned agree to them as well. But what about the real prospects for the two-track resolution? Dutch agreement to it is still open in spite of the government's statement which really means no more than that preparations for deployment should continue. The Belgians, for their part, have not issued a direct statement on the matter as yet. Deployment of the cruise missile, for that matter, is not to commence in these two countries until 1986. The Danes are against the resolution and the Norwegians make no bones about their opposition to any kind of nuclear arms.

Greece is in the vanguard of the opposition to nuclear security policy. The footnotes of the communique clearly show that Greece does not agree with the joint security policy. The Greeks also are against the two-track resolution as well as against the thesis that "conventional forces (of the West) are in themselves insufficient as a deterrent in view of the striking power of the nuclear and conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact."

One paragraph of the communique is quite revealing in that it stresses the importance of the presence of U.S. and Canadian forces in Europe. The paragraph is addressed to the U.S. Congress. It is indicative of the Europeans' bad conscience—and their fear that the Americans might withdraw some of their troops. Both the communique issued by the Euro-Group and the statement by the British defense minister—who was deputy chairman of the meeting—were aimed at the American Congress as well. In both, the Europeans emphatically point out that they are providing the lion's share of NATO strength—75 percent of the ground forces; 65 percent of the tanks and 60 percent of the warships. This list is meant to refute American contentions that the old world is not doing its share.

The figures may be accurate; but what kind of troops are these? None of the armies except the Bundeswehr and the U.S. 7th Army is impressive as a classic defense force. From a qualitative point of view, the British are the best NATO soldiers; but the Rhine Army is low on personnel. It has been restructured and in part has obsolete equipment. The British navy maintains some units in the Falklands; but on the other hand Great Britain does have a powerful air force. London also plans to increase its financial contributions to NATO by about 10 percent over the next few years. But that still is in the future. As for Belgium and the Netherlands, their armies are shadow armies. The Belgian air force must cut down on anti-aircraft weapons; its pilots will soon not be able to complete the necessary number of training hours; the modernization of fighter aircraft is being delayed.

The Dutch, too, are saving money by cutting military expenditures and yet a Dutch general holds down the highest military post in the Alliance. The Danes—who fill all the important command positions of NATO in the Baltic straits and in Schleswig-Holstein—are about to cut their defense budget by 2 to 4 percent. The Danish government also does not want to pay the cost of American and British reinforcements. This would include expenditures for supply depots, auxiliary personnel and port facilities. This particular NATO partner is meaningless from a military point of view.

Greece, too, is doing things militarily that are bound to make the Americans unhappy. Athens is constantly interfering in operational cooperation in the Aegean for example. And the Greek prime minister in his role of defense minister is putting on a kind of surrealist show in the NATO council. For another thing, the Greeks no longer want the repair facilities paid for by the Americans and skilled labor trained by the United States on Greek soil to be used for the maintenance of American naval and air force units. The Greeks want to use these facilities themselves as a basis for an armament industry of their own. It is no wonder under the circumstances that "anti-European sentiments" are on the rise in the U.S. Congress. The fact is that in a substantive sense the claim that the Europeans are not doing enough is justified. And if Europe were not to fulfill the military part of the two-track resolution in the end, an uncontrolled reaction by the U.S. Congress could be expected.

All these imponderables and halfway solutions will weigh down on the upcoming NATO foreign ministers' conference. And then there is the trouble with Spain. Even before anyone can tell what Madrid really wants, the new Spanish foreign minister has started to make life difficult for NATO. In interviews and cryptic statements, he has been alluding to a future Spanish role vis-a-vis NATO not unlike that of France or Greece. The Spanish socialist government has given rise to speculation that it might either be reconsidering its decision to join NATO or aiming to revise its bilateral military agreement with the United States or be trying to use the NATO membership issue as a wedge to enter the EC. The United States is not taken with any of these eventualities. Treaties must be kept and bilateral agreements cannot be altered at the expense of multilateral ones. But above all the Americans--and some of their NATO partners--are warning Spain which was welcomed with so much sympathy and approval not to commit a psychological mistake: any Spanish provocation of the Alliance at the foreign ministers' conference would be tantamount to handing the new Soviet party chief his first foreign policy victory--at the expense of the Western nations united under NATO.

9478

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FRENCH, SPANISH CONDUCT 'BRUMAIRE' NAVAL EXERCISE

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 p 20

[Article: "Brest: Autumn Sally of the Atlantic Squadron"]

[Text] This year, the autumn sally of the Atlantic squadron is designated "Brumaire," an attractive name. It is taking place from 18 October to 23 November 1982 along the Atlantic coasts of France, Spain and Morocco and is broken down into several stages. First of all, there are group training exercises. It was necessary on the morning of 18 October to admire the sailing of the "Duperre" flying the flag of Rear Admiral Lesec; of the frigates "De Grasse" and "Duguay-Trouin"; of the squadron escort vessels "Maille-Breze," "Vauquelin," "Casabianca" and "Dupetit-Thouars"; of the avisos "Jean Moulin" and "Lieutenant de vaisseau Lavallee"; and finally of the "Doudart de Lagree," which had landed its midshipmen for the occasion. These vessels, scheduled to execute on 18 and 19 October the first exercise of the maneuvers (dubbed "Coup de Force" and which was also to involve the tugboat "Centaure" and two submarines from Lorient), had been joined, merely for this sailing, by the corvette "Aconit" and the avisos "Detroyat" and "Commandant Blaison" and the submarine "Le Bihan," starting at the CEF [expansion unknown] stage at sea. Such a spectacle is quite rare; it is still magnificent.

Not all these proud vessels took part in the entire sally. By 20 October only the "Duperre," "Duguay-Trouin," "Casabianca" and "Dupetit-Thouars" had arrived at Le Ferrol. From 20 to 31 October 1982, together with the submarine "Narval" and two frigates, three escort vessels, a tanker and two Spanish submarines effected, under Spanish command this year, the classic "Finisterex" exercise, which was concluded with a new stopover at Le Ferrol or La Corogne. Between 31 October and 10 November, navigational control exercises or antisubmarine maneuvers are planned (with the participation of the "Flore," which arrived from Toulon). This stage is to come to a close with a visit to Las Palmas [Canary Islands] from 6 to 9 November.

From 10 to 15 November further exercises will take place, still with the "Flore" but also with the supply tanker "Var," which will then be involved in a long-term crossing, and an aircraft carrier also originating from Toulon, naturally. A stopover in Funchal, Madeira Islands, is scheduled from 15 to 18 November, allowing the crews to rest. Finally, between

18 and 23 November, the ships will sail from Funchal to Brest, when new exercises with the use of submarines and the French Air Force are scheduled. The "Duguay-Trouin" and the "Casabianca" will then leave the "Duperre" and the "Dupetit-Thouars" and head for the African coast, especially the Gulf of Guinea, where they will maintain through January 1983 a customary show of presence dubbed "Okoume."

To give the entire picture it is naturally necessary to mention the participation of maritime patrol aircraft from the Lann-Bihoue base (Breguet Atlantic aircraft will from time to time be based on the Madeira Islands); Mirage F 1 planes of the Spanish Air Force; planes from the French tactical air force on the occasion of the "Fatma" or "Friture" exercises; the lighter "Fourmi" from Toulon (from 11 to 18 November); and naturally seaborne helicopters. All this makes one strongly yearn to be at sea rather than behind a desk.

And during this time the activity offshore from Brest is not curtailed: The Ouessant "sealane" continues to have its warship mounting guard, the missile-launching nuclear submarines always require the presence in the port or landfalls of antisubmarine escort vessels; the research offices continue their preparation for commissioning to active service (the "Leopard," operating as TLD [possibly, long-range transport vessel], will be visiting Portugal, while the craft involved in exercise "Brumaire" will be in Spain); the "Orage," stopping at Le Havre, Groix and Brest, will be taking on personnel little by little before sailing on 3 November on a round-the-world tour; and the officer-cadets of the Operational Group School are taking their final courses while in port before sailing, they too on a cruise around the world.

The piers of the port of Brest are nearly empty.

2662

CSO: 3519/129

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN, FRENCH EXERCISE--After crisscrossing the warm and sunny seas for a long time, the submarine "Dauphin" was invited to return to the cold, sometimes less inviting waters of Norway's sea. To celebrate the event, the exercise designated "Northern Wedding" was an excellent occasion. Thus, the "Dauphin" was away for 5 weeks. It used the Saint George Canal and a few well-known Scottish sounds, including the Jura Sound, the Feroe-Shetland Straits, the North Sea and the Baltic before finally seeking rest in Lubeck, an old Hanseatic town on the border between the two Germanies. On the way back, the "Dauphin" slid through the Kiel Canal and picked up the French consul general for the trip. The "Dauphin" came down the Elbe River and the Straits of Dover and dropped off some reports in Portsmouth. [Excerpts] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 p 21] 2662

CSO: 3519/129

DEFENSE MINISTER ENGELL'S FIRST HUNDRED DAYS AT POST VIEWED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Dec 82 Sect II p 1

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell has managed his first 100 days as minister nicely. This is at least the opinion at Christiansborg, even if some members of the Folketing find that he ought to show up more frequently in the Folketing. Nevertheless, the minister has a working day of 12 hours, and he even has to bring work home.

Hans Engell has been attracting much attention. In a way, this suits the defense minister quite well, but he, nevertheless, is sitting in the Folketing today, crossing his fingers in the hope that his government will survive the missile dispute. Partly because he wishes the government a long life, and partly because he really likes very much being minister of defense.

He certainly does not conceal this latter fact, nor did anybody in the Folketing have any doubts about Hans Engell's happiness when, on 9 September, Poul Schluter asked him if he would like to become defense minister. Would he!

Hans Engell, 34, a journalist by profession and leader of the Conservative Party's Information and Press Service when he became minister, finds today, 3 months after his appointment, that "it is a fantastic challenge and very exciting. I have not regretted it for one minute."

Hans Engell has always been very interested in the defense. Until his appointment as minister of defense, he was an active member of the Home Guard, but he has now applied for leave of absence from the Home Guard. He found it too difficult, all of a sudden, to be his own boss if he had to go out and defend the country. The minister has also done much work within the Royal Guards' Association and was, for many years, editor of GARDERBLADET. He did his military service in the Royal Guards, and he will tell many funny stories from those days. Former colleagues will testify to the fact that he has got a great sense of humor and is a good story-teller.

Adjutant

The defense minister is sitting in the most beautiful minister's office of the Red Building, which he has had adorned with a few white planters in front of the old preserved paintings, and he, moreover, is the only minister who has got both a ministerial secretary and an adjutant.

When, on 10 September, the government was to hold its first press meeting following its appointment at the Queen's Palace, the still somewhat perplexed defense minister was taken by surprise when his adjutant asked him politely if "the minister wanted him to take him over to the prime minister's office." For, from his time as journalist, Hans Engell really knew the way quite well from the Red Building, across the minister's lobby, through the Folketing, and into the prime minister's office. However, he was accompanied by his adjutant to the press meeting.

No Blunders

It is being widely held at Christiansborg that the defense minister has handled his job well, even if many people still need to find out how much political ballast he has got. Others find that he really ought to show up a little more often in the Folketing and not just when his own matters are on the agenda. Even if he is not a member of the Folketing, it gives political ballast being present in the Folketing, it is being said.

However, it is noted that Hans Engell really tries to be well prepared. When, after Hans Engell's appointment, the initial laughter among members of the press and members of the Folketing had subsided, people became curious to find out how the man would now actually handle matters. Many former colleagues were seated in the press gallery above the ministerial benches when Hans Engell was asked his first question during the question time in the Folketing. But, as was noted, he managed both that particular question, the subsequent questions, debates and consultations "without making any blunders."

No Parliamentary Experience

As said earlier, Hans Engell has got no parliamentary experience, and if he had had any doubts at all about accepting the post as defense minister, his lack of parliamentary experience would have been the reason. But the fact that he has managed the first 3 months as minister he attributes to his years as political journalist (at BERLINGSKE TIDENDE) and his subsequent job as leader of the Press Service.

"It means a lot that one is used to being present in the Folketing, and that one knows the atmosphere and the working methods of the Folketing. I also imagine that I know when my political opponents try to foil our plans. As a journalist, one is used to asking questions, to explore central issues, to move among very different people. The very things that are the most important things to a minister."

On the other hand, his appointment as minister has also given him political benefits. Hans Engell has received 2-3 offers from vacant constituencies

to become their Folketing candidate. He is still considering these offers. One of the reasons being to find out how to combine such a job with his job as leader of the Press Service, from which he has merely been granted leave of absence.

NATO Meeting

Hans Engell's debut as minister of defense took place during the meeting last week of the NATO Council of Ministers in Brussels. And nobody doubts its correctness when Hans Engell states, with beaming eyes, that it was "very exciting."

As far as his command of foreign languages is concerned, Hans Engell speaks English reasonably well and is able to get along in German. However, to brush up his knowledge of the English terminology used in NATO, the minister perused the reports in English from previous NATO meetings before departing for Brussels. So that is probably the reason why Hans Engell did not show any signs of shaky hands, when, in a 20-minute meeting under four eyes in Brussels, he explained to the U.S. minister of defense, Caspar Weinberger, the government's problems with the Social Democratic Party and the NATO missiles.

Work Load

Like all other new ministers, Hans Engell, however, also had to admit that he had not imagined the great responsibility and the heavy work load which the post as minister involves.

"I must admit that I feel the responsibility which rests on me. And it is not many days that my workday is below 12 hours. I bring work home with me, and that is bound to affect the family life."

Hans Engell, Annette Engell and Charlotte of 11 and Christina of 9 live in an old house at Espergerde, and that is where the defense minister sits with his papers in the evenings and Saturdays and Sundays. The work of a minister is important, but the minister of defense cannot quite escape his bad conscience.

"Last Saturday, I was sitting at home, reading through some papers, when Charlotte came in and asked me to repair her barrette which had broken. No, I am in the middle of something important, I said. To which Charlotte, of course, gave the only right answer: But, Dad, my barrette is equally important."

7262

CSO: 3613/31

SULLY EXERCISE INVOLVES 2ND ARMORED DIVISION, III ARMY CORPS

Paris TAM in French 23-30 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Jean Patrick Coppin: "Sully 82: 18,000 Troops in France's Granary"]

[Excerpts] General Barthez assumed command of the III Army Corps in directing the Sully 82 open-space maneuver. This exercise, the first since the establishment of this army corps in 1979, was held from 20 to 24 September 1982 in the presence of Charles Hernu, minister of defense; Georges Lemoine, secretary of state to the minister of defense; and General Delaunay, army chief of staff.

Priority to the Base Unit

The characteristic of this maneuver was the priority given to the base unit: the cadre and its handful of troops facing their responsibilities in the real terrain. More than a broad-based battle, won in advance by the general staff, this exercise was the aggregate of 72 diversified operations offering each small group the possibility of winning a genuine victory. The principle involved was that a small group of personnel holding a small parcel of terrain in appropriate fashion would ensure, by increasing the number of groups to the national level, the protection of the whole of metropolitan France.

True Scope of Reservists

A total of 917 reservists took part in the exercise in many specific fields. Let us note in this connection the presence of the 625th Highway Traffic Regiment made up entirely of reserve personnel. Their role during this specific exercise made it possible to stress their importance within the framework of overall defense.

III Army Corps


The 2nd Armored Division and the 8th Infantry Division

Consolidating several divisions under its command (for the Sully exercise) and supported by the attack and reconnaissance capabilities of the tactical air force, the army corps is entrusted with the following tasks:

1. Preparation and conduct of interservice tactical operations;
2. Use of tactical nuclear weapons;
3. Use and application of safety and research means;
4. Logistical operations, including:
 - a. Supplies;
 - b. Maintenance of equipment in working condition; and
 - c. Health support services.

Participation in the Sully 82 Exercise

1. The 2nd Armored Division with 5,200 men and 1,500 vehicles, of which 410 are armored vehicles;
2. The 8th Infantry Division with 4,500 men and 1,350 vehicles, of which 250 are armored vehicles;
3. 3rd Logistical Brigade with 1,800 men and 760 wheeled vehicles;
4. Organic elements of the III Army Corps from the infantry, cavalry, military engineers, artillery, communications and light army air corps with 5,300 men, 60 helicopters and 1,600 vehicles, including 48 armored vehicles, 30 Gillois missiles and 6 Pluton missiles;
5. The 1st Mobile Gendarmerie Armored Group with 480 officers and non-commissioned officers and 52 armored vehicles;
6. The 6th Naval Infantry Paratroop Regiment with 800 men and 75 vehicles; and
7. The 1st Naval Infantry Paratroop Regiment with its information sections, that is, 100 men.



1. Forward zone of the III Army Corps: Depth from 30 to 40 km from south of Paris to north of the Loire River (outskirts of the Orleans forest).
2. Rear zone of the III Army Corps: 100 to 120 km (reserve units and units of the logistical system) between the south bank of the Loire River and the Vierzon-Bourges-Sancerre line.

2662
CSO: 3519/131

AVISOS EQUIPPED WITH COMPLETE ECM, EXOCET MM 40'S

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 pp 4-6

[Article by Corvette Captain de Fombelle: "An Ultramodern Aviso"]

[Excerpts] The aviso has proved itself and has become an indispensable element in the French Navy.

Its qualities of endurance and its low operational cost have proved to be essential at a time when, between the operational use of the 1st aviso and the 15th, the price of fuel has increased fivefold.

The coherence of its weapons systems, with its Duba 25 sonar, 375-millimeter rocket launchers and four torpedoes for antisubmarine warfare, its V 51A gun and 100-millimeter turret for antiaircraft defense and especially its anti-ship surface-to-surface missiles (Exocet 38's and 40's) intended for surface vessels make this dispatch boat a fearful adversary. However, the planned savings right from the start of the program did not allow--for practical reasons--sufficient development of the aviso's self-defense system.

Since the threat in that respect was becoming clearer and stronger given the growing number of countries acquiring antiship capabilities based on rapid missile-launching vedette boats or aircraft (whether attack fighters or helicopters) equipped with air-to-surface missiles, the general staff of the French Navy decided to offset at that juncture this weak point of its craft. Thus, the avisos numbered 12 to 17 were outfitted during their construction with a complete electronic protection system: Radar-detection equipment and Dagaie decoy launchers capable of detecting and decoying most of the existing antiship missiles.

Because of the need to trim costs, the rapid disengagement of a driving shaft is now feasible. This makes it possible for intermediate and long voyages to be undertaken on a single shaft, the other being activated by the wake under conditions of acceptable safety. In noting the savings achieved, it is necessary to also mention optimum use of the propulsion engine which, more highly charged, gets fouled up much less frequently.

Additionally, the low tonnage of the aviso making it vulnerable to bad weather, the efficiency of its personnel is thus affected. An improvement, tested with success by the Argentine Navy, was made to the four latest avisos which are equipped with a pair of active stabilizer fins.

Finally, the six latest avisos are equipped with four ship-to-ship Exocet 40 missiles instead of two ship-to-ship Exocet 38 missiles.

Thus, the avisos appear to have reconciled the "irreconcilable": continuity and improvement--continuity on what is essential--hull, propulsion system (with the exception of the "Commandant L'Herminier"), 100-millimeter anti-submarine weapons, internal layout--and improvement but without breaking with earlier models by expanding only some of the aviso's functions--self-protection, behavior at sea, antiship capability. The compromise that has been struck seems to have been a good choice.

At any rate, here is a dispatch boat such as "Commandant Ducuing" epitomizing the aviso type 69 concept equipped to undertake its sea trials and its long-range voyage and to enter service early in 1983. Some 19 weeks should elapse between its commissioning on 23 August 1982 and its admission into active service in mid-January 1983. This is a good performance that reflects not only the quality of materials used but also the caliber of the men who installed them.

Series of Avisos

1. "D'Estienne d'Orves"
2. "Amyot d'Inville"
3. "Drogou"
4. "Detroyat"
5. "Jean Moulin"
6. "Quartier-maitre Anquetil"
7. "Commandant de Pimodan"
8. "Second maitre Le Bihan"
9. "Lieutenant de vaisseau Le Henaff"
10. "Lieutenant de vaisseau Lavallee"
11. "Commandant L'Herminier"
12. "Premier maitre L'Her"
13. "Commandant Blaison"

14. "Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet"

15. "Commandant Ducuing"

16. "Commandant Birot"

17. As yet unnamed.

2662

CS0: 3519/129

FRENCH-TUNISIAN SIGNALS, ATTACK EXERCISE IN MEDITERRANEAN

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 pp 12-13

[Article by E. E. Guepratte: "On All the Seas"]

[Text] At 0800 on 16 October 1982, a Breguet Atlantic aircraft took off from Tunis airport. At the same moment, three rapid motor torpedo boats armed with SS12 missiles sailed from the port of Bizerte. The mission of the vedette boats was to attack an important signal craft coming from the east, escorted by a squadron escort vessel and sailing toward the western Mediterranean.

The mission of the Atlantic aircraft was to find and shadow these surface vessels and guide the motor torpedo boats to their target.

Visibility was excellent and the sea was calm, but the two "clients" concealed themselves in the commercial "sealane." The important vessel (involved was the Tunisian frigate "President Bourguiba") took the precaution of leaving its radar inoperative, obliging the plane, in order to identify the ship, to approach it fairly closely. And if the distance should fall below the range of the "President Bourguiba's" 76-millimeter guns, the hunter could become the prey... The "Guepratte," which was acting as escort vessel, positioned itself ahead and to the north of the "President Bourguiba." It was to serve as a decoy and deliberately emit electronic giveaways in order to lure the adversary to the north.

At 1000 the Atlantic aircraft located the "Guepratte" despite a highly saturated electronic environment that hindered analysis of radar signals, but the plane did not detect the "President Bourguiba." The vedette boats deployed themselves and were preparing to attack.

At 1025, in circling the "Guepratte," the plane spotted the "President Bourguiba" but got too close to it. Engaged by gunfire and pinned down for 20 minutes, the plane still had time to report the position of the adversary to the vedette boats.

It was to be the finish. The division chief, sailing on the "Bizerte," issued the order to attack. One motor torpedo boat made a run from the north, one from the southwest and the third from the west.

On board the "Guepratte" the crew felt the danger approaching. The vedette boat coming from the southwest was spotted, challenged and repulsed, and the "President Bourguiba" changed its course toward the north. Soon, increasing speed in a sea that began to become heavy, the three vedette boats returned to the attack. Those approaching from the south and southwest were engaged by the "Guepratte's" 100-millimeter guns firing at maximum range, but the vedette boat from the west was detected only at the moment it arrived within range of the "President Bourguiba's" missiles. The gunners from the two vedette boats took it on in turn but the "President Bourguiba" nevertheless had the time to launch its missiles.

It was now 1400. That was the end of the tactical exercise. The five vessels formed a close group while the Breguet Atlantic aircraft returned to base in Tunis.

Communications and tactical exercises and antiaircraft gunnery practice were to round out this fruitful day of joint French-Tunisian exercises in which each participant strove to give his best.

At the time when the "Guepratte" took leave of the Tunisian vessels to return to Toulon, the final signals were exchanged. These already referred to future exercises.

2662

CSO: 3519/129

BRIEFS

MINE DEFUSING GROUP--Among the missions for which the maritime prefect is responsible is one that involves both military missions and public service missions. This is the neutralization of underwater explosive devices. Indeed, the 1st Maritime Region is in this respect the command post of numerous operations. The number of mines dropped during World War II in the bay where the River Seine discharges, and mainly off the ports and beaches where the [Allied] landing took place, was considerable. Many of these mines exploded during the war or were netted after the close of the hostilities. Others were tracked and neutralized by our minesweepers to clear the access channels and roadsteads of the ports in the English Channel. But some mines have remained, despite everything, for in this region the mines are almost never buried in the ocean bed and it is fairly common for a fisherman to haul a mine into his trawler. To intervene in such a situation, the maritime prefect of the 1st Region has under his jurisdiction the 1st GPD [Mine Defusing Group]. Thus, on 13 September 1982 at 1140, the 1st GPD received the order to neutralize a mine hauled into the trawler of a fisherman from Boulogne. At 1300 the mine defusing unit took off by helicopter from Cherbourg Maupertus. At 1420 the pilot landed the helicopter between the edge of the pier and Boulogne's piloting station. At 1631 the mine, removed from the trawler with infinite precaution, was transported to the detonating center where the 1st GPD carried out a mine destruction operation 15 meters underwater. On Thursday, 21 October 1982, on the occasion of a training session and in the presence of the local media, the GPD once more proceeded in Cherbourg with the detonating of a World War II mine. [By Rene Moirand] [Excerpts] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 p 19] 2662

SEA PATROL RESCUES--During the week of 11 to 15 October 1982, maritime patrol aircraft from Lann-Bihoue again participated in rescue operations involving leisure craft in difficulty, namely, some British people on board two sailboats, one of them southwest of Sein, the other in the Gulf of Gascony. After locating the sailboats, which, in very heavy weather, had requested assistance, the patrol aircraft were able to guide to the distressed boats merchant vessels that saved the daring sailors. During the night of 20 to 21 October 1982, in another instance, the dredgers "Pivoine" and "Azalee," on an orientation mission for students from Poulmio, at one point altered their course to assist another sailboat, this time of French origin, which had run aground near Grande Vinotiere in the Four

channel. The "Sofalo Gwen," overturned on rocks, was finally righted by a fortunate gust of wind. However, it was towed to Le Conquet by the rescue boat that had arrived from the port. This was the first rescue operation carried out by the new center of Corsen-Ouessant (the CROSSCO), which replaced CROSS-Iroise and the surveillance center of the Ouessant "sealane" previously located at the Stiff signal post. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 6 Nov 82 p 20] 2662

COMPOSITION OF POITOU SQUADRON--Affiliation: 61st Transport Squadron; 48 aircraft divided into three squadrons: 1/61 Touraine; 2/61 Franche-Comte; 3/61 Poitou. It is based at Bricy-Orleans, air base 123. The squadron includes about 40 pilots, 15 navigators and 30 mechanics. One crew includes two pilots, one mechanic, one support personnel and one navigator on tactical flights. Its missions are logistical transportation in metropolitan France, units assigned for transfers, service abroad, Dakar, Djibouti, the West Indies, Reunion; its tactical training missions include parachute drops. [Excerpts] [Paris TAM in French 29 Oct 82 p 17] 2662

MISSIONS OF ALPINE MILITARY SCHOOL--The Alpine Military School was established at Chamonix in 1932 by General Dosse. Its first commander was Captain Pourchier, who died following deportation in 1944. Closed in 1939 when war was declared, the school was reestablished in 1944 within the framework of the 27th DIA [Alpine Infantry Division]. Its commander was then Captain Flotard. The Alpine Military School has the following basic duties: Instructional mission--technical and tactical training of specialist "mountain" cadres and military and technical instruction of cadet non-commissioned officers who have volunteered to serve at the school. Its research and experimental mission includes tactical and technical experiments and the drafting of technical regulations and documents pertaining to "mountain" service. Its extramural operations mission includes training of the French military skiing team and participation in the organization of all national and international mountain activities. [Excerpts] [Paris TAM in French 29 Oct 82 p 25] 2662

CSO: 3519/131

DEFENSE CHIEF OF STAFF ON PROBLEMS OF ARMED FORCES

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 17 Nov 82 pp 662-664

[Article: "In an Interview Given to a Milan Daily--Extension of Length of Draftee Service Hypothesized by Defense Chief of Staff, General Santini"]

[Text] --Reduced length of service should have been accompanied by more intensive training; but the funds are lacking, there is a shortage of fuels and munitions, and the regions and local administrations are against the firing ranges.

--"Irreversible" consequences of the drastic "cut" of Lit 950 billion from the 1983 defense budget

--Disturbing factors of crisis among the personnel, but despite this, the political forces can and must have faith in the armed forces.

--It is inconceivable to solve the budget-cutback problem by recourse to a professional army (a professional costs six times more than a draftee).

--The present Italian commitments would require an effective conventional instrument--today it is below the "guard level"--and not autonomous atomic armament.

(INTERARMA)--The hypothesis that the length of draftee service could be revised in future, making it longer again, was expressed by General Vittorio Santini in an interview given to the Milan daily LA NOTTE (6 November), in the course of which the defense chief of staff speaks of the problems of the armed forces, related to the shortage of men and means.

Three Hundred Thousand Soldiers--"The need for about 300,000 draftee servicemen is not related to the Army alone but to the three armed forces as a whole," General Santini explained; and he continued: "This need is in line with criteria of maximum economy. Right now, the difficulties are connected mainly with two snags: excessive liberality in the policy of exemptions and discharges practiced, and the 'upstream tapping' of about 30,000 men per year for the Carabinieri, police and fire departments and other corps that should be made up of professionals only. For the future, what is already being said openly in other European countries should be considered also: the reduced flow of personnel

should be compensated for by taking action on the length of service also." The defense chief of staff then clarified that "in all armies there is also a need for 'all-around men,' because for every man that fights, other men are needed at all levels for services and support."

INTERARMA points out that with this clarification, General Santini was replying to the question of the interviewer, who, citing a statement by Deputy Zarro, wanted confirmation of the announcement that starting on 1 January, those who have defective vision (in the code: V4) would be called up also.

The Wastage of Reduced Length of Service--General Santini continued: "Furthermore, technologies do not always make the use of weapons and materiel more difficult. Sometimes the reverse is true. I do not mean by this to deny that there are complex weapons systems, but in these cases they are used predominantly by long-hitch specialists. What is more, we have some high-quality servicemen even among the young draftees, capable of using any type of modern materiel with an ease and confidence unknown to their fathers. The real problem is a different one. For the tendency toward reduction of length of service there should have been the antidote of more intensive training. In Italy, the reduction from 18 to 15 and then to 12 months has instead been accompanied by increasing difficulties in training; the results are obvious to everyone. A few days ago, the Army chief of staff, in a televised interview, pointed out that the Italian soldier fires from 70 to 300 rounds per year for rifle practice; the French soldier, from 300 to 500; the German soldier, from 1,700 to 2,000; and the English soldier, from 2,000 to 3,000. This is a very instructive fact that needs no comment."

The Trauma of the Budget Cuts--"The expenditure planned for defense in 1983," General Santini said, "is not Lit 12 trillion but Lit 11.64 trillion, with a cut of Lit 950 billion from the Lit 12.6 trillion that we had responsibly asked for. This drastic cut will have irreversible consequences, far beyond what the figures can suggest, because we will have to cut into sectors of vital importance that are already chronically short and now are beyond the breaking point. But the critical sum that made an already precarious and extremely taut balance 'jump' and that makes a further reduction in our armed forces inevitable is about Lit 400 billion. This will also raise, for consistency, the problem of revision of the tasks, which can no longer, even in prospect, be carried out in the terms in which they are now expressed."

Factors of Crisis--"There are other factors of crisis also," the defense chief of staff added: "Our personnel are bemoaning an enduring insensitivity to the problems of pay, housing, the professional problems, those of status and promotion, that beset them. Training is insufficient, there are shortages of fuels and munitions because of lack of funds. The insufferance of the regions and local administrations toward military activities makes use of the firing ranges and the few training areas problematic. I could also talk about the problems of 'comprehension' of the role of the armed forces by the political forces and the information media. But I rule out the idea that one of the causes of the crisis is our ordering based on the draft call-up (indeed, the reverse is true!)."

Draftee Army and Professional Army--"A professional serviceman costs far more than a draftee," said General Santini, "both because his pay has to be competitive with what civilian jobs offer and because of the permanent employment relationship that binds him to the state. A great many of those who make much of this problem forget that the annual cost of a professional is more than six times the cost of a conscript. Personally, I find it inconceivable that one could think of solving the tight budget situation by recourse to a professional army, which, though reduced, would cost far more than the present one! Apart from all other considerations, in any case, I agree with the choice embodied in the Constitution, which assigns defense to all citizens, in the line of a proven and noble tradition and not for mere ideological reasons."

Having Faith in the Armed Forces--To the question whether the politicians consider a professional army a potential danger to democratic and republican institutions, General Santini gave this distinct reply:

"I think that in Italy today, even those political forces that have always regarded the military with suspicion have finally come to understand that one can and should have faith in the armed forces. Only those who cultivate an archaic antimilitarism or bad-faith detractors can stubbornly continue to deny this fact."

Advantages and Disadvantages of a Professional Army--"With this understood," said the defense chief of staff, "the advantages of professional armed forces from a technical point of view are obvious: greater cohesion, 'capitalization' of training, a high degree of workability, quick reaction, immediate availability and reliability for special operations (even outside the national territory). But one must also view its disadvantages objectively: the far higher costs, the less close attachment to the reality of the country, a rise in the average age levels, difficulties of replacement, etc. We must further take account, in Italy, of the 'credibility' of a volunteer system so that it does not constitute a purely 'employment' solution, with an influx of young men coming from the economically more depressed areas and lacking a true military vocation. These considerations justify my preference for obligatory conscription, as the Constitution desires, incorporated with opportune temperings on the 'professional-army' level."

Preparation and Motivation--To the question whether he considers it more advisable to simply form corps of "professionals" (on a voluntary basis and with an indefinite time commitment) or to offer adequate economic incentives to induce the draftees to extend their service period by at least 2, 3 or 4 years, the defense chief of staff replied: "With a function complementary to the draft, both of the approaches cited by you have validity, and they are not necessarily alternatives. On the contrary, they can be integrated and permit optimal results through diversified approaches. What counts is that all military men, draftees or professionals, should be able to be well-equipped and well-trained, and therefore also feel better-motivated and have better conviction."

Impediments to National Atomic Armament--To the question whether Italy could provide itself with national atomic armament in order to remedy an insufficiency in conventional armament, the defense chief of staff replied as follows:

"First of all, I would like to make something clear. If you are relating the low effectiveness to the qualitative and quantitative situation of the means and materiel, to the training deficiencies, to the logistic and infrastructural difficulties, I agree with you. But what with the surprising proofs of reliability that they succeed in giving even in the tight circumstances in which they struggle, the men certainly do not deserve such a label. As for the question, I do not understand how, on the conceptual level, one can imagine recourse to a national nuclear force as a remedy for unsatisfactory effectiveness of the armed forces--that is, for a contingent fact due to insufficiency of resources. The creation of an autonomous nuclear force is an event of great political and strategic importance, such as to modify profoundly the role of a state, the character of its international relations, its relations with its allies. It must therefore emerge mainly from political evaluations. On the military-technical level, nuclear armament and conventional armament are not alternative subjects but rather balanced components of an overall defensive design whose purpose is 'deterrence.'

"Nuclear coverage is indispensable as is conventional defense," General Santini continued, "though Italy is assured of it within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and not by an autonomous nuclear component. France and Great Britain, for example, have chosen that route certainly not in order to 'save' or to remedy deficiencies in their instruments. It would therefore be more appropriate to ask whether it is advisable for Italy to give its deterrent force a different posture by introducing a national nuclear force.

"The Italian problem is different in many respects," the defense chief of staff clarified. "Italy has signed the nonproliferation treaty and has entrusted its nuclear coverage to the Alliance. Any eventual change of route--and therefore of our country's political and strategic role--still remains entirely to be evaluated in its implications. Even if technical difficulties were not to subsist, the first impediments would arise on the economic level because of the high costs of such an undertaking. But many other elements would also influence such a decision, which would, I repeat, be above all a political one. In the area of the specific--to which I would like to return in conclusion--our present commitments would require an effective conventional instrument, at a time when the effectiveness of our armed forces has fallen well below the 'guard' level.

"To overcome the crisis, it would be sufficient," the defense chief of staff concluded, "for defense to be assigned the level of priority that it deserves, in line with the resources available. Unfortunately, the trend confirmed for 1983 has eliminated all residual possibility of optimism. From this angle, as you see, the 'draftee armed forces' or 'professional armed forces' problem becomes an entirely marginal one."

11267

CSO: 3528/45

BRIEFS

'SAURO' CLASS SUB DELIVERED--(INTERARMA)--The submarine "Leonardo da Vinci," of 1,460 tons displacement on the surface and built in the Monfalcone shipyard of Italcantieri, was delivered (on 6 November) to the Italian Navy. It is the fourth and last twin unit of the "Sauro class." These are conventional submarines equipped with the most recent and sophisticated electronic devices. Before construction of the "Sauro" submarines, Italcantieri had built four submarines of the "Toti" class, of 530 tons. Speaking at the ceremony were the president of Italcantieri, Engineer Vittorio Fanfani, and for the Navy, Admiral Renato Fadda, vice commander of the Adriatic Department. Engineer Fanfani, speaking of collaboration with the Navy involving complex and technologically advanced units, revealed that it is still going on, with the building of the helicopter-carrier "Giuseppe Garibaldi," of 10,370 tons displacement, under construction at Monfalcone--an advanced unit with high-level qualifications for the Italian Navy and particularly well-suited for the conduct and control of naval formations and convoys. Engineer Fanfani said that the launching of the "Garibaldi" is planned for next Spring, and delivery of the unit in 1985. Italcantieri and the Italian Navy--it was said--are developing the designing and preparation of the plans for units that will be even more advanced and will have all the technical-operational innovations required for the constantly faster and more sophisticated construction of these units. [Excerpts] [Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 17 Nov 82 p 670] 11267

CSO: 3528/45

AUDITORS REPORT CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTERS IN POOR SHAPE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 82 p 48

[Article by Ann-Charlotte Samec: "Control of Defense Shelters Too Poor"]

[Text] The Civil Defense Administration has poor control of the country's defense shelters. It has, for example, no clear picture of which shelters are in bad or miserable condition. Thus it is difficult to plan today how many new shelters are needed and how many should be repaired or modernized.

The State Audit Board states this in a critical report.

But the Civil Defense Administration thinks that they are recommended in the report.

"The Civil Defense Administration must pull itself together and quickly get its computer system in order. It is not working satisfactorily, and that is why the control of the shelters is poor," says Ingemar Sedergrén, department chief of the State Audit Board.

"It is a serious situation that the Civil Defense Administration does not have a good total picture of the shelters. This makes it difficult to give the government authorities a proper picture of the shelter resources.

"Should the government today, because of a sudden war situation or a threat of war, want to know the exact situation of the shelters, the Civil Defense Administration cannot give this information."

"A Lot of Money"

"The Civil Defense Administration has received a lot of money for the repair of the defense shelters, but as long as they do not have proper supervision of them, the money cannot be effectively used," says Ingemar Sedergrén.

"The longer it takes before they obtain this supervision, the less effectively the money will be used and the more expensive the repair will be."

A few years ago the Civil Defense Administration changed to a new computer system. One has not been able to straighten it out, and the administration has therefore not been able to use it as they had planned.

Local districts handle the defense shelters and, among other things, make sure they are checked out every 10 years. The districts and the County Government Boards send continuous reports to the Civil Defense Administration in Karlstad.

And here it comes to a halt. Instead of being fed into the computers, the reports are left lying and the Civil Defense Administration cannot use important information.

Gunnar Gustafsson, director general of the Civil Defense Administration, is completely indifferent to the slaps that are passed out by the State Audit Board.

"I Am Satisfied"

"I am satisfied with the report. It gives us good grades, I think. The report says also that we have been ambitious." Gunnar Gustafsson says that the poor control of the defense shelters is a detail.

"It is a question of statistics and will have to take second place. In a tough economic situation one must concentrate on more important things, for example, defense shelters in areas where new houses are being built."

"We must also make sure that those who cannot get a satisfactory shelter can get a simpler shelter."

"We must concentrate on education, and we have at last started the protective mask supply."

DN: "Don't you agree with the criticism at all?"

"Well, of course there are shortcomings, but I have already said that it is a question of a detail, a secondary question."

DN: "You do not know how many shelters should be repaired or rebuilt?"

"No, but I know how many there are, and I have an approximate picture of the situation."

Shortcomings in the Routine

"The shortcomings in the computer routine are due to the fact that we do not have sufficient personnel and economic resources. And the Civil Defense Administration is not responsible for this. The computer system is complicated and therefore it takes a while to learn. And it has to take its time. We cannot help that."

Ingemar Segergren of the State Audit Board, on the contrary, says that there is a great hurry.

"Sweden thus has no up-to-date and complete knowledge of the defense shelters. The last inventory was taken in 1978, and since then much has happened, so it can hardly be useful. We must have a joint modernizing and upkeep plan.

"And as I said, the longer it takes, the more expensive it will become."

Footnote: There are in Sweden 5.8 million defense shelter spaces. The oldest shelters are from World War II, but half of them were built after 1960. There are "uncompleted" defense shelters in the 14 largest cities in the country, and no one knows how much it will take to complete them.

9843

CSO: 3650/62

BRIEFS

MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES TO INDONESIA--During the first seven months of this year, Sweden exported military equipment to Indonesia for 80 million kroner. It was a question of antiaircraft equipment and some smaller antisubmarine weapons. Lennart Bodstrom said this in the Swedish parliament to Oswald Soderqvist (VPK) who was upset over Sweden's having supplied weapons to the dictatorship of Indonesia which had occupied East Timor. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Dec 82 p 6] 9843

FIRST WOMEN ARMY OFFICERS--In January and February, 89 women will join the military for training as professional army officers. During the first years there are 20-40 places for training of female platoon and company officers. In March of next year the final selection will take place for the basic training which begins in June. In September, 1984, the first officer training course at the Officer Training School will begin, and in June 1986, the first female second lieutenants of the army will graduate. At the application deadline 172 women had applied. Of these 71 had the prerequisite education. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Dec 82 p 40] 9843

CSO: 3650/64

CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF ON ARMS PROCUREMENT, FINANCING

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHTE in German 17 Nov 82 pp 13-15

[Interview with Swiss Chief of General Staff Joerg Zumstein by Marcel H Keiser: "No Zero Cost Option for Army"]

[Text] The army no longer places a time limit on its planning guidelines and is basing its material buildup on 4-year segments corresponding to the sessions of the legislature. Are the military plans taking effect in 1984 sufficient to provide an adequate defense for Switzerland? General Joerg Zumstein, chief of the general staff, makes it plain in the following interview that insufficient funds could create a credibility gap.

[Question] What is the significance of the new army guidelines and the concomitant so-called "buildup measures"--first of all for the 1984-87 time frame?

[Answer] The Swiss Defense Ministry (EMD) report will provide the basis for the projected army buildup. This plan is somewhat elastic and flexible and can be updated, if necessary. We could not proceed in any different manner because there is no way we can control advances in arms technology. We can only try to keep pace. For another thing, there is little we can do about the political-military, strategic threat. It simply exists and we have to live with it. The planning goals of the overall scheme which might be compared to the construction plans of any given municipality are coordinated with specific recommendations submitted to the government and the parliament on arms programs or force structures.

[Question] What is the reason for the EMD signing off on the documents on its own while the government as yet has not?

[Answer] At this stage, the government does not need to get involved. Parliament will not start debating the agenda for the next legislative session until spring of 1984. If the army were to wait until this debate has run its course, it could not make any plans at all. Its way into the future would be a zigzag course; a stop-and-go procedure. That is something we must avoid at all costs which is why we decided to make our planning

goals public in an EMD report. We are hoping for a consensus to come out of our discussions with the military committees of parliament which is to provide the basic government guidelines in the end.

[Question] The detailed aspects are likely to cause problems and funding certainly will. Recent budget projections for 1984-1987 by the government call for average expenditures for arms and military construction of 6.6 billion Swiss francs while the planning concept cites a figure of 6.3 billion. Those two figures are not easy to reconcile.

[Answer] We, too, have some difficulty with them; but essentially they are the same figures. The differences are based on varying approaches and accounting methods. In our document, some of the items are listed under the defense material budget; but the government--and the finance ministry in particular--list them under investments. The main problem is that the government has not yet worked out its fiscal plan for the upcoming legislative session. We are still looking for binding estimates for 1987 although we were convinced that advance planning by the government would include that year as well. This failure to come up with guidelines beyond 1986, I think, is a typical reflection of the tight budget situation at the government level these days where no one likes to commit himself unless he really has to. In a way, the army is operating in a vacuum with its 4-year plan. Only 3 of those years are really covered and for 1987 we have to extrapolate. The army is not responsible for this rather unsatisfactory state of affairs.

[Question] Military circles can still hear the government saying that Swiss military expenditures have already gone down as far as they can responsibly go. But still the government may cut as much as 710 million from the budget. Is there such a thing as a zero cost option for defense ?

[Answer] We have said often enough that there is not. Aside from increased costs due to inflation, we are faced with substantial changes in technology based on the growing complexity of modern weapons systems. If we do not take account of these, we cannot have a viable defense. The zero cost option comes down to making no replacements and just waiting for materiel to wear out. The striking power of the entire establishment will then decrease rapidly with every passing year.

[Question] The army would then reach an impasse, if it could not keep pace with changes in technology over the long haul.

[Answer] The government is aware of the problem but says that as long as parliament holds on to its mandate to balance the budget so-called "symmetrical sacrifices" will have to be made across the board. As far as I am concerned, however, an exception would have to be made in the case of the army. National defense cannot be based on internal policy considerations but on an actual or assumed threat. In this light, the symmetrical sacrifice principle just does not apply to national defense. In addition, expenditures for defense and foreign policy are the only ones for which the government alone is fully responsible. There is no second or third branch to which such responsibility could be transferred in these instances.

[Question] Let us assume the cuts are made despite your warnings. Would that mean that Switzerland would drop below the military credibility threshold or that our credibility would at least be impaired ?

[Answer] That is a legitimate question. As chief of the general staff, I must do everything in my power to guard against throwing in the towel prematurely. If we should one day lose our dissuasive capability and could no longer obtain the weapons we need, we would have to come up with new solutions. That there is no way of washing a bear without getting him wet--everyone knows that. If it ever got to that point, then we would of course have to reevaluate the army's mission. But for the time being I refuse to tamper with or have anyone else tamper with the army's mission as it was set down in the 1973 report on our security policy which is still valid today. A cheap army would by definition be a "cheap" army. The government would have to sensitize parliament and the public for the national defense problems looming on the horizon.

[Question] Are our fiscal problems placing our defense concept which is made up of static and dynamic components in jeopardy ?

[Answer] No. It would be premature and wrong to tamper with a very well balanced doctrine merely because there are debates on funding. We could not simply give up our defense principles without at the same time going into the basic precepts of our entire security policy.

[Question] Some time ago, the government approved 1.192 billion Swiss francs for the purchase of the three stages of the British RAPIER guided missile for low-altitude air defense. The fact that additional credits amounting to 500 million Swiss francs are now needed will hit the government twice as hard in view of its empty coffers.

[Answer] The report to parliament had already called attention to the need for additional credits in view of increased costs and exchange rate developments. At this point, we cannot say exactly how much it will be; at the moment, we are talking about something like 400 million. Our earlier efforts to find ways of getting around foreign exchange problems proved counter-productive; I need only remind you of the first TIGER series. In this particular regard, we are simply at the mercy of international events.

[Question] In view of all these fiscal problems, would you not find a defense bond issue rather tempting ?

[Answer] No. National defense remains credible only if it is continually developed and improved. A defense bond issue would not help in this regard.

[Question] Do you wholeheartedly agree with the recommendation of the military committee of the parliament calling for a special arms program which is to create jobs as early as 1983 ? There is talk of spending 500 million Swiss francs on a substitute for the Jeep, for combat uniforms, for transmission equipment and ammunition.

[Answer] I would welcome a special weapons program. We have worked out such a program and could submit it on short notice. We have called it a pump-priming program to denote its significance for the economy. The prerequisite would be that it would only include items which are of a high priority from the point of view of military needs. Such a pump-priming program amounting to about 500 million Swiss francs would permit us to carry out an additional regular weapons program of about 1.2 billion in 1983. It would still take some government subsidies to cover possible cost overruns. The Jeep substitute would be dropped because there is no urgent need for it. But we do need to get 350,000 simple camouflage suits for those soldiers that do not have one. Otherwise, we would have to purchase old-style regular uniforms. Large quantities of transmission equipment are in fact included in the 1983 military budget but this item could easily be transferred to the special program.

[Question] According to the report, the first premise for the army buildup should be to concentrate on those areas "which have a high dissuasive potential." Can you tell me what the "dissuasive potential" of a new automatic rifle might be ?

[Answer] If you simply take the rifle as it is—as a weapon that weighs less and looks better than the 57 automatic rifle, there is nothing much dissuasive about it. But the dissuasive feature is that by the end of the century there will be such a compact, accurate weapon with high firepower in every household.

[Question] By the same token, it has been said that the arms chiefs came out against assigning a high priority to the new rifle practically without exception.

[Answer] You are right in part; in terms of assigning priorities, they have other things to worry about. But as chief of the general staff who has to cast a "visionary" eye over the big picture, I am decidedly in favor of the new 5.6 mm automatic rifle developed in Switzerland and the reasons I have for this are, I think, quite cogent. The 57 automatic rifle is slowly becoming obsolete from a technical standpoint. For another thing, it can only be overhauled two or three times—for some time our recruits have not been issued new rifles any more—and then its usefulness is at an end. The length and weight of it definitely diminish its effectiveness in certain types of operation—particularly those involving mountain and parachute troops as well as armored infantry. Now that we have come up with a rifle that is lighter and more compact and just as accurate up to 400 meters, there is to my mind every reason to go ahead with it. In addition, mass production cost of the new rifle stands at 1,200 Swiss francs each as compared to 2,000 francs for the 57 automatic rifle.

[Question] Just the same, in spite of what you say about the urgency of it, would it not be more sensible to wait for the revolutionary German G-11 ?

[Answer] That is an interesting weapon which, for that matter, I have already fired myself. But we could not procure that weapon under license prior to 1990 or the year 2000. Compared to our own 5.6 mm rifle, the tactical advantages of that weapon are not so very relevant. Target impact is not

that different and in addition, adequate aiming accuracy requires the firing of three-shot bursts which uses up more ammunition. And furthermore, the precision of the weapon does not meet our requirements—particularly in terms of non-military use. And that is a practice we must retain under all circumstances, I think, because we should not sacrifice our own defense traditions. And then I am not really happy at the thought of importing a foreign weapon to help us preserve our national pride.

[Question] The report says that armor will continue to play a dominant role on the battlefield until the year 2000. As of when will the Swiss army shopping list contain a new battle tank. Will we decide on the German LEOPARD 2 or on the American M 1 ?

[Answer] As before, we want to increase the number of tanks—not by getting rid of older models but by both raising their combat effectiveness and by purchasing new armor. The decision-making process is under way on all levels. The actual decision on a new battle tank can be reached once the arms procurement branch receives the necessary binding offers early next year. As far as the field units themselves are concerned, it would be an easy and quick decision to make.

[Question] From what I have heard, they would prefer the LEOPARD 2.

[Answer] The LEOPARD is ahead in the sense that it corresponds to the specifications we are looking for because it is armed with a 12-cm cannon while the M 1 still has a 10.5-cm cannon.

[Question] Despite your fiscal problems, would you be willing to accept the additional costs involved in production under license ?

[Answer] That is a difficult question to answer. I must also look out for the interests of the field units. They would be delighted by "buying off the rack." The government, on the other hand, has told us to produce under license. It comes down to a tradeoff—over the medium or long term we could certainly handle the additional costs. I think that participation by Swiss industry could lead to a cost-efficient solution in the long term because we would be better able to control costs domestically than in the case of a straight foreign purchase.

[Question] The report looks to the establishment of an anti-tank helicopter unit. What about Enrico Fanchini, the commanding officer of the mountain troops: has he dropped his demand for a transport helicopter without a word ?

[Answer] No, he has not. But he himself feels that the mountain troops must give the highest priority to increasing their firepower; a special study will soon come up with initial recommendations. Nonetheless, the transport helicopter issue remains urgent though not of top priority. I hope we will soon be in a position to place an order for a very small series of an aircraft that meets our needs. We want to have a few aircraft which will permit us to operate under instrument flight conditions at night, if need be and we also want to replace the missing ALOUETTE III's.

[Question] The report also calls for a "law and order" unit. Is there an expectation in Bern that the internal situation will get worse ? Can't the police handle things any more ?

[Answer] This has nothing to do with the pictures that remind us in these days of the unfortunate occurrences in Geneva of some time ago. It is really based on our evaluation of the threat. For the foreseeable future, it will no doubt be characterized by the nuclear stalemate between the power blocs--which forces one, if one wishes to stay operational, to look for possible alternatives; possible ways of getting around things, I mean. One variant which would help retrieve freedom of action would be to resort to chemical weapons and another--which we are discussing in this instance--would be covert warfare training for which is being provided by certain powers and which would be carried into the cities because this type of activity would have the greatest impact on the inhabitants. If such a threat scenario became reality, the state security apparatus, the police would immediately be overtaxed. In the sense of providing a "subsidiary law and order service," the armed forces should increasingly be placed in a position to relieve the police of certain functions--namely in operations which are not normally related to police functions. These would include area detection and tracking; protection of major installations; the closing of certain roads as well as transport functions. It would also no doubt make sense to train a part of our armed forces--perhaps only a very small part but one that should not be neglected--in anti-terrorist operations. If, for example, a major civilian or military installation is occupied, we must be able to assist the police or be able to clear up the situation on our own.

<u>Major Arms Projects</u>	<u>Cost in Millions of Swiss Francs</u>	<u>Procurement</u>			<u>Target Date</u>
		<u>Domestic</u>	<u>License</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	
New hand grenade to replace HG 43	70		x		1985
Regimental anti-tank weapon to replace Pak 58 (TOW guided missile mounted on armored personnel carrier)	500		(x)	x	1985
Night sighting device for DRAGON anti-tank missile	50		x	(x)	1984

New battle tank (advanced production engineering and first series)	800		x	x	1984/85
New battle tank (second series)	600		x		1986/87
CENTURION retrofit program	800		x		1985
Arrow ammunition (second generation)	80		x	(x)	1986
Combat effectiveness upgrading of 68 tank (includes fire control system)	400	x	x		1986
Armor-piercing projectile for armored personnel carrier M-113	30	x			1985
Artillery reinforcement for 3d Mountain Army Corps (Project pending)	open	x			open
Laser rangefinder for fire commander	55		(x)	x	1986
Anti-tank helicopter	630		(x)	x	1987
Tactical anti-aircraft radar. (TAFLIR)	200	x	x	x	1984
Auxiliary fuel tanks for MIRAGE and TIGER	85		x		1986
Light anti-aircraft guided missile (first series)	300		(x)	x	1986
Electronic reconnaissance (OMEGA)	40			x	1986
Additional credits for RAPIER anti-aircraft missile (minimum requirement; cost increase; exchange rate fluctuations)	400				1984
Main wing spar adjustment on MIRAGE	50	x			1984

New fuze for anti-tank mine 60 and/or new anti-tank mine	40 (200)		x		1985
12-cm fortress mortar (weapon and new ammunition)	40	x			1986
Radio set SE-430 (second series)	70	x			1985
(Third series)	70	x			1987
Multi-channel equipment plus en- coding supplements for integrated military telecommunications system 90/RIMUS (first series)	30	x			1984
(Second series)	200	x			1986
VHF direction-finder for elec- tronic reconnaissance	30		(x)	x	1986
Vehicles for construction of transmission lines	50		x	x	1986
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 5720 (5920)				

Options:

New automatic rifle (first series) Pilot run provided for in 1983 military budget	900	x			1987
Temperature-wind probing device for artillery (TEWISA)	30	x			1986
Artillery reconnaissance to be provided for by an unmanned missile	—		(x)	x	—
Partial rehabilitation of airborne communications	25			x	1984
Infrared line scanner for MIRAGE	30		(x)	x	1986

Protected gun positions	35	x			1985
Arms for fortifications. Project not yet defined. Remodeling urgently needed. Matter under consideration.	open	x	x	x	open

9478
CSO: 3620/117

GENERAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

COST OF ARIANE DELAY--Edouard Bonnefous (Democratic Left deputy from Yvelines) questioned the government on the "cost of the Ariane [space] program" and its profitability. The chairman of the Finance Committee in the Senate, in an oral question, did not hide his concern at the failure of the launch of 23 May 1982 and its consequences. "This failure," Jean-Pierre Chevenement, minister of state for research and industry, answered, "resulted in a year's delay, that is, a loss of Fr 240 million. This cost does not exceed the margin anticipated. The cost of the attempted launch of 10 September 1982 was Fr 70 million, covering the loss of the launcher and the two satellites. The resulting delay, estimated at 5 months' time, will cost Fr 100 million for all participating countries." Regarding the cost of future programs, according to Jean-Pierre Chevenement this is underwritten by France "to the tune of Fr 1.45 billion." [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 15 Nov 82 p 10] 2662

CSO: 3519/131

END